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Part I
Dissertation Overview

Dissertation Overview
This dissertation consists of three essays in the field of Applied Macroeconomics. The
first two essays analyze the transmission of tax changes empirically and theoretically. The
third essay explores the effect of exchange rates on tourism in Switzerland.
The first essay is joint work with Christoph Winter. In this essay, we demonstrate
that tax changes affect financial market conditions in the data. For this purpose, we
conduct a VAR analysis using the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative record of exogenous
tax changes in the US. We find that a tax increase drives up risk premia for corporate
bonds issued by financial and non-financial firms. In a next step, we argue that balance
sheet conditions of financial intermediaries act as a channel for the transmission of tax
changes to financial markets. In line with the recent literature on intermediary asset
pricing, we empirically document that risk premia depend on intermediaries’ balance
sheet conditions, which are also affected by taxes. Strikingly, our results are not driven
by tax acts targeting the financial sector. This implies that any tax change can have
substantial effects on financial market conditions, which in turn may influence its overall
impact on real economic activity.
The second essay, which is also joint work with Christoph Winter, is based on the fact
that the previous literature finds significant empirical tax multipliers for real economic
activity. The effects are especially large for durables purchases and investment. In this
essay, we show that a model with standard tax distortions is not able to explain the
large empirical impact of taxes on these two variables. We then quantify the additional
investment wedges needed in an augmented RBC model in order to match the size of
the empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases and investment. Our results have
important implications for the modeling of the transmission of tax changes. Based on our
findings, we conclude that the right model should allow for separate durables and capital
investment wedges, which should both be positively affected by tax changes. As a further
contribution, we discuss possible microfoundations for this type of wedges, and we argue
that financial frictions are obvious candidates. To the extent that this is the case, our
results provide useful guidance for the construction of models with financial frictions.
In the third essay, I estimate exchange rate elasticities for tourism in Switzerland.
For this purpose, I develop a new estimation approach that can also be applied to other
countries. My identification strategy is based on effective exchange rates, which in turn
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are determined by the relative share of tourists from different countries of origin. Due
to regional variation in these shares, the tourism sector of each canton in Switzerland
is exposed to a different basket of bilateral exchange rates. This allows me to estimate
the effect of exchange rates on tourism in a panel error correction model. I find long-run
exchange rate elasticities for arrivals, overnight stays, bed and room occupancy rates, and
revenues per available room between 0.47 and 1.54, with an adjustment speed that lies
between 30 and 56 percent. My results are highly robust to different measures of my
explanatory variables and to a wide range of alternative specifications.
The common component of all three essays is their relevance for policy making. The
first essay demonstrates that it is crucial to take into account the reaction of financial
markets when assessing the consequences of tax changes. This has been particularly
important during the recent financial crisis, which originated in financial markets. Fiscal
policy, and especially tax changes, were a widely-used instrument in the mitigation of
the adverse effects of the crisis. Our results suggest that tax changes themselves can spill
over to financial market conditions, which consequently affect real economic activity. This
additional channel increases the potential impact of taxes. However, it also illustrates the
complexity of the mechanisms at work. The results from the second essay demonstrate
that this spillover has direct consequences for the modeling of the transmission of tax
changes. Specifically, conventional models – which often serve as a basis in political
decision making – need to be augmented by additional investment frictions. Only then
are they able to successfully predict the impact of taxes on the economy, and only then
can they provide reliable advice for policy makers.
Whereas the first two essays focus on taxation, the third essay analyzes the impact
of exchange rates on tourism. Especially in Switzerland, this has been a highly discussed
topic recently. As a safe haven currency, the Swiss franc has experienced a strong appreci-
ation during and after the Great Recession. My findings suggest that the tourism sectors
in different Swiss cantons are able to reduce the negative impact of this appreciation by
targeting tourists from different countries of origin. However, there is also a large common
component that drives the effective exchange rates of all cantons. Therefore, additional
policies that address the problem on a more aggregate level are necessary in order to
combat the adverse effects of the strong Swiss franc on tourism.
The results from all three essays demonstrate that the effects of public policies can
be diverse and are not necessarily straightforward. There are direct as well as indirect
channels, and the impact may vary across different geographical regions. Policy makers
should take all of these aspects into account when making their decisions.
Part II
Research Papers

1 Do Tax Changes Affect Credit Markets and
Financial Frictions? Evidence from Credit
Spreads
Joint with Christoph Winter
1.1 Introduction
The general topic of the first two papers in this thesis is the transmission of tax changes.
Specifically, we use two different, complementary approaches to show that taxes affect
investment wedges caused by financial frictions, which in turn have an impact on real
economic activity. In the present paper, we analyze this question from an empirical point
of view, whereas in the second paper, we take a theoretical approach.
Our empirical analysis is motivated by the recent financial crisis. The widespread view
is that the crisis originated in financial markets. Moreover, fiscal policy, and in particular
tax changes, played a decisive role in the combat of the adverse effects of the crisis on
the real economy. What if financial market conditions are themselves influenced by fiscal
policy changes? And if so, what are the effects of tax policy changes on financial market
conditions and on credit supply?
In this paper, we show that there is indeed a tight connection between tax policy
changes and financial markets. Using VARs, we document that exogenous tax changes
have a sizeable impact on corporate bond spreads. We identify exogenous tax changes in
the US for the post-World War II period using the narrative account by Romer and Romer
(2010). In order to avoid anticipation effects, we focus on unanticipated tax changes, in
the spirit of Mertens and Ravn (2012).
We find that an increase in tax liabilities by one percent of GDP raises corporate
bond spreads by between one and two percentage points, depending on the measure used.
Interestingly, when we distinguish between corporate and personal income tax adjustments
using information from Mertens and Ravn (2013), we find that corporate bond spreads
respond to both types of tax changes. This finding rules out that credit spreads only
respond to tax changes because firms alter their mix of equity and debt financing in
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order to avoid higher corporate income taxes. Moreover, since the Romer and Romer
(2010) narrative record ends in 2006, and therefore does not include the Great Recession,
our results imply that even in ‘normal’ times, tax liability changes and financial market
conditions are linked.
We know from the previous literature that an increase in tax liabilities has large
contractionary effects on real economic activity, in particular on GDP and investment, see
e.g. Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011, 2012, 2013), and most recently
Ramey (2015). Since corporate bond spreads are negatively correlated with real economic
activity (see e.g. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 2012), the response of corporate bond spreads to
an increase in tax liability changes could simply be the by-product of the adverse response
of various economic measures to an increase in taxes.1 To address this concern, we use
the excess bond premia of financial and non-financial corporate firms, as constructed by
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011, 2012). Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011, 2012) decompose
the spread between the yields of corporate bonds and Treasuries of the same maturity and
payment structure into two components: one that captures the countercyclical movements
in expected default rates and another component measuring the procyclical variations
between the expected default risk and the credit spread. This latter component is what
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011, 2012) call the excess bond premium. By construction, the
excess bond premium measures the willingness of the market to accept default risk of
corporate firms, i.e. the effective risk aversion.
Recent empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that financial intermediaries are
central for understanding the behavior of corporate bond spreads (see e.g. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin 2001). In turn, the risk appetite of financial intermediaries seems
to be determined by their balance sheet conditions (see e.g. the theoretical models by He
and Krishnamurthy 2013 and Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014).2 Adrian, Moench, and
Shin (2010), Adrian and Shin (2010a), and Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) provide empiri-
cal evidence on the link between risk premia and intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions.
The finding from this strand of literature regarding the link between intermediaries’ bal-
ance sheet conditions, their effective risk aversion and excess bond premia has important
consequences for our analysis, since it implies that tax changes that have an impact on
excess bond premia should also affect measures of the stance of intermediaries’ balance
sheets, such as their return on assets.
We evaluate this hypothesis using the ‘dummy variable approach’ by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), who analyze the impact
1As Philippon (2009) makes clear, even in the absence of financial frictions, corporate bond spreads
react to changes in expected default risk.
2Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) survey the theoretical literature.
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of government spending on economic activity. We use this approach to disentangle the
overall effect of taxes into the contribution of specific tax acts. This allows us to analyze
whether financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions respond to the same tax acts
as excess bond premia. Moreover, using detailed information about each tax act, we can
also determine why the financial intermediaries’ return on assets (and therefore excess
bond premia) react after a specific tax act.
We find that intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions and excess bond premia simul-
taneously respond to two tax acts, namely to the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 and
to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. The 1986
TRA affects intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions because it leads to an increase in
the fraction of non-performing loans. We relate this increase to the adverse effects of the
1986 TRA on capital-intensive industries such as mining (see Cutler 1988).
On the other hand, the 2003 JGTRRA has a major impact on personal income taxes,
in particular on the taxation of dividends and capital gains. In line with a large literature
that finds that changes in dividend/capital gain taxes have an impact on stock prices
(see Sialm 2009), we document that the 2003 JGTRRA has a significant effect on equity
valuations.3 Corporate equity is the second largest asset in balance sheets of the financial
industry. We therefore conclude that the 2003 JGTRRA affects intermediaries’ balance
sheet conditions via changes in stock prices. Indeed, we find that the overall impact of
personal income tax changes on equity valuations, the intermediaries’ return on assets,
and excess bond premia is entirely driven by the 2003 JGTRRA.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the rise in excess bond premia after an increase
in tax liabilities indicates strains in the financial sector, which might have general impli-
cations for the supply of credit, both through the corporate bond market and through the
banking sector in general.
Our paper therefore contributes to the growing literature that documents possible link-
ages between fiscal policy and financial market conditions, see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Melina and Villa (2014), Canzoneri et al. (2015), Ji
and Qian (2015), and Röhrs and Winter (2015). The focus of most of these papers is on
government spending multipliers (see Carrillo and Poilly 2013, Melina and Villa 2014, and
Canzoneri et al. 2015) or on government debt (see Röhrs and Winter 2015). Moreover,
with the exception of Melina and Villa (2014) and Ji and Qian (2015), none of these
papers empirically documents that fiscal policy and financial markets are linked.
Our work is also related to several other strands of literature. First, we contribute to
the literature that analyzes the consequences of tax liability changes, see the survey by
Ramey (2015). So far, the focus of the previous papers has been exclusively on the real
3See also Auerbach and Hassett (2005, 2006) for related evidence.
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part of the economy. Our results suggest that tax changes also have an impact on the
financial sector.
Second, our findings are also relevant for the question of whether the contractionary
effects of tax increases are determined on the ‘supply’ or on the ‘demand’ side of the
economy. By showing that credit supply conditions are important, our evidence points
to the relevance of supply side conditions. In macro models with financial frictions,
such as the financial accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), and Hall (2011), a tightening of these frictions adversely affects credit supply, with
substantial consequences for aggregate economic variables.4 Our results may therefore
help to explain the large contractionary responses observed after a tax increase.
Third, the results in our paper contribute to the literature that is interested in un-
derstanding the consequences of prominent tax acts, such as the 1986 TRA and the 2003
JGTRRA, see e.g. Cutler (1988), Poterba (1992), or Auerbach and Hassett (2005, 2006).
We document new channels through which these tax acts affect the US economy, which
have not been considered by the previous literature.
Fourth, we contribute to the literature that analyzes the importance of financial inter-
mediaries and their balance sheet conditions for economic activity in general and, more
specifically, for asset pricing, see e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), He and Krishnamurthy
(2013), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). We show that intermediaries’ balance
sheet conditions matter for the transmission of tax changes, even if these tax changes do
not directly target the financial sector.
And last but not least, by documenting that tax changes can lead to large, albeit
infrequent, deviations of corporate bond prices relative to the expected default risk, we
contribute to the literature that attempts to explain the ‘corporate bond puzzle’ (see e.g.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe our
data for tax changes and excess bond premia. In Section 1.3, we discuss our estimation
strategy. The responses of excess bond premia to tax changes are shown in Section 1.4. In
Section 1.5, we argue that financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions are important
for understanding the behavior of excess bond premia. In Section 1.6, we analyze whether
tax changes also have an impact on measures of the condition of intermediaries’ balance
sheets. For this purpose, we take a more disaggregate view and analyze the impact of
personal and corporate income tax changes separately. Moreover, we also disentangle the
impact of specific tax acts. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
4See Quadrini (2011) for a recent survey.
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1.2 Data: Tax Changes and Excess Bond Premia
This paper documents a novel link between tax changes and credit spreads. In this section,
we describe how changes in tax liabilities and excess bond premia are measured.
1.2.1 Identification of Exogenous Tax Shocks:
The Romer and Romer (2010) Narrative Approach
In order to identify the impact of discretionary tax changes, we make use of the Romer and
Romer (2010) narrative record of federal tax changes in the US between 1945 and 2007.
Romer and Romer (2010) classify each tax act according to four categories of motivation:
spending-driven (e.g. due to war), countercyclical, deficit-driven (to reduce inherited bud-
get deficits), and to raise long-run growth (e.g. improve incentives, reduce inefficiencies).
They argue that spending-driven and countercyclical tax changes are endogenous because
they are correlated with other forces affecting output in the short run. Tax events that
belong to the other two categories, on the other hand, can be seen as exogenous, since
they are not motivated by current or prospective short-run economic conditions. Using
this classification, Romer and Romer (2010) construct a quarterly dataset of exogenous
tax changes.5 The size of each tax change is defined as its impact on annual tax liabilities
in percent of current GDP. The dataset contains 54 exogenous tax liability changes that
are the result of 35 tax acts.
We only use those tax liability changes that are ‘unanticipated’. We will discuss the
reason for this in greater detail in the following paragraph.
Avoiding anticipation effects. When looking at tax changes, it is important to be
aware of anticipation effects. This has, among others, been pointed out by Mertens and
Ravn (2012), Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012), and Yang (2007). In our context, the
issue of anticipation effects is even more pressing, since we work with market-determined
interest rates, which can react instantaneously to news about future tax changes.
Therefore, we only use the exogenous tax changes in the Romer and Romer (2010)
dataset that were ‘unanticipated’. Our definition is inspired by Mertens and Ravn (2012),
who classify a tax change as unanticipated if there are no more than 90 days between the
announcement and implementation date (where the announcement date is the day on
which the tax became law, i.e. when it was signed). For our purpose, we are even stricter
and treat a tax change only as unanticipated if the implementation and announcement
5See also their companion paper, i.e. Romer and Romer (2009).
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date are less than 30 days apart.6 As a robustness check, we also create a time series that
follows the Mertens and Ravn (2012) definition. It turns out that our results are robust
to different definitions of unanticipated tax acts.
In that context, it is important to note that we use a slightly different timing conven-
tion than Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and Ravn (2012). Specifically, Romer
and Romer (2010) assign a tax change that takes place in the second half of a quarter to
the following quarter. As we are dealing with interest rates, which are expected to react
even within the same day, we assign every tax change to the quarter it actually happened
in.7
As a result of these adjustments, our dataset contains 21 unanticipated tax liability
changes that derive from 21 different tax events. Exact details about the timing, the size,
and the categorization of every tax change are given in Tables 1.A.1 and 1.A.2 in the
Appendix. Figure 1.A.1 presents the data.
Finally, we test whether there are signs that our series of unanticipated tax events was
nevertheless anticipated by the market. For this purpose, we construct the yield spread
between Treasuries and municipality bonds, using data from Leeper, Richter, and Walker
(2012). Treasuries are subject to federal income taxation, whereas municipality bonds
are not. The spread between the two bonds should therefore reflect market expectations
of the present value of tax changes over the maturity of the bond. If tax changes were
anticipated, we should therefore find that their incidence can be predicted by the munic-
ipality bond spread. However, this is not the case. Specifically, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the municipality spread does not Granger cause our narrative series of
unanticipated tax shocks.
1.2.2 Excess Bond Premia: EBP and FBP
Data on excess bond premia are taken from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) for financial
firms and from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) for non-financial firms.8 Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2011, 2012) construct individual corporate bond spreads for non-financial and
for financial firms using micro-level data for a large sample of US firms. For each firm, the
spread is defined as the difference in the yield of senior, unsecured bonds and a synthetic
6Note that for the announcement date, we have the exact day, whereas for the implementation date
we only know the month. Assuming that the implementation always happened at the beginning of the
month, we also count those tax acts as ‘unanticipated’ for which the implementation month is in the
month after the announcement date. In a robustness check, we only count those tax acts for which the
announcement month and the implementation month are the same. Reassuringly, this does not change
our results.
7In Section 1.6, we distinguish between personal and corporate tax changes. For this purpose, we use
the dataset by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and therefore follow their timing convention.
8We thank the authors for making their data publicly available.
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risk-free asset. The synthetic risk-free asset is constructed such that its cash flows exactly
match the payment structure of the corresponding corporate bond.
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011, 2012) then decompose the spread for each firm into a
component that captures the countercyclical movements in default risk and a procyclical
residual, which measures the willingness of the market to accept default risk. This latter
component is labeled as excess bond premium. In the following, we denote the average
excess bond premium for non-financial firms as EBP and the average excess bond premium
for financial firms as FBP. EBP is available from 1973Q1 onwards. The time series for
FBP starts in 1985Q1.
Relative to other corporate bond spreads that are commonly used in the literature,
such as the spread between yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries, the excess
bond premia have two key advantages. First, they are constructed using micro-level data,
whereas other corporate bond spreads are typically based on aggregate data only. The
aggregate approach makes it impossible to compare the payment structure, maturity etc.
of the financial instruments. EBP and FBP, on the other hand, are not subject to this
maturity mismatch.
The second key advantage is that the excess bond premia can be interpreted as evidence
for the existence of ‘financial frictions’. As noted by Philippon (2009), even in the absence
of financial frictions (i.e. in a world in which the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds), the
prices of corporate bonds, and therefore corporate bond spreads, depend on default risk
(i.e. the amount of corporate debt).9 The high predictive power of excess bond premia, in
particular of EBP, for real economic activity can be interpreted as further evidence for the
fact that excess bond premia signal the strength of ‘financial disruptions’, see Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012). In Section 1.5, we will elaborate more on the link between excess
bond premia and financial frictions.
1.3 Estimation
Before we proceed to our results, we discuss our estimation procedure in this section.
Baseline VAR. Following Favero and Giavazzi (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2011,
2012), and Cloyne (2013), we estimate the following reduced-form VAR:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
Bjxt−j +D + Et+ ut (1.1)
9According to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the value of a firm is independent of the capital struc-
ture, but not the price of corporate bonds (see Modigliani and Miller 1958).
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where yt is the vector of endogenous variables, and the exogenous variable xt is given
by ∆taxt, the narrative account for the exogenous, unanticipated tax liability changes in
quarter t, relative to GDP in the same quarter. In the exogenous part of the VAR, we
also include a constant D and a linear time trend with coefficient matrix E.
Using our reduced-form VAR, we can compute the dynamic multipliers, i.e. the re-
sponses of the endogenous variables to exogenous tax liability changes. Following Lütke-
pohl (2006), Chapter 10, we rewrite the reduced form as:
A(L)yt = B(L)xt + ut
using the following definitions: A(L) := IK −A1L− ...−ApLp and B(L) := B0 +B1L+
...+BsL
s. The final form of the system is then given by
yt = D(L)xt + A(L)
−1ut
where D(L) := A(L)−1B(L) is the dynamic multiplier.
We estimate the system given in Specification (1.1) using quarterly data. The vector yt
consists of the logarithm of GDP, nondurables consumption (including services), durables
consumption and private investment. We divide all variables by their respective deflator
and by population. In addition, we also include the logarithm of hours worked and
the ratio of federal tax revenues/GDP. Later, we will augment the system with additional
endogenous variables, such as e.g. measures of excess bond premia. A detailed description
of all variables is provided in Table 1.A.3 in the Appendix.
Note that the concept of exogeneity imposed by Romer and Romer (2010) for the selec-
tion of tax liability changes does not necessarily correspond to the definition of exogeneity
applied in Specification (1.1). The econometric definition of exogeneity requires that past
changes of observable variables have no predictive power for tax changes. An additional
requirement is that tax changes should not contemporaneously respond to other variables.
The first assumption can be formally tested. Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and
Ravn (2012) analyze whether observable variables have predictive power for tax liability
changes and conclude that there is no strong evidence for predictability. The second re-
quirement is untestable. However, as noted by Mertens and Ravn (2011), "legislative lags
make it very likely that contemporaneous causality runs from changes in tax legislation
to observables and not vice versa" (page 29).
Also note that the results from Specification (1.1) should be interpreted as the average
effect of exogenous tax changes. In Section 1.6, we will decompose this aggregate effect
into the effects of corporate and personal income tax changes using information from
Mertens and Ravn (2013). In addition, we will adopt the ‘dummy variable approach’
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applied by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) to
separate the impact of specific tax acts. Specifically, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) use narrative measures as exogenous variables
in order to analyze government spending shocks, see also Ramey (2011). With this strand
of literature, we share the approach to treat the narrative measure directly as the shock
of interest, as in Specification (1.1).
Note that Specification (1.1) is just the reduced form, from which the structural form
(which includes the instantaneous coefficients between the endogenous variables, see e.g.
Lütkepohl 2006) cannot be identified without further assumptions.
Instead of using the narrative measure directly, there is a prominent alternative ap-
proach, which was developed by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013).
Here, narrative measures are used as instrumental variables only, and not directly as the
shocks of interest. An advantage of their approach is that the structural coefficients can
be identified. However, estimating Specification (1.1) has the advantage that – in the
language of the program evaluation literature – the average treatment effect is correctly
identified, whereas an instrumental variables estimation only delivers the local average
treatment effect. This is a problem if there is heterogeneity in the treatment effects, see
Stock and Watson (2008). Given the host of tax instruments, heterogeneous treatment
effects are likely. We therefore conclude that for our purposes, the estimation of the
reduced form is more suitable.10
Next, we will briefly comment on our selection of p and s, the number of lags for the
endogenous and for the exogenous variables respectively.
Determination of p and s. The lag length p determines the dynamics of the en-
dogenous variables. We set p = 3, as suggested by the Akaike information criterion. Our
results are robust to a longer lag structure.
The number of lags of the exogenous variable s determines the number of periods
during which a narrative tax shock ∆taxt affects the system of endogenous variables.
Ideally, we would like to estimate an infinitely distributed lag model to measure the impact
of exogenous tax shocks, see e.g. Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013). That is, we
would like to set s to a very large number. However, there is a trade-off between a long lag
structure and saving degrees of freedom, in particular in small samples. Following Romer
and Romer (2010), many authors have set s = 12, see e.g. Mertens and Ravn (2011,
2012) and Cloyne (2013). In contrast to us, these authors do not incorporate the average
10Another issue with the instrumental variable approach is that tax narratives have been shown to be
weak instruments, see e.g. Hebous and Zimmermann (2015) and Ramey (2015). Ramey (2015) argues
that weak instruments lead to a downward bias, implying that the ‘true’ tax multipliers might be even
larger. The impact of weak instruments in empirical macroeconomics more generally are analyzed by
Montiel Olea, Stock, and Watson (2012) and by Hebous and Zimmermann (2015).
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tax rate (i.e. tax revenues/GDP) as an endogenous variable. This is done by Favero and
Giavazzi (2012), who set s = 0, i.e. they only consider contemporaneous values of ∆taxt.
We depart from Favero and Giavazzi (2012) and set s = 1, for the following reason.
The narrative record of ∆taxt measures changes in tax liabilities, whereas in the data,
we observe changes in tax revenues. We would expect that, for administrative reasons, it
takes time before a tax liability change shows up as a change in tax revenues. This time
lag is captured by s, among other things.
In Figure 1.A.2, we compare the impulse responses of tax revenues/GDP for s = 0
and s = 1. For s = 0, we observe only a small initial response of tax revenues/GDP to an
exogenous increase in tax liabilities by one percent of GDP. If we set s = 1, the response
becomes hump-shaped with a peak in the first quarter following the tax increase. Since
the response at the peak is much larger than on impact, this suggests that there is a time
lag of one quarter until the increase in tax liabilities translates into higher tax revenues.
This is in line with Perotti (2012), who also argues that it takes time until tax revenues
react after a tax change.
The shape of the impulse response of tax revenues/GDP remains constant for all s ≥ 1.
We therefore use s = 1 in our estimation procedure. We would like to stress that all our
results are also robust to a longer lag structure for ∆taxt.
Correcting for measurement error. As Figure 1.A.2 makes evident, a narrative
shock ∆taxt that increases tax liabilites by one percent of GDP does not change tax
revenues/GDP one-to-one. Without further corrections, our results would therefore be
subject to an attenuation bias.11 Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013),
and most recently Hebous and Zimmermann (2015) all argue that narrative series are
likely to suffer from severe measurement problems.12
Our procedure to correct for the resulting bias is inspired by Stock and Watson (2012)
and by Mertens and Ravn (2013). More precisely, we normalize the narrative tax liability
changes such that a one unit positive shock (i.e an increase in tax liabilities by one percent
of GDP) increases tax revenues/GDP by one percent at the peak.13
11Mertens and Ravn (2013) discuss several reasons why narrative shocks could be misreported. Nar-
rative measures may for example be censored because large innovations are more likely to be measured.
In addition, the narrative record may misreport exogenous, unanticipated tax changes as either endoge-
nous or anticipated. Measurement error could also occur because the size of the innovations ∆taxt is
mismeasured, e.g. because of wrong scaling. ∆taxt is computed using available projections of changes
in tax liabilities. These projections assume that the tax base remains constant following a tax change.
Clearly, this is not the case, since GDP, and therefore the tax base, decline following a tax increase.
12Interestingly, Hebous and Zimmermann (2015) show that there is a close connection between what
we call ‘measurement problems’ and the fact that narratives tend to be weak instruments, as outlined in
Footnote 10.
13Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) normalize tax shocks according to the
response of the endogenous variable on impact. Due to the difference between tax liabilities and tax
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In the following, we will refer to the specification described above as our baseline VAR.
The effects of a positive tax shock on the endogenous variables are standard and confirm
the findings from the previous literature using the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative
identification. The impulse responses are presented in Figure 1.A.3.14
1.4 The Impact of Tax Changes on Excess Bond Premia
In this section, we demonstrate that tax liability changes have an impact on excess bond
premia.
Technically, we proceed as follows. We use Specification (1.1) and augment it by either
EBP or FBP. The results are shown Figure 1.A.4. A rise in tax liabilities by one percent of
GDP increases excess bond premia by between 0.8 and 1.8 percentage points, depending
on whether we consider FBP or EBP. Apart from the difference in the level, which may
be due to the fact that the time series of the two excess bond premia do not have the
same length, the shape of the responses for EBP and FBP is almost identical.
In this paper, we focus on excess bond premia. However, we would have also found a
significant response had we used other, more conventional corporate bond spreads, such
as the spread between yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries or the spread
between BAA-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries. See also Ji and Qian (2015), who
document an impact of tax liability changes on bank spreads.
So far, we have documented that tax changes affect excess bond premia for both non-
financial and financial firms. In the remainder of this paper, we want to understand
why taxes have an impact on these spreads. For this purpose, we will first identify the
determinants of excess bond premia in theory. Specifically, we will document that balance
sheet conditions of financial intermediaries are important drivers of excess bond premia.
In a second step, we will then show that tax changes that drive excess bond premia also
affect intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions empirically.
revenues and the associated time lag discussed above, we argue that our normalization procedure leads to
a better assessment of the bias. Normalizing according to the response of tax revenues/GDP on impact
would result in even larger multipliers. More precisely, we normalize by multiplying all elements of D(L)
by 1
btr1
, where btr1 is the coefficient of B1 that is estimated in the equation for tax revenues/GDP one
quarter after the tax shock hits. Here, we implicitly assume that tax revenues/GDP peak in the quarter
after the tax shock occurred, in line with our empirical results displayed in Figure 1.A.2.
14We use asymptotic standard errors with a small-sample correction. Bootstrapping standard errors
with 10’000 replications as in Mertens and Ravn (2011) leads to identical results.
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1.5 Financial Frictions, Financial Intermediaries, and
Corporate Bond Spreads: Evidence from Theory
In this section, we explore the theoretical determinants of excess bond premia. We start
our analysis by looking at their precise meaning. By construction, the excess bond pre-
mium measures the component of corporate bond spreads that cannot be explained by the
default risk of the borrower, see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011, 2012). In other words, the
excess bond premium measures the risk premium that the investor requires for holding
corporate bonds (see Adrian, Moench, and Shin 2010 for more empirical evidence on the
relationship between the risk premium and excess bond premia). Therefore, our finding
that tax changes affect excess bond premia implies that taxes also have an effect on the
willingness of investors to accept the risk associated with corporate bonds. This begs the
question of who invests in corporate bonds.
The importance of financial intermediaries for understanding corporate
bond prices. Recent research suggests that corporate bonds are priced by financial
intermediaries. There is a large empirical literature that studies the level and the vari-
ations of corporate bond spreads, concluding that spreads appear to be too high to be
explained by a household pricing kernel (see e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Mar-
tin 2001). Consequently, He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014), among others, assume that corporate bonds are priced by financial intermedi-
aries.15 Other models of financial intermediation also assume that savers, or households,
cannot buy assets directly, see e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
With respect to corporate bonds, the assumption that they are almost exclusively
held by financial intermediaries is also borne out by the data. According to the 2012 Flow
of Funds, the personal sector only owned 2326 billion US dollars (USD) of corporate
or foreign bonds (see Table L.10), compared to 7579 billion USD that were held by
financial intermediaries (see Table L.107).16 The picture looks very different for stocks (i.e.
corporate equity). Here, the personal sector directly owned 9771 billion USD, whereas
financial firms held 12514 billion USD in corporate equity. In sum, this suggests that the
fraction of risky assets in the hand of households depends on the asset type.
Based on these findings, we assume that households do not matter for the pricing
of corporate bonds, but that they have an impact on the price of stocks. While this
distinction does not matter for our analysis in this section, it will become important later,
15See also Xiong (2001). Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) survey the literature.
16The personal sector consists of households, non-profit organizations and non-financial, non-corporate
businesses.
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when we argue that changes in personal income taxes, in particular in dividend/capital
gain taxes, affect stock prices. Obviously, personal income tax adjustments can affect
equity valuations only if the personal sector directly owns corporate equity.17
The link between excess bond premia and financial intermediaries’ balance
sheet conditions. A common feature of models in which financial intermediaries price
assets is that their willingness to hold (risky) assets is linked to their net worth position.
This link typically arises because there is an agency problem between intermediaries and
households, who are the ultimate suppliers of funds. While the specific details differ across
models, a common assumption that is shared by many of them is that there is moral hazard
by the intermediary, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). As a result, households require
that the intermediary has a sufficient stake in the business in order to prevent shirking.
Suppose now that intermediaries’ net worth is subject to a negative shock. Then, the
incentive compatibility constraint, which prevents intermediaries from shirking, becomes
binding. A binding incentive compatibility constraint might then imply, as in He and
Krishnamurthy (2013), that intermediaries (or ‘specialists’) have to hold more risky assets,
since they are the only ones who can directly acquire them. In He and Krishnamurthy
(2013), specialists are risk-averse. As a consequence, they are only willing to hold a larger
share of risky assets if they get compensated in the form of a higher risk premium.
Using a different approach, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) instead generate varia-
tions in the risk premium without assuming risk-aversion on the side of specialists. In their
model, specialists display risk-averse behavior in the aggregate because their investment
opportunities negatively comove with their wealth.
Evidence in support of these theories is provided by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010),
Adrian and Shin (2010a), Adrian and Shin (2010b), and Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012),
who show that financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions are important for their
effective risk-bearing capacities and therefore also for asset prices in general.
In sum, this strand of literature suggests that shocks to intermediaries’ net worth are
an important determinant of observed variations in the excess bond premium. Indeed,
we will later document that those tax events that are key for explaining the response of
excess bond premia also affect the health of intermediaries’ balance sheets.
As a measure of financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions, we will use their
return on assets. Our choice is in part motivated by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
who document a negative correlation between the return on assets of financial firms and
EBP, the excess bond premium of corporate bonds issued by non-financial firms. If
intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions are important for explaining the link between
17As we will argue later, there is ample empirical evidence for the fact that dividend/capital gain tax
adjustments indeed have an impact on equity valuations.
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tax adjustments and excess bond premia, we should therefore observe that the same tax
changes that affect excess bond premia also have an impact on the return on assets. In
the next section, we will show that this is indeed the case.
Before we analyze the relationship between tax changes, excess bond premia and
intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions in greater detail, we will discuss a few alternative
explanations for the link between tax adjustments and risk premia.
Alternative explanations for the link between tax changes and corporate
bond spreads. In addition to the balance sheet channel mentioned above, there might
be alternative explanations for the link between tax liability changes and excess bond
premia. One possibility is that variations in taxes alter the total amount of public debt
held by the private sector. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show that lower
public debt/GDP ratios are associated with higher corporate bond spreads, a finding that
they attribute to the special role that government bonds play as a liquid and safe asset.
As we will explain later, the response of excess bond premia is driven by only a few
tax events. We have conducted tests to check whether any of these tax acts leads to a
significant response in public debt held by private households, as a fraction of GDP. Our
preliminary findings suggest that this is not the case.18
It could of course be that corporate bond spreads change because there are other
sources that affect the supply of safe and liquid assets (i.e. changes in the supply of money,
as mentioned by Nagel 2014). Alternatively, it is also possible that there are changes in
the demand for safe and risky assets (i.e. an increase in uncertainty). However, note that
factors that influence corporate bond spreads would have to comove with tax changes
in order to account for the relationship between taxes and excess bond premia that we
documented above. A priori, it is not clear why this should be the case.
We therefore conclude that there might be alternative ways through which tax changes
could potentially affect excess bond premia, other than through intermediaries’ balance
sheet conditions. We leave it to future research to disentangle the quantitative importance
of the various channels. Our contribution is to document that financial intermediaries’
balance sheets respond to the same tax events that also drive the response of excess bond
premia, a finding that is independent of the potential coexistence of other channels.
18Our results are independent of whether we incorporate public debt/GDP or the log of real public debt
in per-capita terms, divided by the GDP deflator. Moreover, our findings are also robust to measuring
public debt at face value or at market prices.
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1.6 The Impact of Tax Changes on Financial Frictions,
Financial Intermediaries, and Excess Bond Premia:
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we empirically analyze the link between tax changes and corporate bond
spreads in greater detail. In line with the theoretical arguments from the previous section,
we document that those tax acts that affect corporate bond spreads also have an impact
on balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries.
Moreover, our findings allow us to pinpoint exactly through which channel tax changes
affect balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries. Given that there are many
determinants that influence balance sheets of the financial sector, our previous assumption
that all tax changes are identical with respect to the size of their effects and that their
dynamics can be estimated using the same system appears to be overly restrictive. In the
following, we will therefore relax this assumption and allow for heterogeneity across tax
changes.
Overview. Technically, we proceed as follows. In a first step, we distinguish between
the two most important subgroups of tax changes, personal and corporate income tax
adjustments. Together, both groups account for 75 percent of total federal tax revenues
(Mertens and Ravn 2013). We estimate a separate VAR for personal and corporate income
tax changes, thereby allowing for different dynamic responses to an adjustment of taxes
in one of the two groups.
Within each group, tax changes differ substantially with respect to their size, see
Figure 1.A.5. In a second step, we therefore investigate to what extent specific tax changes
influence the aggregate impact of personal and corporate tax changes that we identified in
the first step. We do so by introducing dummy variables for the most important tax acts
in our sample. These tax acts are the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), the 1987 Omnibus
Tax Reconciliation Act (OBRA), the 1990 Omnibus Tax Reconciliation Act (OBRA),
and the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). All of these
tax changes belong to the post-1984 period, for which we have information on the excess
bond premia of both financial and non-financial firms. In this second step, we follow the
‘dummy variable approach’ employed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and in particular by
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), who allow for different intensities of important
military buildups in the US in order to estimate the government expenditure multiplier.
Measuring the impact of personal and corporate tax changes. Using the
Romer and Romer (2010) data as a source, Mertens and Ravn (2013) construct sepa-
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rate time series of exogenous, unanticipated tax changes for corporate income taxes and
personal income taxes. Corporate income tax changes include adjustments in deprecia-
tion allowances, investment tax credits and marginal tax changes. Personal income tax
changes include marginal income tax adjustments, adjustments in capital gain and divi-
dend taxes, and various deductions and tax credits. In order to distinguish between the
impact of personal and corporate income tax changes, we apply the Mertens and Ravn
(2013) methodology to our data. The resulting categorization of every single tax change
is given in Table 1.A.2 in the Appendix.
Similar to our baseline specification, we estimate the following VAR:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
Bjxt−j +D + Et+ ut (1.2)
where xt is now given by either ∆taxPIt or ∆taxCIt , depending on whether we are interested
in estimating the impact of an adjustment in personal income taxes (PI) or corporate
income taxes (CI). As before, we also include a constant D and a linear time trend
with coefficient matrix E in the exogenous part of the VAR. We modify the vector yt
of endogenous variables by replacing the variable tax revenues/GDP with the average
personal income tax rate (APITR) and the average corporate income tax rate (ACITR).
We follow Mertens and Ravn (2013) and define:
APITRt =
Personal Current Taxest + Contributions to Govt. Social Insurancet
Personal Taxable Incomet
ACITRt =
Taxes on Corporate Profitst
Corporate Profitst
Identification and bias correction of the impulse responses. Again, we set the
number of endogenous lags to p = 3 and the lag length of exogenous variables to s = 1.
All our following results are robust to including more lags.
It is important to note that ∆taxPIt and ∆taxCIt are positively correlated, since, for
most tax events, ∆taxPIt and ∆taxCIt are changed in the same direction.
This correlation may give rise to an omitted variable bias if we incorporate only ∆taxPIt
or ∆taxCIt in Specification (1.2).
Fortunately, we are able to assess the strength of the omitted variable bias by analyzing
the cross-responses, i.e. the response of APITR (ACITR) in Specification (1.2) to ∆taxCIt
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(∆taxPIt ). If the cross-responses are insignificant, then the impact of the omitted variable
is limited.
The results are shown in Figure 1.A.6. The left panel displays the response of APITR
to ∆taxCIt . Although it increases, it is not significantly different from zero. The same is
true if we consider the response of ACITR to ∆taxPIt , shown in the right panel of Figure
1.A.6. Given that all cross-responses are insignificant, we conclude that the omitted
variable problem should not bias our results significantly. This test is inspired by Mertens
and Ravn (2013), who separate the impact of corporate and personal income tax changes
by assuming that a change in ∆taxPIt affects only APTIR on impact, but not ACITR,
and vice versa.19
In order to further alleviate potential concerns regarding the presence of an omitted
variable bias, we will include both ∆taxPIt and ∆taxCIt into Specification (1.2) in a ro-
bustness check. All of our results survive this test. Hence, we conclude that our results
are not biased because we omit either personal or corporate income tax changes. Note
that when we incorporate both ∆taxPIt and ∆taxCIt , we also implicitly assume that the
coefficients of the A matrix, which govern the dynamics of the endogenous variables, are
identical for both personal and corporate income tax changes. This is also the case in
Mertens and Ravn (2013), who estimate the dynamic effects of personal and corporate
income tax changes within the same VAR.
Finally, we correct for the measurement error inherent in the narrative measures for
∆taxCIt and ∆taxPIt by rescaling our impulse responses such that ACITR (respectively
APITR) increases by one percent at the peak.
1.6.1 Personal Income Taxes and Corporate Bond Spreads
Figure 1.A.7 summarizes the responses of EBP and FBP to an adjustment in personal
income taxes. Personal income tax changes drive up both excess bond premia. In par-
ticular the response of EBP is sizeable and highly significant, whereas the response of
FBP is insignificant using a 95 percent confidence interval. This may be due to the fact
that there is a small number of degrees of freedom, given that FBP is not available before
1985.20
The fact that personal income tax changes have an impact on corporate bond spreads
implies that the overall link between tax changes and corporate bond spreads is not
only due to the impact of corporate income tax changes on firms’ leverage decisions, as
suggested by many important theories in corporate finance, such as e.g. the trade-off
19Note that this specification tests the recursivity assumption employed by Mertens and Ravn (2013)
to separate the impact of personal and corporate income tax liability changes.
20Indeed, if we reduce the number of lags, the confidence interval becomes substantially smaller.
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theory.21 See Tirole (2006) for an intuitive overview of the static theory and Strebulaev
and Whited (2011) for the dynamic version.
How do personal income tax changes affect corporate bond spreads? We
argue that personal income tax changes affect corporate bond spreads via balance sheet
conditions of financial intermediaries. Specifically, taxes have an impact on stock prices,
which are an important part of banks’ balance sheets. Our argument is structured as
follows. First, we show that personal income tax changes have an impact on stock market
returns, a finding that is consistent with the tax capitalization hypothesis, according to
which an unexpected change in the taxation of income from dividends and capital gains
affects stock prices and therefore stock returns (see e.g. Sialm 2009 for recent evidence).
In order to explain the transmission of tax changes to corporate bond spreads, we refer
to theories according to which corporate bonds are priced by financial intermediaries. We
have in mind models such as e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2013). In these models, shocks to financial intermediaries’ balance sheets translate into
changes in corporate bond spreads.
Based on this argument, we conclude that personal income tax events affect balance
sheet conditions of financial intermediaries through changes in stock prices and stock
returns. Stocks account for a sizeable fraction of financial intermediaries’ assets. A change
in stock returns therefore affects the return on assets of financial intermediaries, thereby
altering the willingness of the financial sector to hold corporate bonds.
We test our hypothesis by incorporating a dummy for the 2003 JGTRRA into our
VAR. According to Sialm (2009), the 2003 JGTRRA had the largest impact on effective
tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Excluding this tax act from our sample should
therefore attenuate the responses of stock market returns. If our hypothesis is true, we
should also see that the return on assets of financial intermediaries only responds to the
2003 JGTRRA, but not to other tax events. Finally, corporate bond spreads should also
change only if we consider the 2003 JGTRRA. We show that all of these effects are indeed
borne out by the data. In sum, we interpret our findings as strong evidence for the fact
that personal income tax changes affect corporate bond spreads via stock market returns
and their impact on the profitability of the financial sector. The 2003 JGTRRA is key
for explaining the overall impact of personal income tax changes.
Personal income tax changes and stock market returns. We start by analyzing
the general relationship between stock market returns and personal income tax changes.
21According to the trade-off theory, corporate income tax changes are the main determinant of the
equity-debt trade-off because debt payments are exempted from corporate income taxation, whereas
equity payments are not. Firms then face a trade-off between reducing tax payments and increasing
debt, which also increases expected default.
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In the first panel of Figure 1.A.8, we plot the impulse response of the excess stock market
return to an increase in personal income taxes by one percentage point. The excess stock
market return is defined as the (value-weighted) stock market return (including dividends)
of the New York Stock Exchange minus the return on short-run (3 months) T-Bills.
After an increase in personal income taxes by one percent relative to the tax base, the
excess stock market return falls by more than 30 percentage points on impact, and starts
rising immediately afterwards back to its pre-tax level. The sharp drop in the excess stock
market return is driven by a decline in equity valuations, as indicated by the response of
the price/dividend ratio and the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio, which decrease
by five and two percentage points respectively.22
The response of stock prices is consistent with the predictions of the ‘tax capital-
ization hypothesis’ (see e.g. Sialm 2009) for an unexpected increase in dividend/capital
gain taxation. According to this hypothesis, stock prices immediately drop after an un-
expected increase in dividend/capital gain taxation, even if dividends are not affected.
This is because investors are willing to pay less for stocks, so that their after-tax return is
unaffected by the tax increase. Additional evidence for the importance of dividend taxes
for stock prices is presented by McGrattan and Prescott (2005), who argue that the fall
in the average marginal dividend tax rate between 1960 and 2000 can account for the
increase in equity prices during the same period.
In the following, we show that the response of stock markets to personal income tax
adjustments is mainly driven by the 2003 JGTRRA. We argue that this finding is perfectly
consistent with the tax capitalization hypothesis, since the 2003 JGTRRA constituted the
largest change for capital gains and dividend taxes in the post-1970 sample of tax events.
We begin by briefly summarizing the dividend and capital gain tax changes introduced
by the 2003 JGTRRA.
The 2003 JGTRRA. Calculations made by Sialm (2009) (see Figure 1 in his paper)
reveal that the 2003 JGTRRA had a massive impact on dividend tax rates. Among
other measures, the 2003 JGTRRA reduced the dividend tax rate for qualified dividends,
relative to the ordinary income tax rate. The effective reduction was substantial for
all income brackets, including the top. For households in the highest income bracket,
the marginal tax on dividend income fell from almost 40 to 15 percent. This decline
is substantial, compared to other tax acts.23 In addition to dividend taxes, the 2003
22Data on the price/dividend ratio and the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio are available on
Robert Shiller’s webpage: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, retrieved on May
19, 2015.
23Notable examples of other tax acts that affected only individual income tax rates in the post-1970
period, which is the time span that we are focusing on in this section, are the Economic Recovery Tax
Act (ERTA) of 1981 and the TRA of 1986. However, the calculations in Sialm (2009) show that both
26 Tax Changes, Credit Markets, and Financial Frictions
JGTRRA also reduced the marginal tax rate on capital gains from 20 to 15 percent.
The quantitative importance of the 2003 JGTRRA is also visible from Figure 1.A.5,
where we plot the narrative measure for ∆taxPI along with ∆taxCI . With a decrease in
personal income tax liabilities of more than one percent relative to the personal income
tax base, the 2003 JGTRRA is by far the largest personal income tax change in the post-
1970 period. In the following, we analyze the implications of the 2003 JGTRRA for stock
prices in greater detail.
The importance of the 2003 JGTRRA for stock markets. In order to analyze
the importance of the 2003 JGTRRA for the response of stock market returns, we isolate
the 2003 JGTRRA from the rest of the post-1970 personal income tax changes considered
by the Mertens and Ravn (2013) narrative. More specifically, we estimate the following
system:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
Boj∆tax
PI,o
t−j +
s∑
j=0
BJj ∆tax
PI,J
t−j +D + Et+ ut (1.3)
where ∆taxPI,o denotes all unanticipated personal income tax changes other than the 2003
JGTRRA and ∆taxPI,J denotes the 2003 JGTRRA. We are interested in DPI,o(L) :=
A(L)−1Bo(L), the dynamic multiplier associated with ∆taxPI,o. We again include a con-
stant and a linear time trend in the deterministic part of the VAR.
We would like to stress that when estimating Specification (1.3), we are only interested
in the sign and the significance of the multipliers, but not in their magnitude.24 Our
specification is thus similar to the dummy variable approach used in Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004). When interpreting the sign of the
estimated dynamic multipliers, it is important to keep in mind that we compute the effect
of an increase in personal income tax liabilities, even if we consider the impact of the 2003
JGTRRA alone, which actually constituted a reduction in tax liabilities. We do this in
order to be consistent with the rest of our analysis. Due to the linearity of the VAR, this
only has an effect on the sign of the dynamic multipliers, but not on their magnitude.
To estimate the dynamic multiplier for the price/dividend ratio, for the cyclically
adjusted price/earnings ratio and for the excess stock market return, we add each of these
tax acts only have a small negative impact on the marginal dividend tax rate, compared to the 2003
JGTRRA. With respect to the marginal tax rate on long-run capital gains, Sialm (2009) reports a small
negative effect for the 1981 ERTA only. The 1986 TRA even increased the marginal tax rate on long-
run capital gains. This is because the 1986 TRA broadened the capital income tax base considerably,
thereby repealing many opportunities to deduct taxes. Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) provide a complete
description of the 1986 TRA.
24This is because ∆taxPI,o and ∆taxPI,J are potentially subject to different measurement error,
rendering a direct comparison of the estimated dynamic multipliers DPI,o(L) and DPI,J(L) meaningless
anyway.
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time series to our system separately as an additional endogenous variable. The results for
∆taxPI,o are shown in Figure 1.A.9.
As a comparison of Figures 1.A.8 and 1.A.9 makes evident, excluding the 2003 JGTRRA
(i.e. considering the response of ∆taxPI,o) renders the response of the price/dividend ra-
tio zero, while the response of both the price/earnings ratio and the excess stock market
return become insignificant. We therefore conclude that the 2003 JGTRRA is pivotal in
explaining the responses of equity valuations and equity returns to personal income tax
changes. This confirms that dividend/capital gain taxes drive stock returns.
The impact of the 2003 JGTRRA on balance sheet conditions of financial
intermediaries. We now turn to the relationship between personal income tax changes
and balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries. Our analysis is motivated by
the fact that corporate equity holdings account for a sizeable fraction of total assets of
financial intermediaries.25 Given that personal income tax changes affect stock returns,
we therefore expect that they also affect the return on assets of the financial sector. In
particular, our previous analysis has shown that the relationship between personal income
tax changes and stock returns is mainly driven by the 2003 JGTRRA. According to our
hypothesis, the same should be true for the return on assets of financial intermediaries.
In order to test this hypothesis, we use Specification (1.3) and include the following
variables into y, the vector of endogenous variables: the return on assets for all financial
firms (see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 2012), the return on assets for commercial banks, which
are the largest subgroup of the financial sector, as well as the excess stock market return,
as defined above.26
In order to save degrees of freedom, we drop all other endogenous variables from our
baseline system, with the exception of APITR and ACITR. For this new system, we pick
s = 6 for the number of lags for the endogenous variables, based on likelihood ratio tests.
With respect to the number of exogenous lags, we keep p = 1, as before.
As Figure 1.A.10 shows, the return on assets for the overall financial sector responds
significantly if we consider the 2003 JGTRRA (left panel), whereas we cannot observe any
reaction for all other personal income tax changes (right panel). This result thus confirms
our hypothesis that personal income tax changes affect balance sheet conditions through
stock market returns. We find that the response of the return on assets of commercial
banks is identical to the response of the return on assets of the overall financial sector.
The corresponding figure is therefore omitted.
25According to the US Financial Accounts (see Table L.107), holdings of corporate equity account
for almost 20 percent of the asset positions of financial business in the US and are therefore the second
largest asset position, after credit instruments, which constitute the core business of the financial sector.
26The return on assets for commercial banks is calculated using Compustat data.
28 Tax Changes, Credit Markets, and Financial Frictions
Our analysis is partly motivated by the high explanatory power of the return on assets
of the financial sector for the excess bond premia. The return on assets of all financial firms
alone can explain between 35 percent and 45 percent of the total variation, depending on
whether we consider the excess bond premium for non-financial or for financial firms.27
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) also find that there is a tight link between the excess bond
premium of non-financial firms and the return on assets of financial firms.
This suggests that balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries are important
determinants of excess bond premia. We will test this more formally in the next paragraph.
The link between the 2003 JGTRRA and corporate bond spreads. We
now return to the relationship between personal income tax events and corporate bond
spreads that we documented earlier. If corporate bonds are indeed priced by financial
intermediaries, as suggested by the institutional finance literature reviewed previously,
the impact of personal income tax changes on corporate bond spreads should hinge on
the 2003 JGTRRA, since, as shown above, only the 2003 JGTRRA leads to a response
of the return on assets of financial intermediaries.
In this section, we use Specification (1.3) to test to what extent the response of cor-
porate bond spreads, in particular EBP, is indeed driven by the 2003 JGTRRA. As the
results in Figure 1.A.11 indicate, excluding the 2003 JGTRRA renders the response of
EBP insignificant. In contrast, the response to ∆taxPI,J , which measures the impact
of the 2003 JGTRRA, is remarkably similar (in terms of shape) to the overall response
generated by all personal income tax changes ∆taxPI that we documented earlier using
Specification (1.2). Of course, the level differs markedly, given that the impulse responses
in Figure 1.A.11 are not scaled. Note that we do not consider FBP, since as demonstrated
above, its response to personal income tax changes is insignificant anyway.
Our finding that the 2003 JGTRRA is pivotal for the response of corporate bond
spreads and aggregate stock market returns relates our work to the seminal paper by
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001). Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001) find that aggregate stock market returns are a powerful determinant of corporate
bond spread changes. Interestingly, they show that aggregate returns outperform individ-
ual firms’ stock returns as determinants of corporate bond spreads by far. Their result
is at odds with the predictions from standard theory (consider for example the famous
Merton 1974 model), according to which corporate bond spreads are related to individual
but not to aggregate stock returns.28
27These values refer to the R2 of a regression of EBP (FBP) on the return on assets.
28This is unless aggregate stock returns are a proxy for the expected recovery rate after default. There
is little empirical evidence for this, see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001).
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The failure of standard asset pricing models to explain corporate bond spreads moti-
vates the institutional finance literature to consider the balance sheet conditions of finan-
cial intermediaries, see e.g. He and Krishnamurthy (2013).29 By showing that there is a
link between personal income tax changes on the one hand and balance sheet conditions
of financial intermediaries and corporate bond spreads on the other hand, we provide fur-
ther empirical support for the importance of financial intermediaries for corporate bond
pricing.
Our findings are also related to a large literature studying the impact of the 2003
JGTRRA on equity valuations and corporate behavior in general, see e.g. the work
by Poterba (2004), Auerbach and Hassett (2005, 2006), Chetty and Saez (2006), Brown,
Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe (2008), Anagnostopoulos,
Cárceles-Poveda, and Lin (2012), and most recently Yagan (2015).
We contribute to this strand of literature by documenting a novel link between the
2003 JGTRRA and equity valuations on the one hand and balance sheet conditions of
financial intermediaries and corporate bond spreads on the other hand. This link implies
that the 2003 JGTRRA also had an impact on the cost of debt financing of firms, via the
balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries.
Discussion: other evidence for the impact of the 2003 JGTRRA on equity
valuations. Our argument hinges on the finding that the 2003 JGTRRA had a positive
impact on equity valuations. In the following, we will carefully scrutinize this result. A
visual inspection of the time series of the S&P 500 stock market index indeed suggests
that share prices rose around the announcement date of the 2003 JGTRRA, see Figure 1
in Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe (2008). What is further needed in order to argue that
this rise is at least partly due to 2003 JGTRRA is that the announcement of the tax act
was unanticipated. According to Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), the tax change
moved particularly fast from its first proposal in January 2003 to the signed law in May
2003. In addition, Auerbach and Hassett (2005) mention that the political debate was
unpredictable, which created a lot of uncertainty among market participants. Amromin,
Harrison, and Sharpe (2008) provide evidence that prior to mid-May 2003, it was still
unclear whether any substantial cut in dividend taxes would find a majority.
However, the unexpected announcement of the 2003 JGTRRA is not sufficient to prove
an impact of the 2003 JGTRRA on equity valuations, since there might have been other
events that also influenced stock prices. For example, Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe
(2008) mention investors’ relief about the resolution regarding the military intervention
in Iraq as a potential confounding event that occurred over the same period.
29Indeed, He and Krishnamurthy (2013) refer to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), see
their Footnote 1.
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It is not possible for us to control for other factors that occurred at the same time, for
example by including a time dummy, since this dummy would be perfectly collinear with
∆taxPI,J . However, recall that the 2003 JGTRRA brought about a massive change in
dividend taxation. Therefore, anything other than a major impact of the 2003 JGTRRA
on share prices would be difficult to reconcile with the findings of Sialm (2009), who
documents that dividend/capital gain tax changes have a significant effect on stock market
valuations. The results by Sialm (2009) are based on time series evidence from 1913 to
2006 and on evidence from cross-sectional data. In addition, we would like to stress
that there are many other papers that present direct evidence for the impact of the 2003
JGTRRA on individual stock prices. Examples include Auerbach and Hassett (2005)
and Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) who both use firm level data. We therefore
conclude that there is strong evidence for the impact of the 2003 JGTRRA on equity
valuations.
1.6.2 Corporate Income Taxes and Corporate Bond Spreads
In this section, we document that corporate income tax changes have an impact on cor-
porate bond spreads. Specifically, we show that an increase in corporate income taxes
raises EBP and FBP.
In a second step, we analyze whether balance sheet conditions of financial interme-
diaries are also affected by corporate income tax changes. Indeed, this appears to be
the case. An increase in corporate income taxes adversely affects the return on assets of
commercial banks and of the financial sector in general; a finding that is in line with our
results for personal income tax changes.
However, in contrast to our previous findings, stock market returns do not seem to
matter for the transmission of corporate income tax changes to balance sheet conditions
of financial firms. Instead, our results suggest that the return on assets declines because
banks increase their loan loss provisions. We document that the rise in loan loss provisions
occurs in parallel with the increase in the fraction of non-performing commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans, which suggests that the increase in the latter is the reason for the
rise in the former.
We then turn to the question why corporate income tax changes affect the fraction of
non-performing C&I loans. To find the answer, we check which tax event (or which group
of tax events) from our narrative record is able to explain the response in the fraction of
non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and the return on assets simultaneously. We
expect that the response of corporate bond spreads to changes in corporate income taxes
also hinges on this tax shock (or this group of tax shocks) if the banks’ balance sheet
conditions indeed matter for the transmission of tax changes to corporate bond spreads.
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Our analysis reveals that the 1986 TRA is the sole driver for the response of non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions. We further show that the 1986 TRA also has
an impact on the return on assets of financial intermediaries and on FBP, but not on
EBP.
Finally, we analyze how the 1986 TRA could have triggered an increase in the fraction
of non-performing loans. One of the main objectives of the 1986 TRA was to ‘level
the playing field’, see Poterba (1992). This required a broadening of the tax base by
reducing investment in tax shelters and by abolishing deductions. Losers of the reform
were therefore firms in capital-intensive sectors such as mining and heavy industries (see
Cutler 1988).
The impact of corporate income tax changes on corporate bond spreads:
aggregate evidence. Paralleling our approach for personal income tax changes, we
estimate the following VAR:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
Bj∆taxCIt−j +D + Et+ ut (1.4)
The vector of endogenous variables y consists of our baseline variables (including APITR
and ACITR). Again, we include a constant D and a deterministic time trend with coeffi-
cients E. We set p = 3 and s = 1, as before. Our results are robust to higher lag orders.
As we will show later, most of our results are also robust to additionally controlling for
∆taxPI .
The responses to a one percentage point increase in ACITR are depicted in Figure
1.A.12. EBP and FBP increase by around 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points respectively.
Different from personal income tax changes, the response of FBP now appears to be more
sizeable.
The impact of corporate income tax changes on balance sheet conditions
of the financial sector. We now analyze whether corporate income tax changes affect
balance sheet conditions in the financial sector. According to the theoretical literature
presented above, this would explain the increase in the excess bond premia that we just
reported.
We incorporate either the return on assets for the overall financial sector or the (pre-
tax) return on assets for commercial banks, which is the largest subgroup within the
financial sector, into Specification (1.4). Our results are identical for the return on assets
of the total financial sector and of commercial banks. In the following, we will therefore
focus on the return on assets for commercial banks. We do so because balance sheet
conditions of commercial banks will play a decisive role in the remainder of our analysis.
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As Figure 1.A.13 reveals, an increase in ACITR by one percent reduces the return on
assets for commercial banks by approximately 0.4 percentage points two quarters after the
tax increase. The effect fades out quickly. The response is highly significant, as indicated
by the narrow 95 percent confidence bands.
Robustness checks reveal that the response of the return on assets is invariant to
changes in the lag length for the endogenous variables, but not to changes in the exogenous
variables (i.e. the tax narrative). Here, a minimum lag length of s ≥ 2 is required to
obtain our results. The fact that the response of the return on assets is only visible if at
least two lags of the corporate income tax shocks are included suggests that the dynamics
of banks’ balance sheet conditions following a corporate income tax adjustment are not
very well described by our baseline VAR.30 In the following, we will therefore set s = 2.
Note that our results for the baseline variables remain unchanged if we set s = 2 instead
of s = 1.
We now turn to the question why corporate income tax changes affect balance sheet
conditions of the financial sector. An obvious point that immediately comes to mind is
that the return on assets declines because banks need to pay more taxes. If this was
correct, then we should only see an effect on the after-tax return on assets, but not on the
pre-tax return. This is not the case, as indicated by Figure 1.A.13, where we plot both
the response of the pre-tax and of the after-tax return on assets for commercial banks.
If anything, the response of the pre-tax return on assets is more pronounced. Hence, we
conclude that tax liability changes in the financial sector are not the driver behind the
impact of corporate tax adjustments on banks’ balance sheet conditions. We will refer to
our result that both pre-tax and after-tax return on assets respond to a corporate income
tax change several times below.
The second hypothesis that we consider are changes in stock market returns, partly
inspired by our previous results for personal income tax changes. Cutler (1988) summa-
rizes theoretical evidence in support of this link, but fails to find a large market response
to tax news empirically. If we incorporate the excess stock market return into Specifi-
cation (1.4), we do not find a significant response either, as indicated by Figure 1.A.14.
We therefore conclude that corporate income tax adjustments affect banks’ balance sheet
conditions via other channels than equity valuation changes. This result establishes a
major difference between the transmission of personal and corporate income tax changes.
We now analyze whether the largest asset position of banks, their loan portfolio, is
affected by corporate income tax changes. One could imagine that some of the banks’
borrowers find it more difficult to repay their loans after an increase in corporate in-
30Indeed, we could have obtained the same results in an AR system (i.e. without endogenous variables
other than the return on assets), as long as we would have kept s ≥ 2.
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come taxes. Through general equilibrium effects, borrowers might suffer either directly
or indirectly from higher tax liabilities.
To test the consequences of corporate income tax adjustments for the quality of loans,
we use the Bank Regulatory Database to construct a quarterly time series for the (an-
nualized) provision for loan losses that banks make, relative to their total stock of loans.
Data are available starting from the first quarter of 1976.31 We incorporate the loan loss
provisions/loan ratio as an additional endogenous variable into Specification (1.4).
The impulse response of the loan loss provisions/loan ratio to a one percent increase in
ACITR is shown in Figure 1.A.15. Strikingly, the response of the loan loss provisions/loan
ratio appears to be the mirror image of the response of the return on assets for commercial
banks. In the second quarter following the tax increase, the loan loss provisions/loan ratio
goes up by 0.6 percentage points, whereas the return on assets declines by 0.4 percentage
points. The responses are highly significant for both variables, and both responses fade
out quickly afterwards.32
According to general accounting principles, additions to loan loss reserves in the form
of loan loss provisions are deducted from reported income in the period in which the
provisions are made (Kuprianov 1997). Moreover, as noted by Kuprianov (1997), prior
to the 1986 TRA, all banks were allowed to deduct additions to loan loss reserves up
to a maximum from taxable income.33 Banks therefore typically held loan loss reserves
in excess of their expected losses. In particular, banks used loan loss reserves as a tax
smoothing device (Balla, Rose, and Romero 2012).
The fact that we observe an increase in the loan loss provisions/loan ratio after a
corporate tax adjustment could therefore indicate that banks raise their loan loss reserves
solely to keep their after-tax profits constant. However, recall that, according to our
previous results, pre-tax and after-tax returns change by roughly the same magnitude. We
therefore conclude that banks do not increase the loan loss provisions/loan ratio to avoid
to pay more corporate income taxes. Rather, the increase in the loan loss provisions/loan
ratio appears to be the result of a deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio.
We therefore investigate in which loan group banks experience an increase in non-
performing loans. To do so, we use quarterly data from the Federal Deposit Insurance
31Access to the Bank Regulatory Database was obtained through Wharton Research Data Services.
32If we had used loan loss reserves instead of loan loss provisions in the numerator, our results would
have been qualitatively unchanged, which is to be expected, since loan loss reserves are the stock variable
to which new loan loss provisions are added.
33As noted by Kuprianov (1997), after the 1986 TRA, this was only possible for ‘small’ banks with an
asset volume below 500 million USD. Larger banks were only allowed to deduct loan loss provisions from
their income statement in the year in which they accrued them. Small banks could continue to deduct
loan loss provisions based on the ‘experience method’, which gave them more flexibility.
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Corporation’s Quarterly Banking Profile Database.34 We focus on two major subgroups,
real estate loans and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. For these two subgroups,
there are also sufficiently long time series available for non-performing loans, starting
from 1984Q1. Non-performing loans are defined as loans that are more than 90 days past
due or in non-accrual status. We normalize the number of non-performing loans by the
number of total loans in the respective category, and include the resulting ratio as an
endogenous variable into Specification (1.4).
As Figure 1.A.16 makes evident, following an increase in corporate income taxes, only
the fraction of non-performing C&I loans increases significantly. Again, it is interesting
to observe that the shape of the impulse response of non-performing C&I loans coincides
almost perfectly with the reaction of the loan loss provisions/loan ratio.
Hence, we conclude that an increase in corporate bond spreads appears to affect banks’
balance sheet conditions through an increase in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans.
In the next subsection, we will investigate why this is the case.
The impact of corporate income tax changes on banks’ balance sheet condi-
tions: a detailed analysis focusing on specific tax acts. We now want to shed fur-
ther light on why corporate income tax adjustments affect the fraction of non-performing
C&I loans. As our previous analysis suggested, the increase in non-performing loans fol-
lowing an increase in corporate income taxes leads to higher loan loss provisions, relative
to total loans. Consequently, banks’ balance sheet conditions deteriorate, as indicated by
the decline in the return on assets of banks.
There are four tax events that affected corporate income taxes in the period for which
data on non-performing C&I loans are available, namely the TRA of 1986, the OBRA of
1987, the OBRA of 1990, and finally the JGTRRA of 2003.
To analyze which of the four tax acts accounts for the change in the fraction of non-
performing C&I loans, we modify Specification (1.4) by incorporating ∆taxk,CI ∀ k ∈
{1986, 1987, 1990, 2003}, where k indicates one of the four tax events. ∆taxk,CI measures
the change in corporate tax liabilities/corporate tax base for one of the four tax acts. The
new system then looks as follows:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
Bk,CIj ∆tax
k,CI
t−j +D +Et+ ut ∀k ∈ {1986, 1987, 1990, 2003} (1.5)
The vector of endogenous variables y consists of our baseline variables (including APITR
and ACITR) and the fraction of non-performing C&I loans. We set p = s = 2. Our
results are robust to different choices of s and p as long as s ≥ 2. We are interested in the
34https://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/index.asp, retrieved May 26, 2015.
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dynamic multiplier Dk,CI(L) := A(L)−1Bk,CI(L) ∀ k ∈ {1986, 1987, 1990, 2003}. D and
E control for a constant and a time trend.
Note that the magnitude of the responses found by considering Specification (1.4),
where we measure the impact of all corporate income tax changes, cannot be compared
to the magnitude of the responses obtained from Specification (1.5), due to differences in
scaling. Specification (1.5) resembles the dummy variable approach employed in Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) and in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004). In the following,
we will therefore focus on whether the impulse response is significant, and not on the size
of the multiplier. Also note that in order to ensure consistency with our other results,
when we plot the respective impulse responses, we consider the impulse response after a
tax increase, even if a specific tax event entailed a decline in corporate income taxes.
In Figure 1.A.17, we present the response of the fraction of non-performing loans for
each of the aforementioned tax acts. Interestingly, only the 1986 TRA appears to have a
significant impact on non-performing loans. Moreover, the shape of the impulse response
looks strikingly similar to the one that we obtained from considering all corporate income
tax changes. In sum, this suggests that the effects of corporate income tax changes on
the fraction of non-performing loans are entirely driven by the 1986 TRA.
If we analyze the response of the loan loss provisions/loan ratio using Specification
(1.5), we also find that the 1986 TRA is responsible for the aggregate effect, see Figure
1.A.18.35 Our results furthermore indicate that the 1986 TRA is the driving force behind
the responses of the return on assets and of FBP to corporate income tax changes, as
is depicted in Figures 1.A.19 and 1.A.20 respectively.36 On the other hand, we cannot
detect any relationship between the 1986 TRA and EBP, see Figure 1.A.21.
Note that our observation that the 1986 TRA affects FBP but not EBP is perhaps
surprising. In particular, in light of our other finding that the 1986 TRA has an impact on
the return on assets. Since banks observe a deterioration of their balance sheet conditions
following the 1986 TRA, we would expect that they require a higher risk premium, as
reflected in an increase in the excess bond premia, independently of whether corporate
bonds are issued by financial or non-financial firms. Our result that only FBP responds
to the 1986 TRA therefore also stands in contrast to our previous analysis for the 2003
35Note that there is a negative reaction of the loan loss provisions/loan ratio after the 1987 OBRA.
According to the theory outlined in Section 1.5, this would imply a decrease in FBP. As shown in Figure
1.A.20, the opposite is the case. Moreover, the 1987 OBRA does not have a significant impact on the
return on assets of commercial banks, as depicted in Figure 1.A.19. Therefore, we conclude that the
response after the 1987 OBRA is not driven by banks’ balance sheet conditions and therefore, we do not
analyze the 1987 OBRA in further detail.
36Note that FBP also responds significantly to the 1990 OBRA. However, since there is no response
of the return on assets of commercial banks, we conclude that banks’ balance sheet conditions cannot be
the reason for this effect. We therefore leave it to future research to analyze why FBP responds to the
1990 OBRA.
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JGTRRA, which has an impact on banks’ return on assets and on EBP, but not on FBP.
We will further comment on this issue later.
The importance of the 1986 TRA. We now analyze in more detail how the 1986
TRA affects the fraction of non-performing C&I loans. Since we do not have information
about the sectoral composition of non-performing C&I loans, we are forced to take an
indirect approach.
We first construct a time series for the failure rates of firms for all sectors. This allows
us to find out which industries experienced an increase in their firms’ failure rates after
the implementation of the 1986 TRA. In a second step, we then analyze whether the
sectors that experienced an increase in their failure rates also depend on bank loans. In
a third step, we link the increase in firms’ failure rates in the aftermath of the 1986 TRA
to the rise in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans.
We compute failure rates of firms using data on firm death from the Business Dynamics
Survey (BDS).37 According to the BDS definition, a firm died in a specific year if it exited
in its entirety during this year. To be considered a firm death, all establishments owned
by the firm must exit.38 We calculate the failure rate in a specific sector by dividing the
number of exiting firms in a given year by the total number of firms in that sector. Note
that data are available on a yearly basis only. This prevents us from formally studying the
response of the sector-specific failure rates to the 1986 TRA by incorporating the failure
rate as an endogenous variable in our quarterly VAR.
Instead, we plot in Figure 1.A.22 the sector-specific failure rates for agriculture, con-
struction, manufacturing, mining, retail trade, wholesale trade, services, and finance,
insurance and real estate. For most sectors, failure rates are stable across years, with the
exception of mining, which experienced a sharp increase in its failure rate in 1987, the
year after the 1986 TRA was implemented.
This suggests that firm failures in the mining industry could be the reason for the
increase in non-performing loans in the aftermath of the 1986 TRA.39 Firms in the mining
37http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data_firm.html, retrieved on May 26, 2015.
38BDS Codebook, page 5. Note that this definition is quite narrow. According to the codebook, "[...]
a firm with 100 establishments would not qualify as a firm death if 99 exited while 1 continued under
different ownership." (page 5).
39It is perhaps surprising that the construction sector does not appear to be important. As noted
above, one of the main objectives of the 1986 TRA was to ‘level the playing field’, which also meant
to abolish investment in tax shelters. As noted by Poterba (1992), rental housing was one of the most
actively used tax shelters in the beginning of the 1980s. The 1986 TRA is therefore typically associated
with the downturn in the real estate segment, in particular with the decline in the construction industry
(see again Poterba 1992). Indeed, Figure 1.A.22 shows a minor increase in failure rates of firms in the
construction sector, but only in 1988. Compared to the spike in the failure rate in the mining sector, this
increase is negligible. This suggests that firm failures in the construction sector cannot be responsible
for the rise in the fraction of non-performing loans in banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, according to our
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sector depend strongly on bank loans, a fact that can be seen from the high bank loan/asset
ratio, which is equal to 12 percent according to the data from the 1987 Quarterly Financial
Report (QFR).40 The bank loan/asset ratio in the mining industry is high, even compared
to other capital-intensive sectors covered by the 1987 QFR, such as manufacturing. For
manufacturing, the bank loan/asset ratio is only 8 percent.
We now analyze whether the increase in the failure rate of firms in the mining sector
can potentially account for the rise in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans that we
documented earlier. Figure 1.A.22 suggests that the failure rate in the mining industry
increased between 1986 and 1987 by almost 30 percent, from 13.5 percent to 17.5 percent.
Using the 1987 QFR, we find that bank loans to firms in the mining sector account for
3.5 percent of all bank loans to the sectors covered by the QFR.
Under the assumption that an increase in the firms’ failure rate by 30 percent directly
translates into an increase in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans in the mining
sector, this suggests that we should see a rise of approximately one percentage point in
the fraction of non-performing loans in the year after the 1986 TRA. Interestingly, our
results for all corporate income tax changes (where it makes sense to consider magnitudes
since we appropriately scale) indicate that increasing ACITR by one percent leads to a
rise in the fraction of non-performing loans by around 0.6 percentage points.
The fact that not all sectors are covered by the QFR understates the total volume of
bank loans. In this context, it is important to note that probably some firms from other
sectors also failed as a consequence of the 1986 TRA, without affecting the aggregate
failure rate in their respective sector. Heavy industries, for example, are part of the
manufacturing sector. The number of firms in heavy industries is small, relative to the
overall number of firms in the manufacturing sector. So it is unlikely that an increase
in the failure rate in heavy industries leads to a rise in the overall failure rate in the
manufacturing sector.41
Moreover, it is very likely that heavy industries also suffered from the 1986 TRA. One
of the main objectives of the 1986 TRA was to ‘level the playing field’, see Poterba (1992).
This required a broadening of the tax base by reducing investment in tax shelters and by
abolishing tax deductions. Losers of the reform were therefore firms in capital-intensive
impulse responses, the peak in the fraction of non-performing loans occurred three quarters after the
implementation of the 1986 TRA in December 1986, which suggests that most of the action took place
in 1987, the year after the implementation of the 1986 TRA.
40http://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/historic.html, retrieved on May 26, 2015. We define bank
loans as the sum of STBANK (short term debt in form of bank loans) + INSTBANKS (long-term debt
in form of bank loans, due in less than one year) + LTBNKDEBT (long-term debt in form of bank loans,
due in more than one year).
41Unfortunately, the Business Dynamics Survey does not allow for a finer breakdown of the sector-
specific failure rate.
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sectors, such as mining or heavy industries. According to the calculations presented in
Cutler (1988), heavy industries and mining were the two sectors that were predicted to
experience the largest loss in their net income following the 1986 TRA.
An increase in failure rates for heavy industries is also likely to affect the fraction
of non-performing C&I loans, since, according to the 1987 QFR, bank loans to heavy
industries account for 4.5 percent of total bank loans.
Explaining the differential impact of the 1986 TRA and the 2003 JGTRRA
on EBP and FBP. As a final remark, we want to comment on another observation that
is implicit in our previous results. It seems that the 1986 TRA only affects FBP but not
EBP, whereas the 2003 JGTRRA (respectively all personal income tax changes) has a
significant impact on EBP only.
This finding is perhaps puzzling. After all, both tax acts have an impact on financial
intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions and should therefore affect the risk premium
that financial intermediaries require to hold corporate bonds, independently of whether
the bonds are issued by financial or by non-financial firms.
In order to understand this puzzle, note that the risk premium is determined by the
correlation of two types of shocks. The first shock determines the default risk of corporate
bonds. For future reference, we denote this the ‘type one’ shock. The second shock
governs the financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions and therefore implicitly the
risk premium that intermediaries require to accept corporate bonds, conditional on type
one risk. We call this shock the ‘type two’ shock.
We believe that the solution to the puzzle that the 1986 TRA affects FBP only, but
not EBP, lies in the correlation of type one and type two shocks. The following example
illustrates this. In the language of our two shocks, an increase in non-performing loans
– as we observe it after the 1986 TRA – is a type two shock that tightens the balance
sheet conditions of a specific intermediary. At the same time, it is also a type one shock
for corporate bonds of financial firms, because an increase in non-performing loans in the
aggregate affects the balance sheet conditions of all other financial firms as well. Therefore,
type one and type two shocks are positively correlated if a financial firm wants to buy the
corporate bonds issued by another financial firm. In this case, it will demand a higher risk
premium, reflected in an increase in FBP. The increase in non-performing loans does not
constitute a shock to corporate bonds issued by non-financial firms.42 Therefore, financial
firms can avoid the positive correlation between type one and type two shocks by buying
42This assumes that firms that have difficulties repaying their bank loans are not the same as the ones
that issue corporate bonds, e.g. because they belong to a different sector, or because they are larger and
are therefore to some extent sheltered from the negative shocks that affect firms that depend on bank
loans.
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corporate bonds issued by non-financial firms. As a result, we do not observe an increase
in EBP.
Consider now the 2003 JGTRRA. In the language of our example, equity valuation
changes constitute a type two shock. Moreover, since changes in equity valuation also
affect balance sheet conditions of firms that issue corporate bonds, they also constitute a
type one shock. Therefore, we would expect that the 2003 JGTRRA has an impact on
both EBP and FBP. This is definitely the case for EBP. However, for FBP, the relationship
is difficult to detect because its response to all personal income tax changes is already
insignificant. We therefore conclude that the correlation between type one and type two
shocks for financial firms is not strong enough to generate a significant response of FBP.
This is most likely due to the fact that FBP is only available from 1985Q1 onwards,
which limits the degrees of freedom and therefore increases the variance of its estimated
response.
1.6.3 Robustness Check: Controlling for Personal and Corporate
Income Tax Changes at the Same Time
We now check whether our previous results are robust to controlling for both personal
and corporate income tax changes. We therefore re-estimate our (baseline) Specification
(1.2), but this time, we use both ∆taxPI and ∆taxCI as exogenous variables:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +
s∑
j=0
BPIj ∆tax
PI
t−j +
s∑
j=0
BCIj ∆tax
CI
t−j +D + Et+ ut (1.6)
We incorporate the same endogenous variables as in Specification (1.2). In addition,
we also include one of our variables of interest, i.e. either EBP, FBP, the return on assets
of commercial banks, the loan loss provisions/loan ratio or the fraction of non-performing
C&I loans. We consider p = 2 lags for the endogenous variables, and we set the number
of lags for the exogenous variables to s = 2, in order to allow for a lagged impact of tax
liability changes on the endogenous variables. D and E again control for a constant and
a linear time trend.
It should be noted that in Specification (1.6), identification hinges on those tax acts
for which personal and corporate income tax changes have a different sign. Since data
on non-performing C&I loans are only available from 1984Q1 onwards, there are four tax
acts that affect corporate income taxes, namely the TRA of 1986, the OBRA of 1987, the
OBRA of 1990, and finally the JGTRRA of 2003. As shown in Figure 1.A.5, the 1986
TRA is the only tax act for which personal income taxes and corporate income taxes are
adjusted in opposite directions.
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Strikingly, we find that our previous results reported in Figures 1.A.12 - 1.A.21 regard-
ing a one percent increase in ACITR remain unchanged, even if we control for personal
income tax changes. To save space, the corresponding figures are omitted.43 The only
exception is the response of EBP, which becomes insignificant after incorporating ∆taxPI .
The reason is that the response of EBP is entirely driven by the 2003 JGTRRA. Recall
from our previous results that the response of EBP becomes insignificant as soon as we
drop the personal income tax component associated with the 2003 JGTRRA from our
sample of personal income tax changes. Since the 2003 JGTRRA changes personal income
taxes and corporate income taxes in the same direction, we cannot separate the impact
of the two tax categories using Specification (1.6). As a result, the response becomes
insignificant as soon as we incorporate ∆taxPI .
Thus, the following concern arises. It could be that it is not the personal income tax
component of the 2003 JGTRRA that is important for the impact of the 2003 JGTRRA
on corporate bond spreads, financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions, and stock
market returns, but rather the change in corporate income taxes associated with the 2003
JGTRRA. And similarly, it could be that the 1986 TRA affects banks’ balance sheet con-
ditions, and therefore corporate bond spreads, through the adjustment of personal income
taxes. We will analyze this point in the next subsection in greater detail. Specifically, we
will show that this is not the case.
A comparison of two tax acts and their impact on banks’ balance sheets:
1986 TRA versus 2003 JGTRRA. We now argue that, by combining our evidence
for the 1986 TRA and for the 2003 JGTRRA, we can infer that the 1986 TRA operates
through corporate income tax adjustments, whereas the 2003 JGTRRA affects financial
intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions via its personal income tax component.
Our main observation is that the two tax acts change intermediaries’ balance sheets
through different channels. Key for our argumentation is the fact that determinants
of intermediaries’ balance sheets that are more likely to respond after an adjustment
in personal income taxes are affected by the 2003 JGTRRA, whereas the 1986 TRA
appears to change determinants that are more likely to be affected by corporate income
tax changes.
Before we turn to the details, recall from Figure 1.A.5 that the 1986 TRA is by far the
most important corporate income tax change in our sample, whereas the 2003 JGTRRA
had a major impact on personal income taxation.
Now, consider the 2003 JGTRRA in greater detail. We previously documented that
this tax act gives rise to changes in (excess) stock market returns. Stocks are the second
most important component of financial intermediaries’ assets, after loans. The quality of
43They are available from the authors upon request.
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loans does not appear to be affected by the 2003 JGTRRA, since we concluded above
that the 1986 TRA is able to explain the response of non-performing loans and of the
loan loss provisions/loan ratio that we observe using all tax changes. Given that the
2003 JGTRRA affects the return on assets for financial intermediaries, it seems likely
that excess stock market returns matter for the transmission of the 2003 JGTRRA to
intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions.
Regarding the question whether the response of stock market returns is a conse-
quence of adjustments in personal or in corporate income taxation, we note that the
2003 JGTRRA entails by far the most significant dividend/capital gain tax change in
our sample. There is evidence by Sialm (2009) and others that dividend/capital gain
taxes influence equity valuations. In contrast, there is no such strong evidence for the
impact of corporate income tax changes on aggregate stock prices, see Cutler (1988).
Since dividend/capital gain taxes are part of the personal income tax component of the
2003 JGTRRA, we conclude that the 2003 JGTRRA affects stock market returns through
adjustments in personal income taxation.
We now turn to the 1986 TRA. As noted above, corporate income tax changes in
general and especially the 1986 TRA do not have an impact on excess stock market
returns. For the 1986 TRA, this finding is to be expected, given that it only had a minor
impact on dividend/capital gain taxes (see e.g. Figure 1 in Sialm 2009). Instead, we
argued above that the 1986 TRA affects banks’ balance sheet conditions through changes
in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans. Arguably, it is more likely that these changes
in the fraction of non-performing C&I loans stem from a corporate income tax adjustment,
and not from a personal income tax change.
In conclusion, we find that our results are robust to controlling for both personal and
corporate income tax changes. In particular, we argue that the 1986 TRA affects financial
intermediaries’ balance sheets via its corporate income tax component, whereas the 2003
JGTRRA operates through its personal income tax component.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically document that tax changes affect financial market condi-
tions. Using the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative record of exogenous federal tax
liability changes for the US, we show that an increase in taxes leads to higher risk premia
for corporate bonds issued by financial and non-financial firms. Using additional informa-
tion by Mertens and Ravn (2013), which allows us to distinguish between personal and
corporate income taxation, we find that risk premia are driven by financial intermediaries’
balance sheet conditions, a result that is consistent with recent theories of intermediary
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asset pricing, such as He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014). Moreover, we also analyze in detail how intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions
respond to tax changes.
Two tax acts turn out to be particularly important, namely the Tax Reform Act
(TRA) of 1986 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of
2003. Interestingly, none of these two tax acts specifically targeted the financial sector.
Therefore, a general conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that any tax change can
potentially spill over to financial market conditions, with the associated consequences for
the real economy.
A promising avenue for future research could therefore be to analyze the effect of tax
changes on real economic activity in a macro model with financial frictions, for example by
using a model that features a financial accelerator, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1995),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).44 However,
as we note in our companion paper, Kraus and Winter (2015b), a tax increase might
not always lead to tighter financial frictions in this class of models. The exact response
depends on the tax instrument and on the model environment considered.45
Moreover, in our companion paper, we conclude that models in which the frictions af-
fect financial intermediaries, such as e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) are more promising in explaining the
response of real economic activity to tax changes.46
Incorporating financial intermediaries into a model to study the transmission of tax
changes would also be consistent with our finding that tax changes affect the return on
assets of the financial sector empirically. Here, further research could shed more light
on the channels through which taxes affect intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions. For
example, more detailed information regarding the sectoral composition of commercial
banks’ C&I loans could be gathered in order to test whether the increase in the fraction
of non-performing loans after the 1986 TRA is indeed connected to the increase in the
44See Quadrini (2011) for a recent survey.
45For example, in Fernández-Villaverde (2010), an increase in taxes implies higher inflation, which in
turn raises entrepreneurs’ net worth (in nominal terms), thereby reducing the external finance premium.
Strulik (2008) studies the consequences of various forms of capital tax changes in a financial accelerator
model à la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). He finds that an increase in the private capital
income tax reduces the tax advantage of debt finance as opposed to equity, which in turn decreases
leverage and therefore also the external finance premium. The opposite is the case after an increase in
corporate income taxation. The findings by Strulik (2008) therefore show the importance of the specific
tax instrument considered.
46This is because investment distortions (in the form of interest rate spreads) for durables and capital
investment are needed in order to account for the empirical effects of a tax change. Since durables are
purchased by households, models in which only firms are subject to financial frictions cannot generate
an interest rate spread for durables purchases. In contrast, financial frictions at the level of the financial
intermediary would be able to affect all lending activities.
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failure rate of firms in the mining sector.
Another interesting avenue for further research would be to analyze alternative chan-
nels through which taxes could affect corporate bond spreads. Such an alternative chan-
nel could for example be changes in the supply of government bonds (see Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). Further research could also clarify whether this channel
can explain the increase in FBP following the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA), which is shown in Figure 1.A.20.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Data
The data used in our estimation are based on Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) and on the
Online Appendix of Mertens and Ravn (2013). There are a few differences between our
dataset and the one used by Romer and Romer (2009, 2010):
• We use a different timing convention than Romer and Romer (2009, 2010) and date
every tax change in the quarter in which it was actually implemented. Romer and
Romer (2009, 2010), on the other hand, only assign tax changes in the first half
of the quarter to this same quarter, whereas tax changes that occurred after the
midpoint of the quarter are assigned to the next quarter.
• We distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. Specifically, we
have three measures for unanticipated tax changes, depending on the lag between
the announcement and implementation date: same month (called S1 in Table 1.A.1),
30 days (called S1-exceptions in Table 1.A.1) and 90 days (called S3 in Table 1.A.1).
The measures we use – if not stated otherwise – are the S1-exceptions tax changes.
• We add the distinction between personal, corporate, and other tax changes, using
the data from the Online Appendix by Mertens and Ravn (2013). The exact decom-
position between the different categories is shown in the last three columns of Table
1.A.2. In three cases, the personal, corporate, and other tax changes do not sum
up to the total amount reported by Romer and Romer (2009, 2010). This is due
to adjustments made by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and is marked with an asterisk
in Table 1.A.2. Note that the decomposition into personal, corporate, and other
tax changes is only available for those tax events with an implementation lag of less
than one quarter.
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Table 1.A.1: Timing of exogenous tax changes
Tax Act Signed Effective S1 S1 + exceptions S3 Our Timing R&R Timing
1 Social Security Amendments of 1947 06/08/1947 01/1950 NO NO NO 1950Q1 1950Q1
2 Revenue Act of 1948 02/04/1948 04/1948 YES YES YES 1948Q2 1948Q2
3 Social Security Amendments of 1950 28/08/1950 01/1954 NO NO NO 1954Q1 1954Q1
4 Expiration of Excess Profits Tax and 
Temporary Income Tax Increases 10/1951 01/1954 NO NO NO 1954Q1 1954Q1
5 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 16/08/1954 08/1954 YES YES YES 1954Q3 1954Q4
6 Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958 30/06/1958 07/1958 NO YES YES 1958Q3 1958Q3
7 Social Security Amendments of 1958 28/08/1958 01/1960 NO NO NO 1960Q1 1960Q1
8 Federal‐Aid Highway Act of 1959 21/09/1959 10/1959 NO YES YES 1959Q4 1959Q4
9 Social Security Amendments of 1958 30/06/1961 01/1963 NO NO NO 1963Q1 1963Q1
10 Changes in Depreciation Guidelines  11/07/1962 07/1962 YES YES YES 1962Q3 1962Q3
and Revenue Act of 1962 16/10/1962 10/1962 YES YES YES 1962Q4 1962Q4
16/10/1962 01/1963 NO NO NO 1963Q1 1963Q1
11 Revenue Act of 1964 26/02/1964 02/1964 YES YES YES 1964Q1 1964Q2
26/02/1964 01/1965 NO NO NO 1965Q1 1965Q1
12 Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 21/06/1965 06/1965 YES YES YES 1965Q2 1965Q3
21/06/1965 01/1966 NO NO NO 1966Q1 1966Q1
13 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 15/03/1966 03/1966 YES YES YES 1966Q1 1966Q2
14 Public Law 90‐26 13/06/1967 06/1967 YES YES YES 1967Q2 1967Q3
15 Social Security Amendments of 1967 02/01/1968 01/1971 NO NO NO 1971Q1 1971Q1
16 Tax Reform Act of 1969 30/12/1969 01/1971 NO NO NO 1971Q1 1971Q1
30/12/1969 01/1972 NO NO NO 1972Q1 1972Q1
17 Reform of Depreciation Rules 11/01/1971 01/1971 YES YES YES 1971Q1 1971Q1
18 Revenue Act of 1971 10/12/1971 01/1972 NO YES YES 1972Q1 1972Q1
19 1972 Changes to Social Security 30/10/1972 01/1978 NO NO NO 1978Q1 1978Q1
20 Tax Reform Act of 1976 04/10/1976 10/1976 YES YES YES 1976Q4 1976Q4
04/10/1976 01/1977 NO NO NO 1977Q1 1977Q1
21 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act 
of 1977 23/05/1977 05/1977 YES YES YES 1977Q2 1977Q3
22 Social Security Amendments of 1977 20/12/1977 01/1979 NO NO NO 1979Q1 1979Q1
20/12/1977 01/1980 NO NO NO 1980Q1 1980Q1
20/12/1977 01/1981 NO NO NO 1981Q1 1981Q1
20/12/1977 01/1982 NO NO NO 1982Q1 1982Q1
23 Revenue Act of 1978 06/11/1978 01/1979 NO NO YES 1979Q1 1979Q1
24 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act 02/04/1980 04/1980 YES YES YES 1980Q2 1980Q2
 of 1980 02/04/1980 01/1981 NO NO NO 1981Q1 1981Q1
02/04/1980 01/1982 NO NO NO 1982Q1 1982Q1
25 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 13/08/1981 08/1981 YES YES YES 1981Q3 1981Q3
13/08/1981 01/1982 NO NO NO 1982Q1 1982Q1
13/08/1981 01/1983 NO NO NO 1983Q1 1983Q1
13/08/1981 01/1984 NO NO NO 1984Q1 1984Q1
26 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982 03/09/1982 01/1983 NO NO NO 1983Q1 1983Q1
27 Social Security Amendments of 1983 20/04/1983 01/1984 NO NO NO 1984Q1 1984Q1
20/04/1983 01/1985 NO NO NO 1985Q1 1985Q1
20/04/1983 01/1986 NO NO NO 1986Q1 1986Q1
20/04/1983 01/1988 NO NO NO 1988Q1 1988Q1
20/04/1983 01/1990 NO NO NO 1990Q1 1990Q1
28 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 18/07/1984 07/1984 YES YES YES 1984Q3 1984Q3
29 Tax Reform Act of 1986 22/10/1986 10/1986 YES YES YES 1986Q4 1986Q4
22/10/1986 01/1987 NO NO NO 1987Q1 1987Q1
22/10/1986 07/1987 NO NO NO 1987Q3 1987Q3
22/10/1986 01/1988 NO NO NO 1988Q1 1988Q1
30 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987 22/12/1987 01/1988 NO YES YES 1988Q1 1988Q1
31 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990 05/11/1990 01/1991 NO NO YES 1991Q1 1991Q1
32 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 10/08/1993 08/1993 YES YES YES 1993Q3 1993Q3
1993 10/08/1993 10/1993 NO NO YES 1993Q4 1993Q4
10/08/1993 01/1994 NO NO NO 1994Q1 1994Q1
33 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and 05/08/1997 01/2000 NO NO NO 2000Q1 2000Q1
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 05/08/1997 01/2002 NO NO NO 2002Q1 2002Q1
34 Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 07/06/2001 01/2002 NO NO NO 2002Q1 2002Q1
35 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 28/05/2003 05/2003 YES YES YES 2003Q2 2003Q3
Reconciliation Act of 2003 28/05/2003 01/2005 NO NO NO 2005Q1 2005Q1
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Table 1.A.2: Size and category of exogenous tax changes
Tax Act Our Timing Total Amount (in billion) Deficit‐Driven Long‐Run Personal Corporate Other
1 Social Security Amendments of 1947 1950Q1 0.75 0.75
2 Revenue Act of 1948 1948Q2 ‐5.00 ‐5.00 ‐5.00
3 Social Security Amendments of 1950 1954Q1 1.30 1.30
4 Expiration of Excess Profits Tax and 
Temporary Income Tax Increases
1954Q1 ‐1.30 ‐1.30
5 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 1954Q3 ‐1.40 ‐1.40 ‐0.80 ‐0.60
6 Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958 1958Q3 ‐0.50 ‐0.50 ‐0.50
7 Social Security Amendments of 1958 1960Q1 1.90 1.90
8 Federal‐Aid Highway Act of 1959 1959Q4 0.60 0.60 0.60
9 Social Security Amendments of 1958 1963Q1 2.00 2.00
10 Changes in Depreciation Guidelines  1962Q3 ‐1.35 ‐1.35 ‐1.35
and Revenue Act of 1962 1962Q4 ‐0.90 ‐0.90 ‐0.90
1963Q1 0.60 0.60 0.60
11 Revenue Act of 1964 1964Q1 ‐8.40 ‐8.40 ‐6.70 ‐1.70
1965Q1 ‐4.50 ‐4.50
12 Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965 1965Q2 ‐1.75 ‐1.75 ‐1.75
1966Q1 ‐1.75 ‐1.75
13 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 1966Q1 0.90 0.90 0.90
14 Public Law 90‐26 1967Q2 ‐1.60 ‐1.60 ‐1.60
15 Social Security Amendments of 1967 1971Q1 3.60 3.60
16 Tax Reform Act of 1969 1971Q1 ‐1.00 ‐1.00
1972Q1 ‐1.00 ‐1.00
17 Reform of Depreciation Rules 1971Q1 ‐2.80 ‐2.80 ‐2.80
18 Revenue Act of 1971 1972Q1 ‐8.00 ‐8.00 ‐3.80 ‐1.60 ‐2.60
19 1972 Changes to Social Security 1978Q1 2.90 2.90
20 Tax Reform Act of 1976 1976Q4 2.40 2.40 1.65 0.75
1977Q1 ‐0.80 ‐0.80
21 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 
1977
1977Q2 ‐7.00 ‐7.00 ‐5.40 ‐1.60
22 Social Security Amendments of 1977 1979Q1 8.80 8.80
1980Q1 1.70 1.70
1981Q1 17.20 17.20
1982Q1 1.50 1.50
23 Revenue Act of 1978 1979Q1 ‐18.90 ‐18.90 ‐14.80 ‐6.50
24 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act 1980Q2 8.20 8.20 8.20
 of 1980 1981Q1 4.10 4.10
1982Q1 4.10 4.10
25 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 1981Q3 ‐8.90 ‐8.90
1982Q1 ‐48.80 ‐48.80
1983Q1 ‐57.30 ‐57.30
1984Q1 ‐36.10 ‐36.10
26 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982
1983Q1 26.40 26.40
27 Social Security Amendments of 1983 1984Q1 12.10 12.10
1985Q1 8.80 8.80
1986Q1 4.20 4.20
1988Q1 15.50 15.50
1990Q1 10.30 10.30
28 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 1984Q3 8.00 8.00 5.6* 3.3* 0.4*
29 Tax Reform Act of 1986 1986Q4 22.70 22.70 22.70
1987Q1 ‐7.20 ‐7.20 ‐7.20
1987Q3 ‐20.00 ‐20.00
1988Q1 ‐7.20 ‐7.20
30 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987
1988Q1 10.80 10.80 0.80 7.50 2.50
31 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990
1991Q1 35.20 35.20 14.00* 1.00* 18.00*
32 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993Q3 22.80 22.80 22.80
1993 1993Q4 5.30 5.30 5.30
1994Q1 13.40 13.40
33 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and 2000Q1 1.70 1.70
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 2002Q1 0.60 0.60
34 Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001
2002Q1 ‐83.00 ‐83.00
35 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 2003Q2 ‐126.40 ‐126.40 ‐94.6* ‐31.2*
Reconciliation Act of 2003 2005Q1 68.10 68.10
Notes: *=deviations from the total amount by Romer and Romer (2009) are due to corrections
made by Mertens and Ravn (2013)
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Table 1.A.3: Sources and descriptions of variables
Variable Description Source
GDP Nominal GDP, seasonally adjusted, in billions of
USD; divided by the GDP deflator (2005=100) and
by population.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Durables
Consumption
Nominal personal consumption expenditures on
durable goods, seasonally adjusted, in billions of
USD; divided by the durables expenditures defla-
tor (2005=100) and by population.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Non-Durables
Consumption
Nominal personal consumption expenditures on
non-durable goods, seasonally adjusted, in billions
of USD; divided by the deflator for non-durable
consumption (2005=100) and by population.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Investment Nominal gross private domestic investment, sea-
sonally adjusted, in billions of USD; divided by
the private investment deflator (2005=100) and by
population.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Hours Product of hours worked and civilian non-farm em-
ployment; divided by population.
Dataset from
Mertens and
Ravn (2012)
Tax Revenues / GDP Federal government current tax receipts, season-
ally adjusted annual rate; divided by nominal
GDP.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Excess Bond
Premium for
Non-Financial Firms
(EBP)
See description in Section 1.2.2 and Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2012).
Dataset from
Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek
(2012)
Excess Bond
Premium for
Financial Firms
(FBP)
See description in Section 1.2.2 and Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2011).
Dataset from
Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek
(2011)
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Table 1.A.3: Sources and descriptions of variables
Variable Description Source
Average Personal
Income Tax Rate
(APITR)
APITR is defined as the sum of personal current
taxes and contributions to government social in-
surance; divided by personal taxable income.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Average Corporate
Income Tax Rate
(ACITR)
ACITR is defined as taxes on corporate profits;
divided by corporate profits. Profits by Federal
Reserve Banks are excluded.
FRED,
St. Louis Fed
Pre-Tax Return on
Assets of Commercial
Banks
Pre-tax income (variable PIQ)/total assets (vari-
able ATQ), annualized, in percent. Commercial
Banks: all institutions with NAICS code 522.
Constructed
from Compustat
After-Tax Return on
Assets of Commercial
Banks
Income before extraordinary items (variable
IBQ)/total assets (variable ATQ), annualized, in
percent. Commercial Banks: all institutions with
NAICS code 522.
Constructed
from Compustat
Return on Assets of
the Aggregate
Financial Sector
See Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). Data are an-
nualized, in percent.
Dataset from
Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek
(2012)
Loan Loss Provisions
/ Loan Ratio
Ratio of loan loss provisions (variable riad4230)
to total loans, net of unearned income (variable
rcon2122), annualized, in percent.
Bank
Regulatory
Database
Fraction of
Non-Performing C&I
Loans
Non-performing loans are defined as loans that are
more than 90 days past due or in non-accrual sta-
tus, in percent of total outstanding C&I loans.
Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation’s
Quarterly
Banking Profile
Database
Fraction of
Non-Performing Real
Estate Loans
Non-performing loans are defined as loans that
are more than 90 days past due or in non-accrual
status, in percent of total outstanding real estate
loans.
Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation’s
Quarterly
Banking Profile
Database
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Table 1.A.3: Sources and descriptions of variables
Variable Description Source
Excess Stock Market
Return
Difference between the quarterly (value-weighted)
stock market return (including dividends) of the
New York Stock Exchange minus the return on
short-run (3 months) T-Bills, annualized, in per-
cent.
Constructed
using data from
the Center for
Research in
Security Prices
(CRSP)
Price / Dividend
Ratio
Stock market data used in "Irrational Exuber-
ance", Princeton University Press, 2000, 2005,
2015, updated, see Shiller (2005).
http://www.
econ.yale.
edu/~shiller/
data/ie_data.
xls, retrieved
on May 19, 2015
Cyclically Adjusted
Price / Earnings
Ratio
Stock market data used in "Irrational Exuber-
ance", Princeton University Press, 2000, 2005,
2015, updated, see Shiller (2005).
http://www.
econ.yale.
edu/~shiller/
data/ie_data.
xls, retrieved
on May 19, 2015
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1.A.2 Figures
Figure 1.A.1: Unanticipated tax changes
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Notes: Unanticipated tax changes with a maximum implementation lag of 30 days. Tax changes are
given in percent of GDP. Source: Own derivations based on Romer and Romer (2010), as described
in Section 1.2.1.
Figure 1.A.2: Impulse responses of tax revenues/GDP
Notes: Impulse responses of tax revenues/GDP to a one percent increase in unanticipated taxes
relative to nominal GDP with 95 percent confidence intervals. VAR using no exogenous lags (left
panel) and one exogenous lag (right panel).
Chapter 1 51
Figure 1.A.3: Impulse responses of endogenous variables
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent increase in unanticipated taxes relative to nominal GDP
with 95 percent confidence intervals.
52 Tax Changes, Credit Markets, and Financial Frictions
Figure 1.A.4: Impulse responses of EBP and FBP
Notes: Impulse responses of excess bond premia for non-financial (left panel) and financial (right
panel) firms to a one percent increase in unanticipated taxes relative to nominal GDP with 95
percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.5: Personal and corporate income tax changes
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Personal Income Tax Changes
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Corporate Income Tax Changes
Notes: Personal income tax changes are given in percent of personal taxable income (left panel)
and corporate income tax changes are given in percent of corporate profits (right panel). Source:
Mertens and Ravn (2013).
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Figure 1.A.6: Impulse responses of APITR and ACITR
Notes: Cross-responses of the average personal income tax rate (APITR) and the average corpo-
rate income tax rate (ACITR) to a one percent increase in corporate and personal income taxes
respectively with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.7: Impulse responses of EBP and FBP
Notes: Impulse responses of excess bond premia for non-financial (left panel) and financial (right
panel) firms to a one percent increase in personal income taxes with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.A.8: Impulse responses of stock market variables
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent increase in personal income taxes with 90 percent (EMR)
and 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.A.9: Impulse responses of stock market variables without 2003 JGTRRA
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent increase in personal income taxes excluding the 2003
JGTRRA with 90 percent (EMR) and 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.10: Impulse responses of the return on assets of the aggregate financial sector
Notes: Impulse responses to the 2003 JGTRRA (left panel) and to personal income taxes excluding
the 2003 JGTRRA (right panel) with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.A.11: Impulse responses of EBP
Notes: Impulse responses of the excess bond premium for non-financial firms to the 2003 JGTRRA
(left panel) and to personal income taxes excluding the 2003 JGTRRA (right panel) with 95 percent
confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.12: Impulse responses of EBP and FBP
Notes: Impulse responses of excess bond premia for non-financial (left panel) and financial (right
panel) firms to a one percent increase in corporate income taxes with 95 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 1.A.13: Impulse responses of the return on assets of commercial banks
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent increase in corporate income taxes with 95 percent
confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.14: Impulse response of the excess stock market return
Notes: Impulse response to a one percent increase in corporate income taxes with 95 percent
confidence interval.
Figure 1.A.15: Impulse response of the share of loan loss provisions
Notes: Impulse response to a one percent increase in corporate income taxes with 95 percent
confidence interval.
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Figure 1.A.16: Impulse responses of the share of non-performing loans
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent increase in corporate income taxes with 95 percent
confidence intervals.
Figure 1.A.17: Impulse responses of the share of non-performing C&I loans
Notes: Impulse responses to the corporate income tax component of specific tax acts with 95 percent
confidence intervals. Results based on dummy variable approach.
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Figure 1.A.18: Impulse responses of the share of loan loss provisions
Notes: Impulse responses to the corporate income tax component of specific tax acts with 95 percent
confidence intervals. Results based on dummy variable approach.
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Figure 1.A.19: Impulse responses of the return on assets of commercial banks
Notes: Impulse responses to the corporate income tax component of specific tax acts with 95 percent
confidence intervals. Results based on dummy variable approach.
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Figure 1.A.20: Impulse responses of FBP
Notes: Impulse responses of the excess bond premium for financial firms to the corporate income
tax component of specific tax acts with 95 percent confidence intervals. Results based on dummy
variable approach.
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Figure 1.A.21: Impulse responses of EBP
Notes: Impulse responses of the excess bond premium for non-financial firms to the corporate income
tax component of specific tax acts with 95 percent confidence intervals. Results based on dummy
variable approach.
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Figure 1.A.22: Failure rates of firms
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Notes: Failure rates of firms in different sectors. Source: Own calculations based on Business
Dynamics Survey.

2 The Importance of Investment Wedges for
the Transmission of Tax Changes
Joint with Christoph Winter
2.1 Introduction
In the first paper of this thesis, we have shown empirically that taxes have an impact
on credit market conditions. In the present paper, we take a theoretical approach and
demonstrate that investment wedges, which can be caused by financial frictions, are also
important for the modeling of the transmission of tax changes.
The starting point for our second paper is the fact that empirically, tax changes
have substantial effects on real economic activity, as has been widely documented by
the previous literature.1 Tax multipliers are especially large for durables purchases and
investment, which suggests that these two variables are the driving forces behind the
contractionary effect of tax changes on the economy as a whole.2 It is therefore crucial
to understand why they react to tax changes in such a strong way. Previous research has
shown that existing models for the transmission of tax changes have difficulties explaining
the large tax multipliers of durables purchases and investment.3
The goal of our paper is to quantify the additional investment wedges needed on top
of standard tax distortions in order to explain the large tax multipliers for durables pur-
chases and investment that we observe in the data. As a measurement tool, we use an
augmented RBC model. We argue that any model that wants to successfully account
for the transmission of tax changes needs to be consistent with the additional investment
wedges implied by our exercise. As a second contribution, we discuss possible microfoun-
dations that can endogenously generate these additional investment wedges. We argue
that financial frictions are obvious candidates. Thus, our results provide important guid-
ance for the modeling of the transmission of tax changes and for the modeling of financial
frictions.
1See e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer (2010), and Mertens and Ravn (2011,
2012, 2013, 2014).
2See e.g. Romer and Romer (2010) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
3See e.g. Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011), and Zubairy (2014).
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Our paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, we empirically document that
an increase in tax liabilities by one percent of GDP decreases investment and durables
purchases by more than seven percent. We do so by replicating the results by Mertens and
Ravn (2011), who identify exogenous tax liability changes in the US using the narrative
approach by Romer and Romer (2010). More generally, large tax multipliers for private
investment are a robust feature of the data and are independent of the identification
scheme used.4
In the second part of our paper, we analyze to what extent distortions that are caused
by an increase in the labor and capital income tax can generate the empirically observable
tax multipliers. To this end, we estimate the processes of labor and capital income taxes
in an RBC model that we augment by real rigidities such as adjustment costs, varying
capital utilization, and habits, as in Mertens and Ravn (2011). We discipline the response
of taxes by imposing that tax liabilities increase by one percent of GDP, as in the data.
Our results suggest that the implied distortions are too weak and are not able to account
for the large empirical tax multipliers. This is a common finding in the literature, see
e.g. Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011), and Zubairy (2014). Our
estimates reveal that additional investment wedges are necessary in order to generate
the empirically documented responses of investment and durables purchases. Specifically,
our results suggest that separate wedges for durables and capital investment are needed
in order to match the data. Furthermore, both additional wedges should be positively
affected by tax changes.
In summary, we demonstrate that a model that successfully accounts for the empirical
response of investment and durables purchases to tax changes requires two additional
investment wedges on top of the standard tax distortions. In doing so, we contribute to
the literature that models the transmission of taxes, such as Baxter and King (1993),
McGrattan (1994), Braun (1994), and Mertens and Ravn (2011). In our model, we do
not take a stand on the microfoundations of these additional investment wedges. Instead,
we follow Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), who demonstrate that the effect of dis-
tortions in a variety of models can be replicated by introducing time-varying wedges into
an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. Whereas they argue that investment
wedges are not key in order to explain business cycles, we show that these wedges are
crucial for the modeling of the transmission of tax changes.
In the third part of our paper, we discuss possible microfoundations that are able to
generate investment wedges endogenously. We argue that financial frictions are obvious
candidates because they can give rise to investment wedges such as e.g. spreads between
borrowing and lending rates or borrowing constraints. We show that credit spreads in the
4See Ramey (2015) for a recent overview of the empirical literature on the estimation of tax multipliers.
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data also react to tax changes.
Under the assumption that investment wedges are generated by financial frictions, our
results provide guidance on how these frictions should be modeled. This is an important
contribution, given the diversity of modeling approaches (see e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki
2010 and Quadrini 2011 for recent surveys). As a consequence, tax changes can affect
financial frictions through a host of potential channels. Based on our findings, we conclude
that the right model should have a channel that induces a positive comovement between
investment wedges and tax changes and should generate a response in the wedges for both
capital and durables investment. In this context, we discuss several alternative modeling
approaches.
A prominent strand of the literature models financial frictions as an agency prob-
lem at the level of entrepreneurs, see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). This approach cannot ex-
plain investment wedges for durables because, by definition, these goods are purchased
by households.5 Moreover, in all of these models, the intensity of the financial friction is
inversely related to the net worth of entrepreneurs. However, depending on the specific
model environment and tax instrument considered, the net worth position may actually
improve after a tax increase, as demonstrated by Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and Strulik
(2008).6 Thus, these models may generate a negative comovement between tax changes
and investment wedges, which is inconsistent with our results.
We conclude that our findings support recent theories of financial frictions that operate
at the level of financial intermediaries, such as e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler
and Karadi (2011), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2013),
and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). In these models, the intensity of the friction is
related to the net worth of financial intermediaries. Under the assumption that both firms
and households borrow from the intermediary, these models can generate wedges for both
durables and capital investment. As long as a tax increase reduces the intermediaries’ net
worth, these models may furthermore be able to predict the positive comovement between
taxes and investment wedges implied by our results.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 derives empirical
impulse responses of economic variables to a tax shock. Section 2.3 describes the model,
which is estimated in Section 2.4. The results from our impulse response matching exercise
5According to the NIPA definition, durables consumption is part of personal consumption, which is
purchased by households and nonprofit institutions serving households.
6In Fernández-Villaverde (2010), higher taxes imply higher inflation, which increases net worth and
thus decreases interest rate spreads. The model by Strulik (2008) predicts a lower risk premium after
an increase in private capital income taxes because the firms’ equity is worth more compared to (taxed)
debt finance.
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are presented in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we discuss the implications of our results.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Estimation
In this section, we empirically estimate the effect of tax changes on real economic activity.
For this purpose, we replicate the results by Mertens and Ravn (2011). In the following,
we provide a broad overview of their estimation strategy.
Exogenous tax changes are identified using the narrative approach by Romer and
Romer (2010). Mertens and Ravn (2011) furthermore divide the resulting dataset into
anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. A tax act is classified as anticipated if the
time span between its announcement and implementation date is longer than 90 days.
This results in 36 anticipated and 34 unanticipated tax changes. Based on these data,
they specify the following VAR model:
Xt = A+Bt+ C(L)Xt−1 +D(L)τut + F (L)τ
a
t,0 +
K∑
i=1
Giτ
a
t,i + et (2.1)
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, whose responses are characterized by a lag
polynomial of order P , referred to as C(L). Tax changes, on the other hand, enter the
VAR as exogenous variables. Unanticipated tax changes are denoted by τut . Anticipated
tax changes, τat,i, are included in the VAR as soon as they are announced, with a maximum
implementation lag of 16 quarters. Within this time span, any tax change that is known in
time t and that is going to be implemented in time t+ i is used as a control variable. The
coefficients on unanticipated and implemented anticipated tax changes are represented
by D(L) and F (L), which are lag polynomials of order R + 1. A is a constant and B is
the coefficient on a linear time trend. Following Mertens and Ravn (2011), we use one
endogenous and twelve exogenous lags, i.e. P = 1 and R = 12.
Our variables of interest are collected in the vector of endogenous variables, which
consists of real GDP, real consumption of nondurable goods and services, real expendi-
tures on durable goods, real private and government investment, and hours worked. All
variables are divided by population and thus are in per capita terms. We use the data
by Mertens and Ravn (2011), who retrieve them from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.7
All endogenous variables enter the VAR in Equation (2.1) in logarithms.
In this paper, we are interested in the effect of an unanticipated tax increase on our
endogenous variables. Therefore, anticipated tax changes only act as control variables
7Hours worked are partly obtained from Francis and Ramey (2004).
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses to an unanticipated tax increase
Notes: Empirical impulse responses after an increase in unanticipated taxes by one percent of GDP.
Estimates from a VAR with one endogenous and twelve exogenous lags. Shaded areas correspond
to 68 percent confidence intervals.
and are not affected by the shock. Figure 2.1 presents the impulse responses to a tax
increase by one percent of GDP for the first 24 quarters after the shock. Shaded areas
correspond to 68 percent confidence intervals, which are computed using a bootstrap with
10’000 replications. We find tax multipliers at the peak of 2.2 percent for GDP, 1.1
percent for nondurables consumption, and 1.2 percent for hours worked. The multipliers
for durables purchases and investment are especially large. They amount to 7.3 percent
and 7.7 percent respectively.
As mentioned above, our results are based on the narrative approach by Romer and
Romer (2010), which has also been used by Favero and Giavazzi (2012) and Mertens
and Ravn (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Alternatively, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use sign
restrictions in a VAR and find even larger tax multipliers. Another prominent method
identifies tax shocks in a structural VAR. This approach was first applied by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In line with our findings, they also document a highly significant
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reaction of investment to tax changes. However, their multipliers are quantitatively not
comparable to ours because their results hinge on an inappropriate assumption about the
elasticity of tax revenues to GDP. As demonstrated by Caldara and Kamps (2012), the
estimates by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) are sensitive to small changes in this elasticity.8
According to Mertens and Ravn (2014), the true output elasticity of tax revenues is higher
than originally assumed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). With this new value, which is
derived using the narrative tax series as an instrument in a structural VAR, Mertens and
Ravn (2014) find tax multipliers that are in the same range as our results.
Based on these findings, we conclude that in the data, there is a strong reaction of
economic variables to a tax change. The effect is especially pronounced for investment
and durables purchases.9 As documented above, these results are independent of the
identification scheme used. In particular, Romer and Romer (2010) and Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) both argue that the high response of investment is the driving force behind
the tax multiplier for output.
In this paper, we demonstrate that an augmented version of the standard RBC model
with tax wedges is not able to explain the large tax multipliers of investment and durables
purchases. This is a common finding in the literature, see e.g. Romer and Romer (2010),
Mertens and Ravn (2011), and Zubairy (2014).10 The goal of our paper is to quantify
the additional investment wedges needed in order to match the empirical responses of
investment and durables purchases to a tax change.
2.3 Model
The aim of this section is to develop a model of distortionary taxation that can explain
the large tax multipliers documented in our empirical estimation. In order to do so, we
start from classical models such as McGrattan (1994), Braun (1994), and Baxter and
King (1993), and additionally incorporate several features that have been shown to be
relevant for the transmission of tax changes to real economic activity. In particular,
we allow for habit formation, investment and durables adjustment costs, and varying
8Note that Perotti (2012) points out that there is an additional bias in the tax multipliers calculated
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). He argues that their estimates are biased towards zero because they
do not take into account that the discretionary and endogenous component of a tax change may affect
economic variables in a different way.
9Romer and Romer (2010) show that the high multiplier on investment is not driven by those tax
acts that change investment incentives. In fact, when they exclude these tax changes from their sample,
the estimated response of investment becomes even higher.
10The paper by Romer and Romer (2010) is purely empirical. However, they argue that the high
investment multipliers found in their analysis cannot be explained by interest rate effects in conventional
models. Furthermore, note that Zubairy (2014) does not include durables purchases in her estimation
and therefore, she does not provide tax multipliers for this variable.
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capital utilization, as e.g. in Auerbach (1986), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004),
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), and Mertens and Ravn (2011).
Using this model, we show that standard tax wedges are not able to account for the
large empirical tax multipliers of durables purchases and investment documented in the
previous section. Therefore, we introduce two additional investment wedges in our model.
In our estimation, we then quantify the size of these additional investment distortions
that are needed in order to match the empirical tax multipliers of durables purchases and
investment. Our findings provide helpful guidance for the construction of models that
successfully explain the transmission of taxes.
Following Hall (2011), we model our additional investment wedges as a wedge be-
tween borrowing and lending rates for capital and durables investment. The advantage
of this approach is that it allows us to introduce separate investment wedges for capital
and durable goods. In the following, we refer to these additional investment wedges as
‘frictions’. This notation is inspired by Hall (2011), who interprets this type of wedges as
financial frictions. In Section 2.6, we discuss whether this interpretation is appropriate in
our context.
In the language of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), our model thus gives rise to
four wedges, with each of them affecting a different set of equilibrium conditions. The
capital income tax distorts the households’ intertemporal Euler equation and can therefore
be interpreted as an investment wedge. Labor income taxes, on the other hand, affect
the (intratemporal) labor supply decision by households. Accordingly, Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2007) call them labor wedges. Our two additional frictions furthermore
drive a wedge between the interest rate paid by capital and durables investors and the
return received by households on their savings. Using the notation by Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2007), these two frictions therefore correspond to investment wedges.
Note that we refer to wedges that distort intertemporal equilibrium conditions, such
as the Euler equation, as intertemporal wedges. Wedges that affect static optimality
conditions, such as the labor-leisure choice, are called intratemporal wedges.
2.3.1 Overview of the Model
In order to model borrowing and lending rates explicitly, we need to depart from the
standard RBC framework in which the representative household owns all the capital of
the economy. We do so by introducing capital and durable good traders, who take out
loans to buy capital and durables, which they then rent to final good producers and to
the household. Two additional investment wedges cause the lending rate paid by traders
to be higher than the borrowing rate faced by the household. The resulting interest rate
spread is allowed to differ for capital and durable good traders.
72 Investment Wedges and the Transmission of Tax Changes
Figure 2.2: Interaction of agents in the model
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Accordingly, there are six agents in our model. A representative household consumes
durable and final goods. It supplies labor to final good producers and pays taxes on
its capital and wage income to the government. The durable goods consumed by the
household are produced by durable good producers. They transform final output into
new durable goods and combine them with depreciated durables from the previous period.
Capital is produced by capital good producers in an analogous manner, reusing old capital
and producing new capital using final output. Capital and durable goods are then sold
to capital and durable good traders, who rent durables to the household and capital
to final good producers. Traders borrow from the financial intermediary in order to
purchase capital and durables, which are later sold back to the producers. The financial
intermediary stands between the household, who acts as a lender, and traders. Investment
wedges cause the interest rate paid by traders to be higher than the interest rate received
by the household. Furthermore, the government raises a tax on returns to saving and
labor income. It uses the income from the household’s tax payments in order to finance
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its own consumption, which is exogenously given and constant over time. The government
budget constraint is balanced by lump-sum transfers to or from the household. Figure
2.2 provides an overview of the interaction between all the agents in our model.
2.3.2 Model Details
The following subsection describes every agent’s problem and optimality conditions. A full
list of all equations used in our estimation is provided in Section 2.A.1 in the Appendix.
For the sake of clarity, we apply a timing convention in which every variable carries the
time subscript of the period in which it is determined.11 The exact timing of our model
is summarized in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Timing of the model
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The Representative Household
The infinitely lived representative household gets utility from consuming a composite
consumption good c, consisting of final goods cy and durable goods d. Furthermore, it
gets disutility from supplying labor h to final good producers at a wage w. The final
good consumed by the household is produced by final good producers and its price is
11State variables therefore usually have a time subscript t−1, whereas control variables are determined
contemporaneously and therefore carry a time subscript t.
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normalized to one. Durables are rented to the household by durable good traders at price
pd.
The household can acquire bonds B that pay an interest rate r. The return on these
bonds as well as the household’s labor income are taxed at rates τk and τn respectively. In
the following, we will refer to τk as the capital tax and to τn as the labor income tax. The
labor tax gives rise to an intratemporal wedge in the household’s problem, whereas the
capital tax creates an intertemporal wedge. In addition, the household receives lump-sum
transfers T from the government and F , which denotes the loss that arises due to our
additional investment frictions. Given that we are interested in the distortion caused by
the friction and not in its income effect, this technicality ensures that we can quantita-
tively compare the model with frictions to a model that only contains tax wedges. The
definition and timing of F are described in more detail later in this section.
The household’s problem is given by:
max
cy,t,dt−1,ht,Bt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − γ
h1+ψt
1 + ψ
)
s.t. Bt = Bt−1 + (1− τn,t)wtht + (1− τk,t)rt−1Bt−1 − cy,t − pd,tdt−1 + Tt + Ft−1
& ct = c
φ
y,td
1−φ
t−1 − picφy,t−1d1−φt−2
The first constraint is the standard budget constraint and the second one is the definition
of composite consumption, which features habit formation.
The optimality conditions of the representative household are listed in the following.
Euler equation:
[c−σt − βpiEtc−σt+1]
(
dt−1
cy,t
)1−φ
= βEt[1 + (1− τk,t+1)rt][c−σt+1 − βpic−σt+2]
(
dt
cy,t+1
)1−φ
(2.2)
Labor-leisure choice:
[c−σt − βpiEtc−σt+1]φ
(
dt−1
cy,t
)1−φ
=
γhΨt
(1− τn,t)wt (2.3)
Choice of the optimal consumption mix:
φ
1− φ
dt−1
cy,t
pd,t = 1 (2.4)
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It is important to note that it is essential for our analysis that we are able to distinguish
between intra- and intertemporal wedges in order to quantify their relative importance.
Thus, our capital tax wedge differs from other models in the sense that it only distorts
intertemporal decisions. In contrast, Mertens and Ravn (2011) e.g. levy a tax on utilized
capital, which – in the language of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) – gives rise to
an intratemporal efficiency wedge via utilization and an intertemporal investment wedge
via capital.
Final Good Producers
Final good producers face a Cobb-Douglas production function that generates final goods
y using labor h and (utilized) capital k˜t ≡ utkt−1. Capital k˜ is rented from capital good
traders at a given utilization rate u at price pk. The final good is then sold to the house-
hold for consumption and to capital and durable good producers, who use it in order to
create new capital and durable goods for the next period.
The final good producers’ problem is given by:12
max
k˜t,ht
νk˜αt h
1−α
t − wtht − k˜tpk,t
The optimality conditions of the final good producers read as:
pk,t = ναk˜
α−1
t h
1−α
t (2.5)
and
wt = ν(1− α)k˜αt h−αt (2.6)
Capital and Durable Good Traders
Capital and durable good traders face a two-period problem. At the end of the first period,
traders buy capital k and durable goods d from capital and durable good producers at
prices qk and qd.13 Capital and durable good traders do not have any net worth and
therefore, they have to take out loans Lk and Ld in order to finance their purchases.
Following Hall (2011), we assume that the total of capital and durable goods are debt
12Note that ν is just a scaling factor, which we use in order to normalize y = 1 in steady state. It does
not change the model dynamics because it drops out in the log-linearization.
13q corresponds to Tobin’s q and is defined as the ratio of the price of installed and uninstalled capital.
Installed capital has already been produced (it is just the depreciated old capital), whereas uninstalled
capital has not been produced yet (its price is the production cost of one unit of capital, which is the
price of one unit of the final good in our economy and is normalized to py = 1).
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financed. This is unlike the literature that usually assumes that entrepreneurs (who can
be interpreted as traders in our framework) own wealth that can be used to finance
investments, such as e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In contrast to their
model, our setup allows us to interpret the spread between the borrowing and lending
rate as an investment wedge because it ensures that it is always non-zero.14
At the beginning of the second period, capital good traders observe shocks to the
economy and choose capital utilization u. They rent capital at this fixed utilization rate
k˜ = uk to final good producers at price pk. Durable good traders rent durable goods d to
the household at price pd.
At the end of the second period, traders sell the depreciated capital and durable goods
back to capital and durable good producers at prices qk and qd respectively. They then
pay back their loans, including interest payments. And this is where our two additional
investment frictions play an important role. Capital good traders pay an interest rate
r + fk and durable good traders pay r + fd, whereas the household faces an interest rate
r. Thus, fk and fd can be interpreted as capital and durables frictions that drive a wedge
between the return on saving and the cost of borrowing.
At the beginning of period t, the problem of capital good traders is to choose capital
utilization, taking the capital stock as given:
max
ut
pk,tutkt−1 + (1− δk − Ω(ut))kt−1qk,t − (1 + rt−1 + fk,t−1)Lk,t−1
where δk is the depreciation rate of capital and Ω(ut) is the utilization cost function.
The first order condition with respect to u yields:
pk,t = Ω
′(ut)qk,t (2.7)
At the end of period t, the problem of capital good traders is to choose the amount of
capital they want to buy from capital good producers, which also determines the size of
the loan. Their problem is to maximize expected profits:
max
Lk,t,kt
λt [Lk,t − ktqk,t]
+ Etβλt+1 [pk,t+1ut+1kt + (1− δk − Ω(ut+1))ktqk,t+1 − (1 + rt + fk,t)Lk,t]
s.t ktqk,t ≤ Lk,t
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier from the household’s problem. The constraint is
14If we want to interpret our investment wedges as financial frictions, our results should be seen as
an upper bound for the importance of these frictions because in reality, entrepreneurs own positive net
worth.
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binding as long as rt + fk,t > 0, which is by definition always the case. Therefore, we can
directly substitute Lk,t = ktqk,t in the capital good traders’ problem. This leaves us with
the following optimization problem:
max
kt
Etβλt+1 [pk,t+1ut+1kt + (1− δk − Ω(ut+1))ktqk,t+1 − (1 + rt + fk,t)ktqk,t]
From the first order condition with respect to capital, we can derive the rental price for
capital:
Etpk,t+1ut+1 = Et [(1 + rt + fk,t)qk,t − (1− δk − Ω(ut+1))qk,t+1] (2.8)
By symmetry, we have the problem of the durable good traders (given Ld,t = dtqd,t):
max
dt
Etβλt+1 [pd,t+1dt + (1− δd)dtqd,t+1 − (1 + rt + fd,t)dtqd,t]
with solution:
Etpd,t+1 = Et [(1 + rt + fd,t)qd,t − (1− δd)qd,t+1] (2.9)
Given the size of the loans by capital and durable good traders, the loss that arises due
to our additional investment wedges compared to a frictionless economy is equal to:
Ft = fk,tqk,tkt + fd,tqd,tdt (2.10)
F is given back to the household as a lump-sum transfer. This is necessary because when
we compare different economies, we want to focus on the distortionary effect of the friction
and not on its income effect. Note that the friction loss is already known in period t, but
will only be paid in period t+1. Therefore, the lump-sum transfer Ft takes place in period
t+ 1.
Capital and Durable Good Producers
Capital and durable good producers buy depreciated capital and durables (denoted by
x and z respectively) back from traders after the final good production has taken place.
In addition, they use their technology in order to transform the final good one-to-one
into new units of capital and durables. When doing so, they pay capital and durable
adjustment costs, determined by the functions Sk
(
It
It−1
)
and Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
, on the deviation
of investment in the current period from the previous period. At the end of the period,
capital and durable good producers combine the purchased (already installed) capital and
durables with the newly produced units and sell them at price qk and qd to the traders.
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The problem of the capital good producers is then given by:
max
xt,It
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiλt+iPkt+i
where Pkt = qk,t
[
xt + [1− Sk
(
It
It−1
)
]It
]
− qk,txt − It
λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s problem.
In a first step, capital good producers choose how much of the already installed (de-
preciated) capital xt they want to buy. The corresponding first order condition is:
∂Pkt
∂xt
= qk,t − qk,t = 0
Therefore, any amount of xt satisfies the optimality condition of the capital good produc-
ers. And it is also consistent with their optimality condition to buy all installed capital
available in the economy:
xt = (1− δk − Ω(ut))kt−1
and thus:
kt = (1− δk − Ω(ut))kt−1 + [1− Sk
(
It
It−1
)
]It (2.11)
By symmetry, it is optimal for durable good producers to buy all installed durables:
zt = (1− δd)dt−1
and thus:
dt = (1− δd)dt−1 + [1− Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
]Vt (2.12)
In a second step, capital good producers choose the level of investment in new capital It.
This is a dynamic problem and the optimality condition reads as follows:
1− qk,t
[
1− Sk
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′k
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
= βEt
λt+1
λt
qk,t+1S
′
k
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2
(2.13)
By symmetry, the optimality condition for investment in durable goods is given by:
1− qd,t
[
1− Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
− S ′d
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
Vt
Vt−1
]
= βEt
λt+1
λt
qd,t+1S
′
d
(
Vt+1
Vt
)(
Vt+1
Vt
)2
(2.14)
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Government
The government in our model is modeled in a very simple manner because we are not
interested in an optimal taxation exercise. It consumes a constant amount G over time
and finances this consumption using taxes on labor income, τn,t, and on interest earnings
on bonds, τk,t. In order to balance the government’s budget, we furthermore introduce
lump-sum transfers T between the government and the household that can be either
positive or negative. The government’s budget constraint is:
G = τn,twtht + τk,trt−1Bt−1 − Tt (2.15)
where G = g · y¯, i.e. government consumption is a constant and time-invariant fraction
of final output in steady state.
The Financial Intermediary
Following Hall (2011), the financial intermediary in our model is not an agent in the
classical sense. Its only purpose is to transform bonds purchased by the household into
loans for the traders. However, it does not make any decisions and hence does not behave
according to any optimality conditions. We simply introduce the financial intermediary
in order to explicitly model investment wedges between borrowers and lenders. However,
we do not take a stand on the microfoundations of these wedges. Instead, we focus
on quantifying the importance of our additional frictions for explaining the large tax
multipliers of durables and capital investment.
Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in this model is given by a sequence of prices {wt, rt, qk,t,
qd,t, pk,t, pd,t}∞t=0, policies {τk,t, τn,t}∞t=0, frictions {fk,t, fd,t}∞t=0, and allocations {yt, cy,t, dt, ht,
kt, Bt, It, Vt, ut, Tt, Ft}∞t=0 that solve the optimization problems of all agents and satisfy
equations (2.2)-(2.15). All markets clear. Specifically, bond market clearing requires:
Lt = Lk,t + Ld,t = Bt (2.16)
and good market clearing requires:15
yt = cy,t + It + Sk
(
It
It−1
)
It + Vt + Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
Vt +G (2.17)
15Note that the friction loss F does not enter the good market clearing condition because it is given
to the household as a lump-sum transfer and therefore, it is already included in consumption.
80 Investment Wedges and the Transmission of Tax Changes
In a next step, we use our model in order to quantify the importance of our additional
investment wedges, fk and fd, for explaining the large empirical tax multipliers of durables
and capital investment. We do so by estimating the key parameters of the model by
indirect inference. We then decompose the total response in order to understand the
contribution of each of our four wedges. However, before proceeding to the estimation of
our model, we need to define the stochastic processes that determine τk,t, τn,t, fk,t, and
fd,t.
2.3.3 Definition of Stochastic Processes
The functional forms that we assume for utilization and investment adjustment costs are
defined in Section 2.A.3 in the Appendix. The description of the stochastic processes for
tax rates and for our additional investment wedges are provided in this subsection.
Tax Processes
Following McGrattan (1994) and Mertens and Ravn (2011), we assume that the tax rates
follow an AR(2) process:
τk,t = (1− ρk,1 − ρk,2)τk + ρk,1τk,t−1 + ρk,2τk,t−2 + εkt (2.18)
τn,t = (1− ρn,1 − ρn,2)τn + ρn,1τn,t−1 + ρn,2τn,t−2 + εnt (2.19)
where τk and τn without time subscripts denote steady state tax rates.
Friction Processes
We assume that the capital and durables frictions follow an AR(2) process:16
fk,t = (1− ρfk,1 − ρfk,2)fk + ρfk,1fk,t−1 + ρfk,2fk,t−2 + εfk,t (2.20)
fd,t = (1− ρfd,1 − ρfd,2)fd + ρfd,1fd,t−1 + ρfd,2fd,t−2 + εfd,t (2.21)
where fk and fd without time subscripts denote steady state capital and durables frictions
respectively. In our analysis, we distinguish between three different cases for fk,t and fd,t.
In our first specification, fk,t and fd,t are set to zero in all time periods. This corresponds
to our baseline model, in which we only consider tax wedges. In our second specification,
fk,t = fk and fd,t = fd are calibrated in steady state and are held constant over time.
In a third specification, we furthermore allow fk,t and fd,t to react dynamically to tax
16Our assumption is based on the fact that the literature usually assumes an AR(2) process for tax
wedges (see e.g. McGrattan 1994 and Mertens and Ravn 2011). Thus, we use the same stochastic process
for our additional investment wedges.
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changes. In that case, εfk,t and εfd,t depend on the deviation of tax revenues over final
output, denoted by TR
y
, from their steady state value, i.e. TR0
y0
− TR
y
. Specifically, the error
terms are assumed to react on impact (i.e. in period t = 0) to a tax shock in the follow-
ing way: εfk,0 = ξk
(
TR0
y0
− TR
y
)
and εfd,0 = ξd
(
TR0
y0
− TR
y
)
. Thus, ξk and ξd determine
the transmission from tax changes to our additional frictions. In our experiment, we set
TR0
y0
− TR
y
= 0.01 and therefore, ξk and ξd can be directly interpreted as the percentage
point increase in the interest rate wedges for capital and durable good traders.
Given the parametrization described above, the structural parameters of our model can
be summarized in the vector Θ:
Θ = [α, β, γ, δk, δd, ν, φ, b, g, τk, τn, fk, fd, σ,Ψ, pi, a, S
′′
k , ...
...S ′′d , ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd]
We are now ready to proceed to the estimation of our model. In doing so, we will
calibrate some basic parameters and estimate the remaining elements in Θ. The estimation
procedure is described in the following section.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we estimate the structural parameters of our model by matching our
empirical and theoretical impulse responses.
2.4.1 Calibration
We divide the parameter vector Θ into two parts: Θ = [Θ1,Θ2]′, where Θ1 are the
parameters that we calibrate based on empirical findings from the literature. Θ2, on the
other hand, are the parameters that we estimate by indirect inference. The two vectors
contain the following parameters:
Θ1 = [α, β, γ, δk, δd, ν, φ, b, g, τk, τn, fk, fd]
Θ2 = [σ,Ψ, pi, a, S
′′
k , S
′′
d , ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd]
The values and sources used in the calibration of Θ1 are summarized in Table 2.1.
The elements of Θ2, on the other hand, differ across specifications and are therefore listed
separately for every version of the model in Section 2.5.
The capital share α in the Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed to be 36
percent and the discount factor β is set to an annual rate of 3 percent. Following Mertens
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Param. Explanation Value Target / Source
α Capital share 0.36 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
β Discount factor 0.9926 Annual rate of 3%
γ Weight of hours varies Match 25% in steady state (Mertens
and Ravn 2011)
δk Capital depreciation 0.025 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
δd Durable depreciation 0.025 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
ν Final good production function varies Match y¯ = 1 in steady state
φ Parameter in composite consumption varies Match 11.9% consumption share of
durables in steady state (Mertens and
Ravn 2011)
b Capital utilization parameter varies Match u¯ = 1 in steady state
g Government consumption 0.201 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
τk Steady state capital income tax rate 0.42 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
τn Steady state labor income tax rate 0.26 Mertens and Ravn (2011)
fk Steady state capital friction 0.016 Historical average of GZ spread by
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
fd Steady state durables friction 0.06 Historical average of car and personal
loan spreads (FRED)
and Ravn (2011), the depreciation parameters for capital and durable goods, δk and δd,
are equal to 2.5 percent.
The steady state share of government consumption in total output amounts to 20.1
percent and capital and labor income tax rates, τk and τn, are set to 42 and 26 percent
respectively. These values correspond to the estimates reported by Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994) and are similar to the ones found by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).17
γ denotes the weight of labor in the utility function and is defined such that hours
worked in steady state are equal to 25 percent of total available time. φ is set such that
the steady state share of durable goods in total consumption is equal to 11.9 percent.
ν multiplies the production function of final goods and is calibrated such that y¯ = 1 in
steady state. The capital utilization parameter b is set to match a utilization rate of one,
i.e. u¯ = 1, in steady state. The latter four parameter values differ across specifications
and are reported in Section 2.5 for each version of the model, together with the values of
the parameters in vector Θ2.
Last but not least, we need to calibrate the steady state values of our frictions, fk
and fd. As explained in the previous section, these wedges result in a spread between
borrowing and lending rates in our model. Thus, we determine their values using the
17Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) find average effective labor and capital income tax rates for the US of
28 and 36 percent respectively. They apply the same methodology as Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994),
extending the time period used in their calculations. Additionally, Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) report an
average share of tax revenues in total GDP of 18 percent.
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historical average of credit spreads from the data as empirical counterparts.18 For the
capital friction, fk, we compute the average of the GZ spread developed by Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2012) for the entire time period available (i.e. from 1973M1-2010M9). The
GZ spread is constructed based on micro-level data for securities by non-financial firms
in the US. It therefore has a high information content and is not subject to the duration
mismatch present in classical credit spreads. Accordingly, the capital friction, fk, is set to
1.6 percentage points. For the durables friction, fd, we rely on credit spreads for car and
personal loans. Data are obtained from the FRED database.19 We compute the average of
the spread between personal loans (2 years) and Treasuries (2 years) for 1976Q1-2014Q4
and the average of the spread between car loans (4 years) and Treasuries (5 years) for
1972Q2-2014Q3. Taking into account the duration mismatch on car loan spreads, this
yields an overall value of 6 percentage points for the durables friction in steady state.
Parameter Constraints
The parameters in Θ2 are estimated subject to several constraints implied by theory.
Specifically, values for the habit parameter range from zero to one, i.e. 0 ≤ pi < 1.
Furthermore, we restrict the parameters that determine adjustment costs and capital
utilization to be greater or equal to zero: S ′′k ≥ 0, S ′′d ≥ 0, and a ≥ 0.
Constraints on preference parameters are less straightforward. In particular, as our
utility function features habit formation, we cannot interpret 1
σ
as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Nevertheless, we can still interpret σ as the coefficient of relative
risk aversion.20 A risk aversion of zero implies risk neutrality and is not consistent with
empirical findings. Following the literature (see e.g. Meier and Müller 2006), we restrict
σ > 1. We furthermore limit ψ ≥ 0.5, which implies a Frisch elasticity of less than 2.
For the autoregressive coefficients of the tax and friction processes, we require that
the AR(2) is stable. This implies that both roots need to be smaller than 1. Specifically,
we set an upper bound of 0.999 in order to make sure that the processes do not become
unstable for small deviations. Furthermore, we require the roots to be non-complex. We
do so by forcing ρ21 + 4ρ2 ≥ 0.01.21
18Note that Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) also use historical averages in order to calibrate
their friction in steady state.
19http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, retrieved on March 16, 2015.
20The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as −ctu
′′(ct)
u′(ct)
and does not have any inter-
temporal components. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, on the other hand, is defined as
− ∂ ln[ct+1/ct]∂ ln[u′(ct+1)/u′(ct)] , which will be influenced by the habits property of our utility function.
21The roots are complex if this expression is smaller than zero. However, we need to make sure that
we can still numerically differentiate our function with respect to the AR(2) parameters and this requires
that they are not too close to being complex.
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Initial Shocks
In order to ensure the comparability of our impulse responses, the initial tax shocks in the
model, denoted by εk0 and εn0 , should correspond as closely as possible to the tax change
considered in the empirical VAR. For this reason, we calibrate εk0 and εn0 such that the
resulting change in tax revenues over final output corresponds to one percentage point,
i.e. TR0
y0
= T¯R
Y¯
+ 0.01, where the ‘bar’ on top of the variable denotes its steady state value.
In doing so, we have to make an assumption about the relative importance of capital
and labor income taxes respectively. The reason is that the tax rates in our model are a
theoretical construct and do not have a direct empirical counterpart.
In our benchmark case, we follow Mertens and Ravn (2011) and assume that both
capital and labor income taxes are equally affected by the change in tax revenues, i.e.
εk0 = ε
n
0 . Section 2.A.4 in the Appendix describes the calibration of εk0 and εn0 under this
assumption. We additionally consider the two extreme cases in which the entire change
in tax revenues is solely driven by either capital or labor income taxes. In all three cases,
the tax change may also affect the innovations of our capital and durables frictions, fk,0
and fd,0. The corresponding effect on impact is derived in Section 2.A.4 in the Appendix.
2.4.2 Estimation
Having calibrated and constrained our parameters, we are now ready to proceed to the
actual estimation of Θ2. We do so by using an impulse response matching strategy,
which chooses the parameters such that the weighted distance between the empirical and
model impulse responses is minimized. This approach is widely used in the literature, see
e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Edge (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), Meier and Müller (2006), and Mertens and Ravn (2011).
Denote the impulse responses of the model for a given set of parameters by Λm(Θ2|Θ1)
and the corresponding empirical impulse responses by Λˆe. We want to choose our parame-
ters in Θ2 such that the model approximates the empirical impulse responses as closely as
possible. According to Newey and McFadden (1994), the optimal Θˆ2 solves the following
minimization problem:
Θˆ2 = arg min
Θ2
D
where D =
(
Λm(Θ2|Θ1)− Λˆe
)′
W
(
Λm(Θ2|Θ1)− Λˆe
)
(2.22)
D is a measure for the weighted distance between the theoretical and empirical impulse
responses and W is the weighting matrix. Efficient estimates require the use of the
inverse of the covariance matrix of Λˆe for weighting. However, it has been shown in the
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literature22 that, as the number of moment conditions gets large, the sample covariance
matrix is not a good estimator of the true covariances. This problem is reinforced by the
fact that we have to take the inverse of this matrix in order to calculate W . Therefore,
it is common to use the diagonal elements of this matrix only. We follow the literature
and define W =
[
Σˆed
]−1
, where Σˆe is the bootstrap estimate of the covariance matrix
from the empirical VAR and Σˆed is a matrix containing its diagonal elements only. The
variables for which we match the impulse responses are final output, investment, non-
durables consumption, durables consumption, and hours worked. We minimize Equation
(2.22) using numerical methods.
Standard errors are calculated following Newey and McFadden (1994).23 The asymp-
totic variance of Θˆ2 is given by:
Σˆm = Âvar(Θˆ2) =
[
H ′
[
Σˆed
]−1
H
]−1
(2.23)
where H = ∂Λ
m(Θ2|Θ1)
∂Θ2
is the Jacobian of the model impulse responses.24
From the asymptotic variance, we can compute asymptotic standard errors:
ŜE(Θˆ2) =
√
Σˆm
T
(2.24)
where T is the sample size.25
There are two different ways to generate the model impulse responses Λm(Θ2|Θ1). The
first method obtains the deterministic responses directly from the solution of the model.
The second approach, on the other hand, simulates data from the model and uses them
in a VAR in order to compute the impulse responses. Mertens and Ravn (2011) show
that both methods yield almost identical results. They only differ for very long forecast
horizons. As the focus of our paper lies on the short run, we therefore choose the first
approach, which has e.g. also been used by Meier and Müller (2006).
22See for example Bai and Shi (2011) and Hayakawa (2014).
23Theorem 4.1 in Newey and McFadden (1994) applies to extremum estimators and thus also to
minimum distance estimators, as is stated on page 2155: "For minimum distance estimators, the choice
between different consistent variance estimators can be based on considerations such as those discussed
for extremum estimators, when the model is correctly specified."
24We use numerical differentiation in order to obtainH. The centered finite difference approximation of
f at x is given by f ′(x) ≈ f(x+h)−f(x−h)2h for a very small h (see Miranda and Fackler 2002, page 98). The
rule of thumb for the choice of the optimal h for two-sided approximations is given by h = max(|x|, 1)·ε1/3
where ε is defined as the machine epsilon or machine precision (page 103).
25T is equal to the number of time periods in our case.
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In the following section, we use numerical methods in order to conduct our impulse
response matching. Specifically, we apply the methodology described above in order to es-
timate the parameters in Θ2 = [σ,Ψ, pi, a, S ′′k , S ′′d , ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2,
ξk, ξd].
2.5 Results
The goal of this section is to quantify the size of our additional investment frictions that
are needed in order to match the large empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases
and investment. For this purpose, we conduct an experiment in which we estimate three
different specifications of our model. In a first step, we establish a benchmark and present
the results for our model with capital and labor tax wedges only. In a second step, we
introduce our additional investment frictions and hold them constant over time. In the
third specification, we allow our capital and durables frictions to react dynamically to tax
changes.
Review of Stochastic Processes
Before proceeding to the experiment, it is useful to recall the definition of the stochastic
processes of our four wedges.
AR(2) process for tax rates:
τk,t = (1− ρk,1 − ρk,2)τk + ρk,1τk,t−1 + ρk,2τk,t−2 + εkt
τn,t = (1− ρn,1 − ρn,2)τn + ρn,1τn,t−1 + ρn,2τn,t−2 + εnt
where τk and τn without time subscripts denote steady state capital and labor income tax
rates respectively.
AR(2) processes for investment frictions:
fk,t = (1− ρfk,1 − ρfk,2)fk + ρfk,1fk,t−1 + ρfk,2fk,t−2 + εfk,t
fd,t = (1− ρfd,1 − ρfd,2)fd + ρfd,1fd,t−1 + ρfd,2fd,t−2 + εfd,t
where fk and fd without time subscripts denote steady state capital and durables frictions
respectively.
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Furthermore, we define:
εfk,0 = ξk
(
TR0
y0
− TR
y
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0.01
εfd,0 = ξd
(
TR0
y0
− TR
y
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0.01
Hence, ξk and ξd determine the transmission from tax changes to our investment frictions
and can be directly interpreted as the percentage point increase in the interest rate wedges
for capital and durable good traders.
The dynamics of our four wedges depend on the following fourteen parameters: ρk,1, ρk,2,
ρn,1, ρn,2, τk, τn, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, fk, fd. The steady state tax rates are cali-
brated to τk = 0.42 and τn = 0.26, as explained in Section 2.4.1. The values for the
remaining twelve parameters, on the other hand, are allowed to differ across specifica-
tions.
Experiment Design and Preview of Results
In order to quantify the importance of our additional investment frictions, fk,t and fd,t,
we conduct an experiment. Specifically, we estimate our model for three different spec-
ifications. We start from a benchmark model without fk,t and fd,t and then gradually
increase the impact of our additional investment frictions.
In our first specification, we allow for capital and labor income taxes only. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the AR(2) processes of the two tax wedges such that the model im-
pulse responses match their empirical counterparts as closely as possible. In terms of
the parameters of our model, this means that ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2 are estimated, whereas
ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd and the steady state frictions, fk and fd, are set to zero. Our
results show that the standard model with tax wedges cannot account for the large re-
action of durables purchases and investment to a tax change in the data. This finding
is robust even if we consider the two extreme cases in which the entire tax increase is
driven by either the capital income tax or the labor income tax alone. We then show that
incorporating additional investment frictions into our model can improve the fit in this
dimension significantly.
In our second specification, in addition to our two tax wedges, we allow for capi-
tal and durables investment frictions that are constant over time. Specifically, we as-
sume fk,t = fk = 0.016 ∀t and fd,t = fd = 0.06 ∀t and estimate ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2.
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The parameters that determine the investment friction dynamics, on the other hand, i.e.
ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, are set to zero. We find that this improves the match of our
model for durables and investment. However, the tax multipliers implied by the model
are still not as high as their empirical counterparts.
Therefore, in our third specification, we allow the investment frictions to react dy-
namically to tax changes. Here, we calibrate fk = 0.016 and fd = 0.06 in steady state
and estimate all the remaining parameters for our tax wedges, ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, and for
our investment frictions, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, such that the model and empirical
impulse responses are as close to each other as possible. In this case, our model is able to
match the data very well. In order to do so, it requires an initial increase of the capital
and durables frictions of ξk = 5.4 and ξd = 0.23 percentage points respectively. These two
coefficients are significantly different from each other.
We conclude that in order to match the large investment and durables multipliers in
the data, we need a model that – on top of the standard labor and capital tax wedges –
allows for two additional investment frictions. These frictions need to react dynamically
to tax changes. Furthermore, their size and dynamics should be allowed to differ for
capital and durable goods.
Our results are interesting because they provide guidance for the modeling of the
transmission of tax changes. According to our findings, a good model should generate
a positive comovement between investment wedges and tax shocks and should allow for
different capital and durables investment wedges. For example, if we interpret our invest-
ment wedges as financial frictions, as in Hall (2011), then our findings also imply that
financial frictions might play an important role in the transmission of tax changes. Given
that there are many different, competing ways of modeling financial frictions, our results
can be used to choose the most appropriate model.
In the remainder of this section, we present the results for our three specifications and
discuss their implications.
2.5.1 Specification 1:
Dynamic Tax Wedges and No Investment Frictions
In this subsection, we estimate the model with tax wedges only, abstracting from our
additional investment frictions. Thus, we set ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, fk, fd to zero.
The parameters that determine the dynamics of our tax wedges, on the other hand, are
estimated. We distinguish three different cases for the composition of tax rates.
In the first case, we assume that both labor and capital income taxes contribute to the
tax increase in t = 0, i.e. εk0 = εn0 . Furthermore, we estimate all four AR(2) parameters
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ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2 for the two tax rates. We will refer to this case as our benchmark in
the remainder of the analysis.
In the second case, we consider an extreme example in which only capital income taxes
increase. Thus, we set all parameters for the labor tax wedge, i.e. εn0 , ρn,1, ρn,2, to zero,
except for its steady state value, which is still calibrated to τn = 0.26. We then estimate
the reaction of capital taxes only, i.e. ρk,1, ρk,2.
The third case presents results for the other extreme in which only labor income taxes
react. Accordingly, we estimate ρn,1, ρn,2 and set εk0, ρk,1, ρk,2 to zero. The steady state
capital tax is again equal to its calibrated value, i.e. τk = 0.42.
Last but not least, we compare the impulse responses generated by our benchmark
model to the ones obtained by Mertens and Ravn (2011).
Case 1 (Benchmark): Capital and Labor Income Taxes Only
In a first step, we estimate our model with capital and labor income taxes, setting our
additional investment frictions, fk,t and fd,t, to zero. We impose that the initial tax
innovation is identical for both tax rates, i.e. εk0 = εn0 . They are calibrated such that tax
revenues over final output in the model increase by one percentage point – exactly as in the
empirical estimation. The tax rate dynamics in the periods after the shock are determined
by the parameters ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, which are estimated such that the distance between
the model and empirical impulse responses is minimized. All the remaining parameters,
i.e. ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, fk, fd, are set to zero.
The resulting parameter estimates and their standard errors are reported in Table 2.2.
All coefficients are highly significant. First, we discuss the preference parameters. The
curvature of consumption in the utility function, denoted by σ, is estimated to be equal to
4.07, which is similar to the value found by Mertens and Ravn (2011). While this seems
to be rather high, it is hard to define a reasonable range for σ in our setting. The reason
is that our utility function features habit formation. Therefore, we cannot interpret 1
σ
as
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The inverse of the curvature of hours, 1
Ψ
, on
the other hand, can be interpreted as the Frisch elasticity of labor, which is estimated to
be equal to 1.5. As documented in a meta analysis by Chetty et al. (2011), this value lies
within the range of existing estimates for macro models. Our habit parameter estimate,
pi, amounts to 0.79. It is close to the value of 0.73 found by Boldrin, Christiano, and
Fisher (2001) and reflects a strong motive for consumption smoothing.
The point estimates for the parameters that determine adjustment costs for capital and
durables investment, denoted by S ′′k and S ′′d , are given by 1.06 and 0.76 respectively. These
values are relatively low, which means that it is not very costly to change investment. The
high significance of both coefficients, however, indicates that they both play an important
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Table 2.2: Coefficient estimates for Specification 1, Case 1
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 4.07*** (0.16)
Ψ Hours curvature 0.67*** (0.17)
γ Weight of hours 6265c
pi Habit parameter 0.79*** (0.01)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.08c
a Capital utilization parameter 0.04** (0.02)
b Capital utilization parameter 0.04c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 1.06*** (0.09)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 0.76*** (0.06)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes 1.70*** (0.06)
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -0.72*** (0.06)
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes 1.59*** (0.03)
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -0.59*** (0.03)
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction -
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction -
ξk Initial response of capital friction -
ξd Initial response of durables friction -
fk Steady state capital friction 0c
fd Steady state durables friction 0c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound.
role. This is in line with the findings by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
who demonstrate that adjustment costs and habit formation are crucial for their model
dynamics. In our model, adjustment costs generate the hump shape in the responses of
investment.
The capital utilization parameter a, on the other hand, is estimated to be equal to
0.04. This implies that it is very cheap to adjust utilization, which is important in our
model because – as explained below – there is a trade-off between matching output and
hours in our model. If utilization can be adjusted, then the model can generate a larger
decrease in final output without having to rely solely on a reduction in hours worked.
The estimated parameters for the AR(2) process of the capital tax rates are ρk,1 =
1.70, ρk,2 = −0.72, and for the labor tax rate ρn,1 = 1.59, ρn,2 = −0.59. The dynamics for
the tax rates implied by these coefficients are displayed in Figure 2.4.
Both tax rates initially increase by εk0 · 100 = εn0 · 100 = 1.3 percentage points. Labor
tax rates are highly persistent, while the decrease in capital tax rates is much faster.
Given the stochastic processes and the parameters described above, we are now in a
position to compute the impulse responses of the model and to compare them to their
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Figure 2.4: Taxes in Specification 1, Case 1
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and labor income tax rates in the model without investment
frictions.
empirical counterparts. The resulting dynamics are shown in Figure 2.5. The lines with
circles represent the responses from our model. The solid lines, together with the shaded
areas around them, correspond to our empirical impulse responses and their 68 percent
confidence bands. We display them for a horizon of 24 quarters after the tax change.
First, consider the impulse responses from our model. All our variables decrease after
the tax shock. At the peak, output goes down by 1.4 percent, durables purchases by
3.8 percent, investment by 4.1 percent, and hours worked by 1.4 percent. Nondurables
consumption declines steadily.
The model impulse responses seem to match the shape of their empirical counterparts
quite well. However, the size of the tax multipliers generated by the model is too low for
output, durables purchases, investment, and nondurables consumption. Hours worked, on
the other hand, overshoot in the sense that the model response lies below the confidence
bands from the empirical estimation for many quarters.
Apparently, there is a trade-off between output and hours in our model. We will later
show that this mismatch can be (and has been) addressed by introducing an additional
efficiency wedge. In contrast, the literature has not been able to explain the fact that
the model underestimates the high empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases and
investment (see e.g. Mertens and Ravn 2011 and Zubairy 2014). In the following, we
show that this finding persists even if we depart from our assumption that both capital
and labor taxes contribute equally to a tax change. Specifically, we conduct two exercises.
In the first one, we generate the entire change in tax revenues by an increase in capital
income taxes only. In the other extreme, we assume that the tax shock is entirely driven
by labor income taxes.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses for Specification 1, Case 1
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in capital and labor income taxes in the model without
investment frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with the shaded areas
corresponding to 68 percent confidence intervals.
Case 2: Capital Income Taxes Only
One reason why our benchmark model underestimates the empirical response of durables
purchases and investment might be that we assume an equal increase in the capital and
labor income tax rate on impact. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show that a
capital tax gives rise to an investment wedge. Therefore, a higher contribution of the
capital tax relative to the labor income tax can potentially increase the tax multipliers on
investment and durables purchases. In that case, the problem might be solved by simply
giving more weight to the capital income tax in the model. Accordingly, there would be
no need for any additional investment wedges in our model.
In order to test this hypothesis, we conduct an exercise in which the entire increase
in tax revenues is driven by the capital tax. Labor income taxes, on the other hand, stay
constant at their steady state value, i.e. τn = 0.26, at all points in time, with all the
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corresponding parameters, εn0 , ρn,1, ρn,2, set to zero. We then estimate the autoregressive
parameters for the capital income tax rate, ρk,1, ρk,2, such that the weighted distance
between the empirical and theoretical impulse responses is minimized. All the parameters
that determine our additional investment frictions, i.e. ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, fk, fd,
are again set to zero.
It is important to note that this is a purely theoretical exercise. In reality, labor
income taxes do of course also play a role. However, the extreme case with capital taxes
only allows us to determine an upper bound for the ability of our model to fit the large
empirical durables and investment multipliers for different compositions of taxes.
Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix shows the dynamics of the capital income tax. As it
is responsible for the entire increase of one percentage point in tax revenues relative to
output, the tax rate is much higher than in the case with both taxes. Specifically, the
capital tax rate goes up by εk0 ·100 = 8.7 percentage points on impact. The corresponding
impulse responses of our model are presented in Figure 2.A.2 in the Appendix.
As expected, the investment wedge inherent in the capital income tax leads to larger
tax multipliers for investment and durables purchases. However, they are still much lower
than in the data. Our model generates a maximum decrease in durables purchases by 4.1
percent (vs. 7.3 percent in the data) and of 4.5 percent in investment (vs. 7.7 percent in
the data). This confirms that investment wedges do indeed have the potential to increase
tax multipliers of the latter two variables. However, the capital tax alone is not able to
explain their large empirical responses.
The overall fit of the other variables is of course worse than in our benchmark speci-
fication with both capital and labor income taxes. Output only declines by 1.1 percent.
Furthermore, there is almost no reaction of nondurables consumption in our model. The
reason for this is the lack of a labor wedge in this one-sided specification, which is appar-
ently important to ensure a good fit.
The focus of this exercise lies on the size of the durables and investment multipliers. We
are not interested in the parameter estimates. However, for the sake of completeness, we
report them in Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix. Many parameters take on extreme values.
This indicates that the model finds it difficult to match the responses of all variables
without a labor wedge and therefore needs to resort to unrealistic parameter values.
Hence, our original assumption that both the capital and labor income tax should
contribute to the increase in tax revenues seems to be justified. There is of course no
particular reason why both tax rates should change by exactly the same amount. However,
our analysis is robust to different tax mixes. Even if we consider a maximum weight on
the capital tax, our model still underestimates the tax multipliers on durables purchases
and investment.
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In a next step, we consider the other extreme case in which only labor income taxes
change.
Case 3: Labor Income Taxes Only
In this exercise, we hold capital taxes constant at their steady state value, i.e. τk = 0.42.
The entire shock to tax revenues is driven by labor income taxes. Accordingly, we estimate
ρn,1, ρn,2, and we set εk0, ρk,1, ρk,2 and ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, fk, fd to zero.
In the notation of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), the impact of the labor
wedge in this specification is at its maximum. However, there is no wedge that distorts
intertemporal equilibrium conditions, such as e.g. an investment wedge induced by capital
taxes. Therefore, the estimated tax multipliers for investment and durables purchases are
smallest in this case. Specifically, both of them are equal to 3.5 percent.
The corresponding tax dynamics and impulse responses of the model are shown in
Figures 2.A.3 and 2.A.4 in the Appendix. Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix reports the
estimated parameter values. However, we are not particularly interested in the details of
this case. The only purpose of this exercise is to provide us with an estimate for the lower
bound of the tax multipliers on durables purchases and investment that our model can
generate.
Summary
In our model, we need to make an assumption about the relative contributions of capital
and labor income taxes to the initial shock to tax revenues. Following Mertens and Ravn
(2011), our benchmark specification in Case 1 assumes that both tax rates increase by
the same amount on impact. This gives rise to tax multipliers of 3.8 percent for durables
purchases and of 4.1 percent for investment. These values are much lower than their
empirical counterparts, which are estimated to be equal to 7.3 percent and 7.7 percent
respectively.
We show that this finding is robust to variations in the composition of the tax mix.
We do so by considering two extreme cases. In Case 2, only capital taxes are shocked,
which gives the maximum weight to the corresponding investment wedge. In Case 3, on
the other hand, the entire tax increase is driven by labor income taxes. The investment
wedge is held constant and the labor wedge works at its full potential.
Based on our results for Cases 2 and 3, our model can generate tax multipliers for
durables purchases between 3.5 and 4.1 and for investment between 3.5 and 4.5. Thus, the
finding that conventional models underestimate the responses of the latter two variables
is independent of the tax mix. Therefore, in the remainder of our analysis, we focus on
the case with identical innovations for both tax rates, which imposes εk0 = εn0 .
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Comparison to Mertens and Ravn (2011)
In the following, we contrast our benchmark results to the ones found by Mertens and Ravn
(2011). Their paper is a suitable reference point because we work with the same empirical
impulse responses, which ensures comparability. Furthermore, our models share most of
the features that have been shown to be important for the transmission of tax changes,
such as investment adjustment costs, habit formation, and varying capital utilization.
However, there are also some aspects in which the models differ from each other. The
main difference concerns the way in which capital taxes are modeled.26 Mertens and Ravn
(2011) tax the return on utilized capital. In the notation of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007), the tax on capital gives rise to an investment wedge that distorts intertemporal
decisions and the tax on utilization affects intratemporal equilibrium conditions in the
form of an efficiency wedge. In our model, on the other hand, capital taxes are levied on
the returns to bonds, which are independent of contemporaneous decisions. Therefore, our
capital tax acts as an investment wedge only. This allows us to clearly separate different
wedges, which is key for our experiment. However, it comes at the cost of a worse fit
of the model in the intratemporal dimension due to the lack of an additional efficiency
wedge.
The goal of this paper is to quantify the additional investment wedges needed in our
model so that it is able to match the large empirical responses of durables purchases and
investment. The match for these two variables is almost identical in our baseline model
and in the model by Mertens and Ravn (2011). This confirms that the difference in wedges
induced by the capital tax does not affect our main variables of interest. However, it does
of course have an effect on the match of our other variables. This can most clearly be
seen from the impulse responses of output and hours. In our model, there seems to be a
trade-off between these two variables, which can be mitigated by an additional efficiency
wedge, as implemented by Mertens and Ravn (2011). Therefore, their model is better able
to match these two variables than our model. However, for the purpose of our experiment,
this is not a concern because it obviously does not have an impact on the fit of investment
in capital and durable goods. Therefore, we leave it to further research to quantify the size
of the efficiency wedge. Instead, in this paper, we entirely focus on investment wedges.
26Mertens and Ravn (2011) furthermore consider depreciation allowances and labor-augmenting tech-
nology, which grows at a constant rate. We abstract from these features because they are not important
for our analysis. In particular, if we fix the growth rate of technology at one for each point in time in
the model by Mertens and Ravn (2011), their impulse responses do not change. Depreciation allowances,
on the other hand, seem to reduce the response of capital investment in the model by Mertens and
Ravn (2011) even more, which increases the discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical impulse
responses. In the presence of depreciation allowances, our model would therefore require even higher
investment wedges for capital, fk,t. Thus, our results should be interpreted as a lower bound for the
importance of the additional investment wedges.
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In the following, we therefore introduce additional investment frictions for capital and
durable goods, denoted by fk,t and fd,t. In Specification 2, those frictions are held constant
after a tax shock. In Specification 3, they are allowed to comove with tax changes.
2.5.2 Specification 2:
Dynamic Tax Wedges and Constant Investment Frictions
The estimation of Specification 1 demonstrates that our model with tax wedges is not
able to explain the large empirical tax multipliers of durables purchases and investment.
In the following two subsections, we show that this problem can be solved by introducing
additional investment wedges. In particular, we incorporate two separate investment
frictions for capital and durable goods into our model. In Specification 2, we first analyze
by how much our results improve if we simply consider static frictions. In Specification 3,
we then allow the frictions to react dynamically to tax changes.
In the present specification, our frictions are assumed to be constant. Therefore,
we calibrate them to fk,t = fk = 0.016 ∀t and fd,t = fd = 0.06 ∀t and set all the
parameters that determine the friction dynamics, i.e. ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd, to zero.
Both capital and labor tax rates are again assumed to increase by the same amount on
impact, i.e. εk0 = εn0 . We then estimate the tax rate dynamics that are determined by the
parameters ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2.
Table 2.3 reports the resulting parameter values. All point estimates are very similar
to the ones found in our benchmark case in Specification 1. Furthermore, they are again
highly significant.
The tax dynamics are displayed in Figure 2.6. The initial increase in both tax rates is
equal to εk0 · 100 = εn0 · 100 = 1.4 percentage points. The dynamic pattern follows closely
the one from Specification 1. Labor income taxes exhibit a higher persistence than capital
taxes.
The impulse responses following a tax shock are presented in Figure 2.7. The solid
lines with the shaded area again display the empirical impulse responses. The dotted
lines correspond to the results from Specification 2, and the lines with circles represent
the findings from our benchmark estimation without additional investment frictions, i.e.
Specification 1. The most striking difference concerns investment. Here, the tax multiplier
at the peak increases from 4.1 percent in the benchmark to 5.4 percent in Specification 2.
The match of durables purchases also improves a tiny bit on impact. For the remaining
variables, the impulse responses of the two specifications are very close to each other.
In conclusion, we find that the introduction of two constant additional investment
frictions for capital and durable goods brings our model closer to the data. This confirms
that these elements play an important role. However, the model in Specification 2 is
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Table 2.3: Coefficient estimates for Specification 2
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 4.16*** (0.19)
Ψ Hours curvature 0.51*** (0.18)
γ Weight of hours 4727c
pi Habit parameter 0.80*** (0.01)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.22c
a Capital utilization parameter 0.04* (0.02)
b Capital utilization parameter 0.05c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 0.92*** (0.06)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 1.12*** (0.09)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes 1.71*** (0.06)
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -0.72*** (0.05)
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes 1.57*** (0.04)
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -0.57*** (0.04)
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction -
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction -
ξk Initial response of capital friction -
ξd Initial response of durables friction -
fk Steady state capital friction 0.016c
fd Steady state durables friction 0.06c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound.
still not able to match the large empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases and
investment. Therefore, in a next step, we allow the two additional investment frictions to
react dynamically to a tax shock.
2.5.3 Specification 3:
Dynamic Tax Wedges and Dynamic Investment Frictions
Specification 1 shows that a model with tax wedges alone cannot account for the large
empirical tax multipliers of durables purchases and investment. In Specification 2, we
demonstrate that the introduction of two constant additional investment frictions can
improve the fit of our model. However, there is still a substantial gap between theoretical
and empirical impulse responses. Therefore, in the present specification, we now allow
the investment frictions to react dynamically to a tax change.
The transmission of tax shocks to the frictions, fk,t and fd,t, is determined by the
parameters ξk and ξd. Specifically, an increase in tax revenues relative to final output by
one percentage point translates into innovations for the capital and durables friction of
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Figure 2.6: Taxes in Specification 2
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and labor income tax rates in the model with constant
investment frictions.
εfk,0 = ξk · 0.01 and εfd,0 = ξd · 0.01 respectively. Hence, ξk and ξd are the key parameters
that we estimate in this specification.
After the initial shock, frictions fk,t and fd,t are assumed to follow an AR(2) process
with parameters ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, which are estimated such that the model impulse
responses fit their empirical counterparts as closely as possible. The steady state values
of the frictions are calibrated to fk = 0.016 and fd = 0.06. In addition to the dynamics of
our investment frictions, we furthermore estimate the autoregressive parameters for our
tax wedges, given by ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2.
The coefficient estimates for Specification 3 are reported in Table 2.4. In the following,
we discuss the resulting parameter values and compare them to the benchmark, given by
Case 1 in Specification 1.
Our preference parameters become more extreme compared to the benchmark specifi-
cation. Specifically, we find a Frisch elasticity of 1
Ψ
= 2. This value is at the upper bound
of empirical estimates for macro models (see e.g. Chetty et al. 2011). Furthermore, the
consumption curvature parameter in the utility function, σ, is estimated to be equal to
7.33. This value increases compared to the benchmark specification, in which it is already
rather high. Reassuringly, in Subsection 2.A.6 in the Appendix, we show that our findings
are robust if we place an upper limit on σ in the estimation.
Our habit parameter, pi, on the other hand, is now estimated to be 0.75, which brings
it even closer to the coefficient of 0.73 documented by Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001). Moreover, we find that the parameter for capital utilization a, is identical to its
counterpart from the benchmark. A value of 0.04 again indicates that it is easy to adjust
utilization, which reflects the fact that the trade-off between output and hours is still
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses for Specification 2
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in capital and labor income taxes in the model with and
without constant investment frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with
the shaded areas corresponding to 68 percent confidence intervals.
present in our model.
The point estimates for the adjustment cost parameters of capital and durables in-
vestment are equal to S ′′k = 0 and S ′′d = 3.6 respectively. Thus, they differ substantially
from their benchmark values. Specifically, capital adjustment costs are no longer signifi-
cant. This contradicts the empirical findings by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), who find
evidence for the presence of capital adjustment costs on the plant level. In the Appendix
in Subsection 2.A.6, we therefore provide a robustness check, in which we show that our
results are robust if we impose a lower bound on the capital adjustment cost parameter.
However, the value of ξk, the parameter that determines the initial response of the capital
friction, fk,t, to a tax shock, becomes a bit lower than in the present specification. This
indicates that the hump shape in investment can be generated by both adjustment costs
or the capital friction.
The estimated AR(2) processes for the tax rates are very similar to the benchmark.
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Table 2.4: Coefficient estimates for Specification 3
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 7.33*** (0.16)
Ψ Hours curvature 0.50*** (0.10)
γ Weight of hours 801155c
pi Habit parameter 0.75*** (0.01)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.22c
a Capital utilization parameter 0.04* (0.03)
b Capital utilization parameter 0.05c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 0
n (-)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 3.60*** (0.19)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes 1.70*** (0.08)
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -0.72*** (0.07)
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes 1.66*** (0.02)
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -0.66*** (0.02)
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction 0.63*** (0.01)
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction -0.10*** (0.01)
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction 0.94n (-)
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction 0.00n (-)
ξk Initial response of capital friction 5.38*** (0.15)
ξd Initial response of durables friction 0.23*** (0.01)
fk Steady state capital friction 0.016c
fd Steady state durables friction 0.06c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound.
Both tax rates initially increase by εk0 · 100 = εn0 · 100 = 1.6 percentage points. As
illustrated in Figure 2.8, the labor income tax is again more persistent than the capital
tax.
In a next step, we finally discuss the estimates for our additional investment wedges.
Most importantly, we find a highly significant transmission of tax changes to the frictions,
determined by ξk and ξd. After a tax shock that increases tax revenues relative to final
output by one percentage point, the capital friction, fk,t, increases by 5.38 percentage
points and the durables friction, fd,t, goes up by 0.23 percentage points. The estimated
dynamics after the initial shock are presented in Figure 2.9. Whereas the capital friction
goes back to its steady state after a few quarters, the durables friction rather behaves
like an AR(1) process and declines more slowly. This is also reflected in an estimate of
zero for the second autoregressive parameter of the durables friction, ρfd,2, as reported in
Table 2.4.
The impulse responses for all our variables are displayed in Figure 2.10. Our results
from Specification 3 are represented by the dotted lines. For the sake of comparability,
the lines with circles correspond to the responses from our benchmark specification, i.e.
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Figure 2.8: Taxes in Specification 3
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and labor income tax rates in the model with dynamic
investment frictions.
Figure 2.9: Friction dynamics in Specification 3
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and durables frictions after a shock to capital and labor
income taxes.
Specification 1, Case 1. Last but not least, the solid lines and the shaded areas describe
the empirical impulse responses with 68 percent confidence bands.
Comparing the results of the benchmark model to Specification 3, we find that the
introduction of our additional investment frictions, fk,t and fd,t, improves the fit of the
model substantially. In the present specification, output and hours worked go down by
1.5 percent at the peak. Strikingly, the model is now able to generate tax multipliers of
5.2 percent for durables purchases and of 6.3 percent for investment.
These findings provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that additional investment
frictions are necessary in our model to match the large empirical tax multipliers for invest-
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses for Specification 3
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in capital and labor income taxes in the model with and
without dynamic investment frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with
the shaded areas corresponding to 68 percent confidence intervals.
ment and durables purchases. In the following, we conduct more formal tests to quantify
the importance and the size of these frictions.
2.5.4 Quantifying the Importance of the Investment Frictions
The goal of this subsection is to assess the quantitative relevance of the two additional
frictions, fk,t and fd,t. Specifically, we want to test whether including these investment
wedges in the model makes a significant contribution to explaining the large empirical tax
multipliers for durables purchases and investment.
Significance Tests
The most straightforward way of determining the statistical importance of the frictions
is to compute the standard errors of ξk and ξd in Specification 3. These parameters pin
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down the transmission of the tax shock to the additional investment wedges in our model.
As reported in Table 2.4, both ξk and ξd are highly significant. This indicates that they
are quantitatively relevant.
We furthermore test whether ξk and ξd are significantly different from each other. Our
null hypothesis is given by H0 : ξk = ξd and is tested against the alternative Ha : ξk 6= ξd.
This is equivalent to testing H0 : ξk − ξd = 0.27 The corresponding Wald test then reads
as follows:
WALD =
[
ξk − ξd√
V AR(ξk − ξd)
]2
=
[
5.38− 0.23√
4.8405
]2
= 5.4642
The critical value at the five percent level from the χ2 distribution is equal to 3.8415.
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal. For the
construction of our model, this implies that it is important to consider two separate
frictions – one for durables and one for capital investment.
Distance Measures
In a next step, we compare the general fit of the model with and without frictions. For
this purpose, we look at the weighted distance between theoretical and empirical impulse
responses, denoted by D. Recall the definition of our distance measure from Equation
(2.22):
D =
(
Λm(Θ2|Θ1)− Λˆe
)′
W
(
Λm(Θ2|Θ1)− Λˆe
)
The parameters in each specification are estimated such that this expression is minimized.
Therefore, we can interpret D as a measure for the goodness of fit. Intuitively, the smaller
it is, the better is the match of a given model. Table 2.5 provides the corresponding values
for all three specifications.
Table 2.5: Comparison of goodness of fit
Value of D
Specification 1 60.02
Specification 2 55.52
Specification 3 39.74
As expected, Specification 3 clearly exhibits the lowestD. The introduction of dynamic
frictions improves the fit of the model by more than 33 percent compared to the benchmark
specification. This difference is of course smaller for the model with constant frictions.
27The variance of this expression is given by: V AR(ξk − ξd) = V AR(ξk) + V AR(ξd)− 2COV (ξk, ξd).
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Nevertheless, Specification 2 still reduces the weighted distance between the theoretical
and empirical impulse responses by 7.5 percent relative to Specification 1.
Over-Identifying Restriction Test
In order to test whether the difference of D between Specification 3 and 1 is statistically
significant, we conduct an over-identifying restriction test for classical minimum distance
estimation as proposed in Chamberlain (1984). In our case, the model with dynamic
frictions is the unrestricted model (subscript u, with p parameters to be estimated) and
the model without frictions is the restricted model (subscript r, with s parameters to be
estimated). The test statistic is given by:
Dr −Du d−→ χ2(p− s) (2.25)
In our case, p = 16 and s = 10, and the corresponding critical value from the χ26
distribution is given by 10.645. Our test statistic is equal to 20.28. Therefore, we conclude
that the model with dynamic frictions fits the data significantly better than the benchmark
model.
Note that this finding should be interpreted with caution. The reason is that – as
explained in Section 2.4.2 – we use the diagonal instead of the full covariance matrix in
order to calculate D. As emphasized by Wooldridge (2010), the test statistic in Equation
(2.25), on the other hand, is defined forW being equal to the inverse of the full covariance
matrix. Therefore, we see our result only as an approximation. However, the fact that
the value of the test statistic is almost twice as large as the critical value is reassuring.
Summary
Based on our findings, we conclude that our additional investment wedges are quantita-
tively relevant. First of all, the parameters that determine the transmission of tax shocks
to our investment frictions, denoted by ξk and ξd, are highly significant. Second, they
are significantly different from each other. Specifically, they are equal to ξk = 5.38 and
ξd = 0.23 respectively. This implies that it is important to allow for separate capital and
durables frictions.
Last but not least, we show that our specification with dynamic frictions reduces the
weighted distance between the theoretical and empirical impulse responses by more than
33 percent compared to the benchmark specification. This finding is confirmed by an
over-identifying restriction test, which clearly rejects the null hypothesis, indicating that
our model in Specification 3 fits the data significantly better than our benchmark.
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2.6 Discussion: Interpretation of Investment Frictions
Our analysis documents that a standard model with tax wedges is not able to explain the
large empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases and investment. We show that this
mismatch can be resolved by introducing two additional wedges for durables and capital
investment that are activated by tax changes. Specifically, we find a positive comovement
between taxes and these additional frictions. Furthermore, the size of the investment
wedge differs significantly for durables and capital investment.
In this section, we discuss the implications of our results. So far, we have not taken a
stand on the microfoundations behind our additional investment wedges. In a next step,
we therefore explore models that can generate these wedges endogenously. Our findings
provide helpful guidance for the choice of the appropriate modeling approach.
Financial Frictions as a Source of Investment Wedges
Models with financial frictions, such as the ones developed by e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) are
obvious candidates for microfoundations because they can generate investment wedges
endogenously.28 This argument is in part motivated by Romer and Romer (2010), who
suggest a link between the large empirical tax multiplier for investment and financial
conditions. Specifically, they state that the "strong response of investment to tax changes
is consistent with research showing that investment depends strongly on cash flow and
overall economic conditions" (page 797). In other words, this implies a tightening of
financial frictions after a tax increase.29
A typical measure for financial frictions is the external finance premium, which is
reflected in credit spreads in the data. Thus, if the investment wedges in our model are
generated by financial frictions, then empirical credit spreads should also react to tax
changes. A credit spread that is especially suitable as a proxy for financial frictions is
the excess bond premium (EBP) provided by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011).30 Figure
28Note that not all models with financial frictions imply an investment wedge. In Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), Fuerst (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997), Cooley and Quadrini
(1999, 2004), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Schmitz (2005), and Lagos (2006), financial frictions act like a
tax on the production of output and therefore, in the notation of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007),
they constitute an efficiency wedge rather than an investment wedge. For more details, see also the review
by Quadrini (2011).
29For empirical evidence on financial market imperfections at the firm level, see Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988).
30As demonstrated by Philippon (2009), credit spreads might react even in the absence of financial
frictions simply due to changes in default risk. Therefore, it is crucial that we focus on a spread that is
free of this default risk component. EBP is a very suitable measure because it is defined as the component
of the GZ spread (recall that we used the GZ spread in our calibration of fk in steady state in Section
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2.11 presents the empirical impulse response of EBP to an increase in unanticipated tax
changes by one percent of GDP.31
Figure 2.11: Empirical impulse response of EBP
Notes: Empirical impulse response of the excess bond premium for non-financial firms after an
increase in tax liabilities by one percent of GDP. The shaded area corresponds to the 95 percent
confidence interval.
Interestingly, EBP increases significantly after a tax shock. Since this reaction cannot
be driven by a higher default risk (which is per definition excluded from the spread), we
interpret it as evidence for the fact that our additional investment wedges might indeed
be driven by financial frictions. This point is further strengthened by observing that the
dynamics of EBP show striking similarities with the AR(2) process of our capital friction
from the model (see Figure 2.9).
Based on these findings, we conclude that the additional investment wedges in our
model are likely to be generated by financial frictions.
Implications of Our Results for Models with Financial Frictions
To the extent that the investment wedges in our model are generated by financial frictions,
our findings offer guidance for the construction of such models. In the following, we discuss
2.4.1) that cannot be explained by default risk. Therefore, it reflects the willingness of the market to
accept default risk. This allows us to interpret it as evidence for financial frictions.
31Since EBP is only available from 1973Q1 onwards, we need to deviate from our empirical specification
in Equation (2.1) in order to save degrees of freedom. Specifically, we use the framework derived in Kraus
and Winter (2015a), which includes one exogenous and three endogenous lags. See Kraus and Winter
(2015a) for a detailed description of our approach.
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several model features using the prominent model by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999).
The key mechanism in the ‘financial accelerator’ model by Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) is based on the idea of costly state verification by Townsend (1979). In
this framework, entrepreneurs finance their projects using a combination of loans and their
own net worth. Due to an agency problem between borrowers and lenders, entrepreneurs
face an external finance premium. The higher the entrepreneurs’ net worth, the lower is
this premium. The reason is that higher net worth allows the entrepreneur to finance a
larger fraction of the project himself, which in turn mitigates the agency problem. Thus,
in this type of models, taxes can have an impact on the external finance premium by
affecting net worth.
The effect of taxes in a financial accelerator economy has been explored by e.g.
Fernández-Villaverde (2010) in a model with nominal rigidities. He shows that a tax
decrease leads to lower inflation, which reduces entrepreneurs’ net worth and thus in-
creases the external finance premium. Therefore, in this model, taxes and interest rate
spreads are negatively correlated, which is at odds with our findings. Similarly, Strulik
(2008) analyzes the impact of different capital income tax changes in a financial accelera-
tor model. He finds that the response of the risk premium depends on the tax instrument
considered. Specifically, a private capital income tax cut increases the tax advantage of
debt as opposed to equity finance. Therefore, firms choose a higher leverage ratio, which
drives up the risk premium charged by banks. The opposite is the case for a corporate
income tax change. Thus, depending on the tax instrument considered, this model may
generate a negative correlation between tax changes and financial frictions, which is incon-
sistent with our results. In contrast, a good model should generate a positive comovement
between investment wedges and tax shocks. Furthermore, these wedges should be allowed
to differ for durables and capital investment.
This latter feature is difficult to model if the agency problem generating the friction
operates at the firm level, as is assumed by e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
as well as in many other theories of financial frictions. Since durable goods are purchased
by households, this kind of model has a hard time explaining changes in the interest rate
spreads for durables. We therefore conclude that our evidence supports recent theories
that place the friction at the level of financial intermediaries, such as e.g. Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), He
and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). In these models,
balance sheets of intermediaries are an important determinant of financial frictions. The
link between taxes and intermediaries’ balance sheets is consistent with empirical results
from our companion paper, Kraus and Winter (2015a).
108 Investment Wedges and the Transmission of Tax Changes
Contributions
In conclusion, we show that the additional investment wedges in our model can be endoge-
nously generated by financial frictions. Therefore, our findings provide useful guidance for
the construction of these models and help researchers choose the appropriate mechanism.
Given that there are many different (and competing) modeling approaches for financial
frictions, we view this as an important contribution.
According to our results, a good model should generate a positive comovement be-
tween investment wedges and tax shocks. Importantly, these wedges should be allowed
to differ for durables and capital investment and should operate at the level of financial
intermediaries.
2.7 Conclusion
Previous research documents that tax changes have a substantial effect on real economic
variables in the data. In this paper, we show that an augmented RBC model with standard
tax wedges cannot explain the large empirical tax multipliers for investment and durables
purchases. We demonstrate that additional investment wedges are needed in order to
bring the model closer to the data. In our quantification exercise, we find that separate
wedges for capital and durables investment are necessary and that they are both highly
significant. According to our estimates, a tax increase of one percent of GDP triggers an
initial rise in the capital and durables friction by 5.4 and 0.2 percentage points respectively.
By doing so, our model is able to reproduce the shape and size of the reaction of durables
purchases and investment observed in the data. Compared to the benchmark specification
with tax wedges only, the introduction of our additional investment wedges improves the
fit of the model by more than 33 percent. Thus, our findings indicate that investment
wedges are crucial for the modeling of the transmission of tax changes.
By quantifying the additional investment wedges needed in order to match empirical
tax multipliers of durables and capital investment, our results provide useful guidance for
the construction of models that successfully account for the transmission of tax changes.
In our model, we do not take a stand on the microfoundations for these wedges. We
leave it to future research to endogenize our capital and durables investment wedges.
Nevertheless, we argue that financial frictions are obvious candidates. Based on our
findings, we conclude that in that case, the friction should be placed on the level of
the financial intermediary, such as e.g. in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and
Karadi (2011), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). A tax increase should then affect the intermediaries’
balance sheets such that financial frictions tighten. In our companion paper, Kraus and
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Winter (2015a), we show that empirically, a rise in taxes widens credit spreads, which
can be interpreted as an increase in financial frictions. We furthermore show that there
is indeed empirical evidence for the fact that tax changes affect balance sheet conditions
of financial intermediaries.
As a final remark, we would like to note that the tension between matching the re-
sponses of output and hours that is currently present in our model can be mitigated by an
additional efficiency wedge that is activated by tax changes. Such a wedge would cause
a larger drop in output for a given change in labor supply. Since this extension would
primarily affect intratemporal optimality conditions, it would not change our main con-
clusions, which depend on intertemporal decisions. Future research should also consider
modeling the actual tax code in a more realistic manner, e.g. by introducing depreciation
allowances (as e.g. in Mertens and Ravn 2011).
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Model Equations
List of Variables and Parameters
• 16 control variables:32 ct, cy,t, ht, λt, pd,t, pk,t, rt, wt, qk,t, qd,t, It, Vt, TRYt, Tt, ut, yt
• 16 endogenous state variables: kt−1, dt−1, dt−2, cy,t−1, rt−1, It−1, Vt−1, Bt−1,
τk,t−1, τk,t−2, τn,t−1, τn,t−2, fk,t−1, fk,t−2, fd,t−1, fd,t−2
• 4 exogenous state variables: τk,t, τn,t, fk,t, fd,t
• Parameters: α, β, γ, δk, δd, ν, φ, b, g, τk, τn, fk, fd, σ,Ψ, pi, a, S ′′k , S ′′d ,
ρk,1, ρk,2, ρn,1, ρn,2, ρfk,1, ρfk,2, ρfd,1, ρfd,2, ξk, ξd
List of Equations
Euler equation
with respect to cy,t:
λt = [c
−σ
t − βpiEtc−σt+1]φ
(
dt−1
cy,t
)1−φ
(2.A.1)
with respect to dt−1:
λt = [c
−σ
t − βpiEtc−σt+1]
(1− φ)
pd,t
(
dt−1
cy,t
)−φ
(2.A.2)
with respect to Bt:
λt = Etλt+1[1 + (1− τk,t+1)rt]β (2.A.3)
Labor-leisure choice:
λt =
γhΨt
(1− τn,t)wt (2.A.4)
Definition of composite consumption:
ct = c
φ
y,td
1−φ
t−1 − picφy,t−1d1−φt−2 (2.A.5)
Technology for final good production:
yt = ν(utkt−1)αh1−αt (2.A.6)
32Note that for simplicity, we define TRYt ≡ TRtyt in the Appendix.
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Final good producers’ FOC(k):
pk,t = να(utkt−1)α−1h1−αt (2.A.7)
Final good producers’ FOC(h):
wt = ν(1− α)(utkt−1)αh−αt (2.A.8)
Choice of capacity utilization by capital good traders:
pk,t = Ω
′(ut)qk,t (2.A.9)
where
Ω(ut) =
1
2
bau2t + b(1− a)ut + b(a2 − 1) and
Ω′(ut) = baut + b(1− a)
Rental price for capital:
Etpk,t+1ut+1 = (1 + rt + fk,t)qk,t − Et(1− δk − Ω(ut+1))qk,t+1 (2.A.10)
Rental price for durables:
Etpd,t+1 = (1 + rt + fd,t)qd,t − (1− δd)Etqd,t+1 (2.A.11)
Price of installed capital:
1−qk,t
[
1− Sk
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′k
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
= βEt
λt+1
λt
qk,t+1S
′
k
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2
(2.A.12)
Price of installed durables:
1− qd,t
[
1− Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
− S ′d
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
Vt
Vt−1
]
= βEt
λt+1
λt
qd,t+1S
′
d
(
Vt+1
Vt
)(
Vt+1
Vt
)2
(2.A.13)
Law of motion for capital:
kt = (1− δk − Ω(ut))kt−1 + [1− Sk
(
It
It−1
)
]It (2.A.14)
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Law of motion for durables:
dt = (1− δd)dt−1 + [1− Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
]Vt (2.A.15)
where
S (mt) =
1
2
{
exp
[√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
]
+ exp
[
−√S ′′ (mt − 1)
]
− 2
}
S ′(mt) = 12
{
exp
[√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
]√
S ′′ + exp
[
−√S ′′ (mt − 1)
] (
−√S ′′
)}
Good market clearing:
yt = cy,t + It + Sk
(
It
It−1
)
It + Vt + Sd
(
Vt
Vt−1
)
Vt +G (2.A.16)
The state cy,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
cy,t = cy,t (2.A.17)
The state dt−2 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
dt−1 = dt−1 (2.A.18)
The state rt−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
rt = rt (2.A.19)
The state It−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
It = It (2.A.20)
The state Vt−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
Vt = Vt (2.A.21)
The state τk,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
τk,t = τk,t (2.A.22)
The state τn,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
τn,t = τn,t (2.A.23)
Chapter 2 113
The state fk,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
fk,t = fk,t (2.A.24)
The state fd,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
fd,t = fd,t (2.A.25)
Definition of bonds:
Bt = ktqk,t + dtqd,t (2.A.26)
Transfers from government to households:
Tt = τn,twtht + τk,trt−1Bt−1 −G (2.A.27)
where G = g · y¯
Definition of tax revenues over GDP:33
TRYt =
Tt +G
yt
(2.A.28)
Law of motion for capital taxes:
τk,t = (1− ρk,1 − ρk,2)τk + ρk,1τk,t−1 + ρk,2τk,t−2 + εkt (2.A.29)
Law of motion for labor taxes:
τn,t = (1− ρn,1 − ρn,2)τn + ρn,1τn,t−1 + ρn,2τn,t−2 + εnt (2.A.30)
Law of motion for capital friction:
fk,t = (1− ρfk,1 − ρfk,2)fk + ρfk,1fk,t−1 + ρfk,2fk,t−2 + εfk,t (2.A.31)
33According to Hall (2011), page 358: "GDP includes both the services of housing as a component of
consumption and the production of houses, as a component of investment. Here, output is the production
of goods, which are used to make houses or are consumed directly." Mertens and Ravn (2011) just define
tax revenues over GDP as tax revenues over final output, regardless of the level of durables. The difference
between Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Hall (2011) is that the latter interprets durables as housing and
the former interpret durables in the classical sense (also in the way they are defined in the data). In our
model, we therefore follow the definition by Mertens and Ravn (2011).
114 Investment Wedges and the Transmission of Tax Changes
Law of motion for durables friction:
fd,t = (1− ρfd,1 − ρfd,2)fd + ρfd,1fd,t−1 + ρfd,2fd,t−2 + εfd,t (2.A.32)
Steady State
We normalize output and capacity utilization to 1 and hours to 25 percent in steady state.
Steady state for y:
y¯ = 1
Steady state for h:
h¯ = 0.25
Steady state for u:
u¯ = 1
Euler equation, determines r:
1 = β[1 + (1− τk)r¯]
Steady state for r:
r¯ =
1− β
β
1
1− τk
Steady state for qk:
q¯k = 1
Steady state for qd:
q¯d = 1
Steady state for pk:
p¯k = (r¯ + fk + δk)q¯k
Choice of capacity utilization by capital good traders:
p¯k = Ω
′(u¯)q¯k = bq¯k
Chapter 2 115
Parameter value of b:
b =
p¯k
q¯k
Steady state for pd:
p¯d = (r¯ + fd + δd)q¯d
The Euler equation determines the consumption basket. We target a share of durables
consumption in steady state of 11.9 percent.
d¯
c¯y
=
1− φ
p¯dφ
=
0.119
1− 0.119 = 0.1351
This allows us to solve for φ.
Parameter value of φ:
φ =
1
1 + 0.1351pd
Combining the final good producers’ production function and FOC(k) allows us to solve
for k¯ and ν.
Steady state for k:
k¯ =
α
p¯k
Parameter value of ν:
ν =
1
k¯αh¯1−α
From the final good producers’ production function and FOC(h), we get the wage in
steady state.
Steady state for w:
w¯ = ν(1− α)
(
k¯
h¯
)α
The laws of motion of capital and durables determine capital and durables investment
respectively.
Steady state for I:
I¯ = δkk¯
The steady state for V is given by V¯ = δdd¯. However, we first need to determine d¯. We
do so by using the equation for good market clearing, which only depends on variables
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that can be expressed as a function of d¯ and variables with a steady state that we have
already determined:
y¯ = c¯y︸︷︷︸
=
φp¯d
1−φ d¯
+I¯ + Sk
(
I¯
I¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
I¯ + V¯︸︷︷︸
=δdd¯
+Sd
(
V¯
V¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
V¯ + G︸︷︷︸
=gy¯
This allows us to solve the good market clearing condition for d in steady state.
Steady state for d:
d¯ =
(1− g)y¯ − I¯
δd +
φp¯d
1−φ
Steady state for V :
V¯ = δdd¯
Steady state for cy:
c¯y =
φp¯d
1− φd¯
Steady state for c:
c¯ = c¯φy d¯
1−φ(1− pi)
The Euler equation allows us to determine the parameter γ, which is set such that
h¯ = 0.25.
Parameter value of γ:
γ = (1− βpi)c¯−σφ
(
d¯
c¯y
)1−φ
(1− τn)w¯h¯−Ψ
Steady state for λ:
λ¯ = (1− βpi)c¯−σφ
(
d¯
c¯y
)1−φ
2.A.2 Log-Linearized Equations
In order to solve our model, we need to log-linearize it. First of all, define xˆ ≡ ln (xt
x¯
)
and xˆ can be interpreted as the percent deviation from steady state. We use the following
rule:
f(x, y) = 0
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becomes:
xˆ
[
∂f(x¯, y¯)
∂x
x¯
]
+ yˆ
[
∂f(x¯, y¯)
∂y
y¯
]
w 0
In order to simplify the resulting log-linearized equations, it is often useful to divide both
sides by the steady state.
List of Equations
Euler equation
with respect to cy,t:
[βpiEtcˆt+1 − cˆt] σ
1− βpi + [dˆt−1 − cˆy,t](1− φ)− λˆt = 0 (2.A.33)
with respect to dt−1:
[βpiEtcˆt+1 − cˆt] σ
1− βpi − [dˆt−1 − cˆy,t]φ− pˆd − λˆt = 0 (2.A.34)
with respect to Bt:
Etλˆt+1 − Etτˆk,t+1τ¯kr¯β + rˆtr¯(1− τ¯k)β − λˆt = 0 (2.A.35)
Labor-leisure choice:
hˆtΨ + τˆn,t
τ¯n
1− τ¯n − wˆt − λˆt = 0 (2.A.36)
Definition of composite consumption:
cˆt − 1
1− pi [φ(cˆy,t − picˆy,t−1) + (1− φ)(dˆt−1 − pidˆt−2)] = 0 (2.A.37)
Technology for final good production:
yˆt − α(uˆt + kˆt−1)− (1− α)hˆt = 0 (2.A.38)
Final good producers’ FOC(k):
pˆk,t + (1− α)[uˆt + kˆt−1 − hˆt] = 0 (2.A.39)
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Final good producers’ FOC(h):
wˆt − α[uˆt + kˆt−1 − hˆt] = 0 (2.A.40)
Choice of capacity utilization by capital good traders:
pˆk,t − qˆk,t − uˆta = 0 (2.A.41)
Rental price for capital:
Etpˆk,t+1p¯k − qˆk,tq¯k(1 + r¯ + f¯k) + Etqˆk,t+1q¯k(1− δk)− rˆtr¯q¯k − fˆk,tf¯kq¯k = 0 (2.A.42)
Rental price for durables:
Etpˆd,t+1p¯d − qˆd,tq¯d(1 + r¯ + f¯d) + Etqˆd,t+1q¯d(1− δd)− rˆtr¯q¯d − fˆd,tf¯dq¯d = 0 (2.A.43)
Price of installed capital:
qˆk,t + S
′′
k [Iˆt−1 − (1 + β)Iˆt + βEtIˆt+1] = 0 (2.A.44)
Price of installed durables:
qˆd,t + S
′′
d [Vˆt−1 − (1 + β)Vˆt + βEtVˆt+1] = 0 (2.A.45)
Law of motion for capital:
kˆtk¯ − kˆtk¯ (1− δk)− IˆtI¯ + uˆt−1bk¯ = 0 (2.A.46)
Law of motion for durables:
dˆtd¯− dˆt−1d¯(1− δd)− VˆtV¯ = 0 (2.A.47)
Good market clearing:
yˆty¯ − cˆy,tc¯y − IˆtI¯ − VˆtV¯ = 0 (2.A.48)
The state cˆy,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
cˆy,t = cˆy,t (2.A.49)
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The state dˆt−2 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
dˆt−1 = dˆt−1 (2.A.50)
The state rˆt−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
rˆt = rˆt (2.A.51)
The state Iˆt−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
Iˆt = Iˆt (2.A.52)
The state Vˆt−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding control in this period:
Vˆt = Vˆt (2.A.53)
The state τˆk,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
τˆk,t = τˆk,t (2.A.54)
The state τˆn,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
τˆn,t = τˆn,t (2.A.55)
The state fˆk,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
fˆk,t = fˆk,t (2.A.56)
The state fˆd,t−1 in the next period is equal to the corresponding state in this period:
fˆd,t = fˆd,t (2.A.57)
Definition of Bt:
BˆtB¯ − k¯q¯k[kˆt + qˆk,t]− d¯q¯d[dˆt + qˆd,t] = 0 (2.A.58)
Transfers from government to households:
TˆtT¯ − τ¯nw¯h¯[τˆn,t + wˆt + hˆt]− τ¯kr¯B¯[τˆk,t + rˆt−1 + Bˆt−1] = 0 (2.A.59)
where Gˆ = 0 ∀t
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Definition of tax revenues over GDP:
T̂RY t − T̂t T
T +G
+ yˆt = 0 (2.A.60)
For the log-linearization of the law of motions of our exogenous state variables, we use
the fact that xˆ ≈ x−x¯
x¯
. Note that the error term, ε, is not in log-linear terms.
Law of motion for capital taxes:
τˆk,t = ρk,1τˆk,t−1 + ρk,2τˆk,t−2 + εkt (2.A.61)
Law of motion for labor taxes:
τˆn,t = ρn,1τˆn,t−1 + ρn,2τˆn,t−2 + εnt (2.A.62)
Law of motion for capital friction:
fˆk,t = ρfk,1fˆk,t−1 + ρfk,2fˆk,t−2 + εfk,t (2.A.63)
Law of motion for durables friction:
fˆd,t = ρfd,1fˆd,t−1 + ρfd,2fˆd,t−2 + εfd,t (2.A.64)
2.A.3 Functional Form Assumptions
Utilization Costs
The utilization cost function is defined as in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010):
Ω(ut) =
1
2
bau2t + b(1− a)ut + b(
a
2
− 1)
with Ω(1) = 0 and Ω′,Ω′′ ≥ 0
and b = Ω′(1) and a =
Ω′′(1)
Ω′(1)
for u ≥ 0
The parameter a determines the curvature of Ω. If a is close to zero, it is easy to change
utilization.
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Adjustment Costs
Following Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010), we assume that the functional form
of adjustment costs is given by:
S (mt) =
1
2
{
exp
[√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
]
+ exp
[
−
√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
]
− 2
}
where mt ≡ ItIt−1 for capital good producers and mt ≡ VtVt−1 for durable good producers.
I denotes investment in capital, and V stands for investment in durables. Furthermore,
we allow the parameters of the adjustment costs for capital and durable good producers
to be different: Sk and Sd have parameters S ′′k and S ′′d respectively, where S ′′ is defined as
the second derivative of S(mt) evaluated at mt = 1. The first derivative of S with respect
to mt is equal to:
∂S(mt)
∂mt
=
1
2
{
exp
[√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
]√
S ′′ + exp
[
−
√
S ′′ (mt − 1)
] (
−
√
S ′′
)}
≡ S ′(mt)
Note that in steady state, mt = 1 and S(1) = S ′(1) = 0.
2.A.4 Initial Innovations
In this section, we describe the calibration of the initial tax and friction innovations in
the model in t = 0.
Tax Innovations
Recall that our tax rates follow an AR(2) process:
τk,t = (1− ρk,1 − ρk,2)τk + ρk,1τk,t−1 + ρk,2τk,t−2 + εkt
τn,t = (1− ρn,1 − ρn,2)τn + ρn,1τn,t−1 + ρn,2τn,t−2 + εnt
where τk and τn without time subscripts denote steady state tax rates.
Following Mertens and Ravn (2011), our benchmark specification assumes that both
tax innovations are affected equally by the change in tax revenues, i.e. εk0 = εn0 . Specifi-
cally, the initial tax shock is chosen such that tax revenues over final output (TRY0 in our
model)34 increase by one percentage point. This is done by increasing capital and labor
tax rates by exactly the same percentage point amount, i.e. τk,0 − τk = τn,0 − τn. The
corresponding levels of εk0 = εn0 as well as the initial tax rates τˆk,0 and τˆn,0 in the log-linear
34For simplicity, we define TRYt ≡ TRtyt in the Appendix.
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version of our model are derived below. We start by pointing out that the solution of our
model is of the following form:
Solution that determines endogenous states xˆ(t):
xˆ(t) = PPxˆ(t− 1) +QQzˆ(t) (2.A.65)
Solution that determines controls yˆ(t):
yˆ(t) = RRxˆ(t− 1) + SSzˆ(t) (2.A.66)
Note that all variables in the vectors xˆ(t), yˆ(t), and zˆ(t) are log-linear and therefore can
be interpreted as deviations from their steady state. zˆ(t) denotes the vector of exogenous
states, which includes capital and labor income tax rates. Tax revenues over final output,
on the other hand, are part of the yˆ(t) vector. Assuming that in time t = 0, all variables
are in their steady state (i.e. the log-linear version of them is equal to zero), we get an
equation that determines T̂RY 0 as a function of taxes:
T̂RY 0 = SS1τˆk,0 + SS2τˆn,0
where SSi is the i-th element of the SS vector from the policy function (2.A.66).
As mentioned above, our initial tax shock is assumed to raise tax revenues over fi-
nal output by one percentage point. Starting from the steady state TRY , this means
that TRY0 = TRY + 0.01. The log-linear version of the variable is given by T̂RY 0 =
ln
(
TRY+0.01
TRY
)
. In a next step, we need to calculate the increase in the two tax rates that
is consistent with this T̂RY 0. Recall that we assumed εk,0 = τk,0 − τk = τn,0 − τn = εn,0.
Rewriting this condition in log-linear form yields:
τk,0 − τk
τk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=τˆk,0
τk =
τn,0 − τn
τn︸ ︷︷ ︸
=τˆn,0
τn
Solving this for τˆn,0 and substituting it into the function for T̂RY 0 leaves us with:
T̂RY 0 = SS1τˆk,0 + SS2 τˆk,0
τk
τn︸ ︷︷ ︸
=τˆn,t
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Solving for τˆk,0 yields:
τˆk,0 =
T̂RY 0
SS1 + SS2
τk
τn
=
ln
(
TRY+0.01
TRY
)
SS1
τk
+ SS2
τn︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εk0
1
τk
=
εk0
τk
By symmetry:
τˆn,0 =
ln
(
TRY+0.01
TRY
)
SS1
τk
+ SS2
τn︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡εn0
1
τn
=
εn0
τn
and
εk0 = ε
n
0 =
ln
(
TRY+0.01
TRY
)
SS1
τk
+ SS2
τn
Investment Friction Innovations
Recall that our frictions follow an AR(2) process:
fk,t = (1− ρfk,1 − ρfk,2)fk + ρfk,1fk,t−1 + ρfk,2fk,t−2 + εfk,t
fd,t = (1− ρfd,1 − ρfd,2)fd + ρfd,1fd,t−1 + ρfd,2fd,t−2 + εfd,t
We assume that the friction innovations in t = 0 react to a tax shock in the following
way:
εfk,0 = ξk
(
TRY0 − TRY
)
= ξk · 0.01
εfd,0 = ξd
(
TRY0 − TRY
)
= ξd · 0.01
In a next step, we derive the corresponding initial values of the log-linear frictions fˆk,0
and fˆd,0. For this purpose, we start from the following relationship:
εfk,0 = fk,0 − fk = ξk · 0.01
and in log-linear terms:
fˆk,0 ≡ ln
[
fk,0
fk
]
= ln
[
ξk · 0.01 + fk
fk
]
= ln
[
1 +
ξk · 0.01
fk
]
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By symmetry, the initial shock to the durables friction is equal to (assuming that we start
in steady state):
εfd,0 = fd,0 − fd = ξd · 0.01
and the initial durables friction in log-linear terms:
fˆd,0 ≡ ln
[
fd,0
fd
]
= ln
[
ξd · 0.01 + fd
fd
]
= ln
[
1 +
ξd · 0.01
fd
]
2.A.5 Tables and Figures
Table 2.A.1: Coefficient estimates for Specification 1, Case 2
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 1.00 (1.57)
Ψ Hours curvature 0.50 (0.87)
γ Weight of hours 9.36c
pi Habit parameter 0.98*** (0.03)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.08c
a Capital utilization parameter 1573559208 (-)
b Capital utilization parameter 0.04c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 45.05** (21.92)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 39.86* (22.85)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes 1.74*** (0.12)
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -0.75*** (0.12)
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes -
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction -
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction -
ξk Initial response of capital friction -
ξd Initial response of durables friction -
fk Steady state capital friction 0c
fd Steady state durables friction 0c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound.
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Figure 2.A.1: Taxes in Specification 1, Case 2
Notes: Estimated dynamics of the capital income tax rate in the model without investment frictions.
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Figure 2.A.2: Impulse responses for Specification 1, Case 2
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in capital income taxes in the model without investment
frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with the shaded areas corresponding
to 68 percent confidence intervals.
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Table 2.A.2: Coefficient estimates for Specification 1, Case 3
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 3.15*** (0.06)
Ψ Hours curvature 2.27*** (0.19)
γ Weight of hours 14373
pi Habit parameter 0.84*** (0.00)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.08c
a Capital utilization parameter 0n
b Capital utilization parameter 0.04c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 0.72*** (0.09)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 0.75*** (0.06)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes -
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes 1.65*** (0.01)
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -0.65*** (0.01)
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction -
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction -
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction -
ξk Initial response of capital friction -
ξd Initial response of durables friction -
fk Steady state capital friction 0c
fd Steady state durables friction 0c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound.
Figure 2.A.3: Taxes in Specification 1, Case 3
Notes: Estimated dynamics of the labor income tax rate in the model without investment frictions.
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Figure 2.A.4: Impulse responses for Specification 1, Case 3
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in labor income taxes in the model without investment
frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with the shaded areas corresponding
to 68 percent confidence intervals.
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2.A.6 Robustness Check
The parameters that differ the most between Specification 3 and our benchmark case in
Specification 1 are σ and S ′′k . In particular, in Specification 3, we find a higher curvature of
consumption, σ = 7.33, than in the benchmark (where it is equal to 4.07). Furthermore,
the adjustment cost parameter for capital investment is estimated to be zero (compared
to 1.06 in the benchmark). Hence, one concern might be that our additional investment
frictions are only significant because they take over the job that capital adjustment costs
play in a standard model. One might also worry that the frictions would become insignif-
icant once we force σ to lie within a more realistic range. In order to address these issues,
we conduct the following robustness check.
We re-estimate Specification 3 subject to the following constraints: σ ≤ 4.07 and
S ′′k ≥ 1.06. That is, we impose that σ cannot exceed its benchmark value and S ′′k has to
be at least as large as in the benchmark specification.35
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2.A.3. Reassuringly, the parameters
that determine the transmission of tax shocks to the friction are still positive and highly
significant. In particular, we find ξk = 2.52 and ξd = 2.66. Compared to Specification 3,
the capital friction is a bit lower, whereas the durables friction increases substantially.
In accordance with these findings, Figure 2.10 illustrates that our constrained model
is better able to match the large empirical tax multipliers for durables purchases and
investment than the benchmark model without additional frictions. This fact is also
reflected in the value of the weighted distance between the theoretical and empirical
impulse responses. For our constrained Specification 3, we find D = 52.31, which is much
lower than its counterpart from the benchmark (60.02 in Case 1 of Specification 1).
Therefore, we conclude that our results are robust to parameter constraints. Most
importantly, our investment frictions remain highly significant and improve the fit of the
model even if we limit our coefficients from Specification 3 to lie within the range of our
benchmark specification.
35We also estimated the model with both constraints separately. Due to space constraints the tables
and figures are not reported here. They are available from the authors upon request. We find that the
constraint on σ only affects the durables friction, whereas the constraint on S′′k lowers the capital friction
and increases the durables friction.
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Table 2.A.3: Coefficient estimates for Specification 3 with constraints
Parameter Explanation Value Standard Error
σ Consumption curvature 4.07*** (0.46)
Ψ Hours curvature 0.50 (0.48)
γ Weight of hours 8905c
pi Habit parameter 0.85*** (0.02)
φ Composite consumption 0.99c
ν Final good production function 1.22c
a Capital utilization parameter 0.06* (0.03)
b Capital utilization parameter 0.05c
S′′k Capital adjustment costs 1.06*** (0.15)
S′′d Durables adjustment costs 0.48*** (0.08)
ρk,1 AR(2) for capital taxes 1.70*** (0.12)
ρk,2 AR(2) for capital taxes -0.72*** (0.11)
ρn,1 AR(2) for labor taxes 1.61*** (0.08)
ρn,2 AR(2) for labor taxes -0.61*** (0.08)
ρfk,1 AR(2) for capital friction 0.31*** (0.10)
ρfk,2 AR(2) for capital friction 0.00 (0.08)
ρfd,1 AR(2) for durables friction 0.10 (0.10)
ρfd,2 AR(2) for durables friction 0.00 (0.11)
ξk Initial response of capital friction 2.52*** (0.33)
ξd Initial response of durables friction 2.66*** (0.31)
fk Steady state capital friction 0.016c
fd Steady state durables friction 0.06c
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. c marks parameters that
are not estimated because they are calibrated in steady state. n marks parameters that hit a natural
bound. Constraints are σ ≤ 4.07 and S′′k ≥ 1.06.
Figure 2.A.5: Taxes in Specification 3 with constraints
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and labor income tax rates in the model with dynamic
investment frictions and constraints σ ≤ 4.07 and S′′k ≥ 1.06.
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Figure 2.A.6: Friction dynamics in Specification 3 with constraints
Notes: Estimated dynamics of capital and durables frictions after a shock to capital and labor
income taxes. Constraints are σ ≤ 4.07 and S′′k ≥ 1.06.
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Figure 2.A.7: Impulse responses for Specification 3 with constraints
Notes: Model impulse responses to a shock in capital and labor income taxes in the model with and
without dynamic investment frictions. Constraints are σ ≤ 4.07 and S′′k ≥ 1.06 in the model with
frictions. The solid line represents empirical impulse responses, with the shaded areas corresponding
to 68 percent confidence intervals.
3 The Effect of Exchange Rate Fluctuations
on Tourism in Switzerland: Evidence from
a Panel Error Correction Model
3.1 Introduction
The tourism sector in Switzerland has faced many challenges in the past few years. The
economic downturn due to the Great Recession has reduced the willingness to travel,
and the strong appreciation of the Swiss franc has made holidays in Switzerland very
expensive. The main reason behind the strengthening of the Swiss franc was its safe haven
property, which has played an important role during the recent European debt crisis. In
order to alleviate the pressure arising from the overvaluation of the Swiss franc, the Swiss
National Bank introduced a minimum exchange rate against the euro in September 2011.
In January 2015, it decided to discontinue this policy. Both of these interventions fueled
the debate about the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the export industry, and in
particular on the tourism sector. Whereas the effect of exchange rates on exports has been
widely investigated in the literature, there is only a limited amount of research about the
consequences for tourism. The present paper fills this gap by estimating exchange rate
elasticities for tourism in Switzerland.
I find that a real (nominal) appreciation of the Swiss franc by one percent leads to a
decrease in tourist arrivals by 1.03 (0.60) percent, in overnight stays by 0.49 (0.47) percent,
in bed and room occupancy rates by 0.82 (0.92) and 0.84 (0.85) percent respectively, and
in revenues per available room by 1.54 (0.87) percent in the long run. My elasticities for
overnight stays are at the lower bound of corresponding estimates from previous studies.1
This is most certainly due to the fact that my elasticities are calculated for an entire
exchange rate basket, whereas existing estimates refer to bilateral exchange rates only.
The approach that I develop for the estimation of exchange rate elasticities in tourism
is therefore an additional contribution of this paper. Specifically, I rely on within-country
variation and effective (as opposed to bilateral) exchange rates. While this method has
1Estimates for bilateral exchange rate elasticities of overnight stays in Switzerland are derived by
Abrahamsen and Simmons-Süer (2011). They range from 0.45 to 1.83 for nominal exchange rates and
from 0.52 to 2.32 for real exchange rates.
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been used in the literature to study the effect of exchange rates on different industries (see
e.g. Campa and Goldberg 1995, Kaiser and Siegenthaler 2014, and Nucci and Pozzolo
2001), I am the first to apply it to the tourism sector. By doing so, I estimate the
effect of fluctuations in the entire exchange rate basket on tourism variables. In contrast
to bilateral estimates, this takes into account the possibility of different tourist groups
compensating for changes in each other’s behavior. Thus, my exchange rate elasticities are
suitable to analyze the actual situation of the tourism sector as a whole, whereas bilateral
estimates focus on specific tourist groups. In that sense, my method is complementary to
existing estimation strategies.
An advantage of using effective exchange rates is that it enables me to estimate ex-
change rate elasticities for aggregate variables that are not directly attributable to tourists
from a specific country of origin. In particular, I additionally assess the effect of exchange
rate fluctuations on bed and room occupancy rates as well as on revenues per available
room. In contrast, the bilateral method used in previous studies is only able to provide
estimates for arrivals and overnight stays and thus misses an important part of the story.
For the tourism sector as a whole, not only the absolute number of tourists is relevant,
but also how it relates to the supply of beds and to prices paid per room.
My analysis for Switzerland is based on quarterly panel data, covering all 26 cantons
and a time span from 2005 to 2013. I document that there is substantial variation in the
composition of tourists across cantons. Some regions traditionally attract more visitors
from the Euro Area, whereas others are more popular with tourists from overseas or
China. I interpret the relative shares of tourists’ countries of origin as a measure for
the exposure of a canton’s tourism sector to the corresponding bilateral exchange rates.
This allows me to construct canton-specific exchange rate baskets. I define the effective
exchange rate of a canton as the weighted average of bilateral exchange rates, using past
tourist shares as weights.
Cointegration tests show that there is a long-run relationship between tourism vari-
ables, effective exchange rates, and real effective GDP in tourists’ countries of origin.
Hence, I am able to estimate exchange rate elasticities in a panel error correction model.
The main advantage of this approach is that it provides long-run and short-run elasticities
as well as an estimate of the adjustment speed, which is an indicator for how fast the
system returns to its equilibrium after a deviation. My method allows for canton-specific
short-run dynamics and adjustment coefficients. The long-run exchange rate elasticities,
on the other hand, are assumed to be the same for all cantons.
In my baseline estimation, I control for canton fixed effects and a linear time trend.
I estimate the model separately for all my tourism measures, i.e. arrivals, overnight stays,
bed and room occupancy rates, and revenues per available room. By doing so, I obtain
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five different sets of coefficients. For each dependent variable, I find significantly positive
long-run exchange rate elasticities. The adjustment speed ranges from 30 to 56 percent.
My results are robust to alternative specifications, weighting procedures, and different
measures for my explanatory variables.
Ideally, one would also want to control for time fixed effects. However, I show that
the non-stationarity in effective exchange rates is driven by a large common component
for all cantons. This implies that identification becomes problematic once I include time
fixed effects. Therefore, I focus on my baseline specification without time fixed effects.
The super-consistency property of cointegration parameters ensures that these estimates
are not subject to an omitted variable bias. In order to make sure that this asymptotic
result also holds in my finite sample, I furthermore conduct an exercise to determine the
importance of potential omitted variables that would have been captured by time fixed
effects. Reassuringly, I do not find any evidence for an omitted variable bias. Therefore,
I conclude that my baseline results are reliable and unbiased even without controlling for
time fixed effects.
Related Literature
My paper is related to the literature on tourism demand. An extensive review of recent
research on the subject is provided by Song and Li (2008). Within this field, my paper
specifically contributes to the strand of literature using error correction models. Lim
and McAleer (2001), for example, use this class of models in order to estimate long-run
tourism demand for Australia. The same approach is taken by Kulendran and Wilson
(2000), who analyze factors influencing long-run demand for business travel to Australia.
Bonham, Gangnes, and Zhou (2009) estimate a vector error correction model for tourism
in Hawaii, taking into account supply as well as demand effects. In a more technical study,
Kulendran and Witt (2003) show that error correction models perform better in terms of
forecasting accuracy than alternative time series models for medium- and long-run tourism
forecasts. A general description of the application of error correction models in tourism
demand modeling is provided by Song and Witt (2000). My empirical strategy differs
from these studies mainly because it also takes into account within-country variation, on
top of the time dimension. Papers using panel data are less widespread. One example is
Falk (2013a), who estimates exchange rate elasticities for Swiss tourists in Austrian ski
resorts using a panel error correction model.
Furthermore, there is a growing number of studies that analyze the effect of exchange
rates on tourism in Switzerland. A recent paper in that field by Falk (2013b) estimates
short-run exchange rate elasticities for winter tourism in 60 communities in Switzerland.
He finds that during the winter season, Alpine tourism is more sensitive to exchange
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rate movements than tourism in lake and city destinations. In contrast to Falk (2013b),
I use a much longer time series covering all seasons of the year, which allows me to
estimate long-run as well as short-run exchange rate elasticities.2 A further difference
between his approach and the one used in my paper is that Falk (2013b) only considers
fluctuations in the bilateral exchange rate between the euro and the Swiss franc in order
to explain changes in overall tourist arrivals and overnight stays, whereas I use exchange
rate baskets reflecting the varying exposure to different bilateral exchange rates in every
canton. Furthermore, while Falk (2013b) focuses on the most important communities in
Switzerland, I provide elasticity estimates on an aggregate level. In that sense, my paper
is more closely related to the KOF study by Abrahamsen and Simmons-Süer (2011).
For each country of origin, they estimate an error correction model for overnight stays
of tourists in Switzerland. Their identification relies on changes over time, whereas I
additionally exploit variation across cantons in Switzerland. In a more recent paper,
Abrahamsen et al. (2015) compare bilateral exchange rate elasticities in Switzerland across
different hotel categories. Based on their estimates, they cannot reject the hypothesis of
identical elasticities across all categories. A more general analysis of tourism demand in
Switzerland is conducted by Ferro-Luzzi and Flückiger (2003). In contrast to my paper,
they do not specifically focus on exchange rates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
and the construction of the explanatory variables. Section 3.3 performs stationarity and
cointegration tests and develops the empirical strategy. Estimation results as well as
robustness checks are reported in Section 3.4 and are discussed in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
This section provides an overview of the data used in my empirical analysis. I work with
quarterly panel data for all 26 cantons of Switzerland, covering the time span from 2005
to 2013.3 Subscript i denotes cantons, and t is the time subscript.
The dependent variables in my estimation are measures for tourism activity in Switzer-
land. My explanatory variables, on the other hand, are weighted averages of bilateral
exchange rates and country-specific GDP. Data sources and definitions as well as the
construction of the dependent variables are described in the following.
2Falk (2013b) bases his estimates on four data points per community only.
3The time period is constrained by the availability of data on explanatory variables. Specifically,
GDP for India is only available until the end of the year 2013. Tourism variables would actually be
available until 2015.
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3.2.1 Dependent Variables
The data source for my tourism variables is the HESTA dataset, which is based on a
monthly, comprehensive survey conducted by the Bundesamt für Statistik (2015). Partic-
ipation is mandatory for all establishments providing accommodation in the Swiss tourism
sector, namely hotels, motels, hostels, guest houses, health resorts, holiday homes, and
campgrounds.4 My dependent variables are:
• Arrivals: Number of tourists who spend at least one night in an accommodation
establishment of the Swiss tourism sector.
• Overnight Stays: Number of nights that tourists spend in an accommodation estab-
lishment of the Swiss tourism sector.
• Bed Occupancy Rate: Overnight stays divided by bed capacity during a specific
time period, measured in percent. Bed capacity is defined as the number of beds
multiplied by the number of days during the time period considered.
• Room Occupancy Rate: Number of occupied rooms and nights divided by room
capacity during a specific time period, measured in percent. Room capacity is
defined as the number of rooms multiplied by the number of days during the time
period considered.
• Revenues per Available Room: Total income of all accommodation establishments
in the Swiss tourism sector divided by room capacity during a specific time period.5
Tourism variables are subject to high seasonality. Before estimating the model, I there-
fore seasonally adjust the data following the procedure given in Baum (2006). In a first
step, I regress tourism variables on quarter dummies. The residuals of this regression
can be interpreted as the deseasonalized component of the time series. The seasonally
adjusted series is constructed by adding the (pre-adjustment) mean to these residuals.
I apply this methodology to every canton separately, allowing for different seasonality
patterns across cantons.6
4The survey has a very high response rate of more than 95 percent.
5Data on revenues per available room were kindly provided by the Swiss Hotel Association ‘hotel-
leriesuisse’ and are only available after 2005. They are based on the same survey as the HESTA data.
By taking an average over all different types of accommodation, this measure is rather theoretical and
does not account for heterogeneity in room quality.
6In the tourism literature, it is common to work with seasonally adjusted data. In many cases,
only deseasonalized data are available in the first place. From an econometric point of view, seasonal
adjustment reduces the degrees of freedom of the estimation, which should be taken into account when
computing standard errors. I do so by reporting adjusted standard errors.
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3.2.2 Explanatory Variables
My explanatory variables are:
• Real Effective Exchange Rate: Weighted average of bilateral real exchange rates.
• Nominal Effective Exchange Rate: Weighted average of bilateral nominal exchange
rates.
• Real Effective GDP: Weighted average of GDP in the tourists’ countries of origin.
Data sources are given in Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix. The methodology for the con-
struction of these variables as well as the weights used in their calculation are discussed
in the following.
The concept of effective exchange rates is widely used in the international trade lit-
erature. It is based on the fact that every country has more than one trading partner.
Therefore, bilateral exchange rates alone do not reflect the conditions that exporters or
importers in a certain country face. Addressing this issue, effective exchange rates take
into account the composition of a country’s trade flows. They are defined as a weighted
average of bilateral exchange rates of a country and its trading partners. The more de-
pendent a country is on a certain trading partner, the higher is the latter’s weight in the
index.
Several organizations, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), and major central banks, provide data on effective exchange rates for
different countries and currencies.7 However, most existing measures of effective exchange
rates abstract from tourism services (see Klau and Fung 2006). To my knowledge, the IMF
is the only organization that does take into account tourism, but only for "[...] countries
that are heavily dependent on trade in tourism services" (Bayoumi, Lee, and Jayanthi
2005, page 9). Therefore, the weights used in the derivation of effective exchange rates
are not representative for the tourism sector, but instead focus entirely on trade flows.
I thus need to construct a measure for effective exchange rates that reflects the composi-
tion of tourists’ countries of origin. For this purpose, I define the tourism-specific effective
exchange rate for canton i at time t as the weighted average of bilateral exchange rates
between the Swiss franc and all countries of origin k:
EERi,t =
k∑
j=1
wi,j,tERj,t (3.1)
7See Chinn (2006) for a detailed overview and discussion of different weighting schemes.
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where EERi,t stands for the effective exchange rate faced by canton i at time t, and ERj,t
denotes the bilateral exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the currency of country
j at time t. wi,j,t is the weight of country j in canton i at time t. It can be interpreted
as the exposure of the tourism sector in canton i to tourists from country of origin j at a
given point in time. k is the total number of countries of origin.8
Analogously, real effective GDP in canton i at time t is defined as the weighted average
of real GDP in tourists’ countries of origin j:
REGDPi,t =
k∑
j=1
wi,j,tRGDP
norm
j,t (3.2)
where REGDP is real effective GDP of tourists in canton i at time t, and RGDP normj,t
denotes (normalized) real GDP of tourists from country of origin j. wi,j,t is identical to
the weight used in the construction of effective exchange rates.
Weights
I define the weight of country j in canton i at time t as the lagged share of overnight stays
by tourists from country j in canton i over four quarters:
wi,j,t =
∑7
m=4 overnight staysi,j,t−m∑7
m=4
∑k
n=1 overnight staysi,n,t−m
(3.3)
where k again denotes the total number of different tourists’ countries of origin. In order
to smooth out seasonality effects, I calculate the share over four quarters from t − 7 to
t− 4.9 The lags reduce concerns about endogeneity.10
In a next step, I need to choose the number of countries of origin to include in the
derivation of weights. Switzerland is visited by many different tourist groups. However,
many countries of origin do not play an important role for Swiss tourism. I therefore drop
all countries with a share that does not exceed three percent in any canton on average
over the time span from 2006 to 2014, from the last quarter in 2013 to the third quarter
in 2014, or over all quarters in the year 2006. This results in a sample of eight countries of
origin: Switzerland, the Euro Area, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US),
India, China, Japan, and Russia.11
8The country of origin of a tourist is defined as his country of permanent residence and hence is not
necessarily identical to his nationality.
9For the weights in the year 2005, I use the shares from 2003 because data for the year 2004 are
missing.
10A similar weighting procedure is used by Ferro-Luzzi and Flückiger (2003) in order to measure the
aggregate tourism demand for Switzerland. However, they use contemporaneous instead of lagged shares.
11In a robustness check, I increase the cutoff to five percent, in which case Japan and Russia drop out.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for weights of each country of origin
Country of Origin Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
overall 56.30 15.82 20.81 92.41
Switzerland between 15.74 26.85 86.52
within 4.78 39.74 75.04
overall 31.25 9.24 6.33 53.46
Euro Area between 8.86 11.39 44.55
within 3.77 17.95 45.19
overall 4.06 3.66 0.05 16.56
United States between 3.43 0.35 12.09
within 1.45 -1.65 14.36
overall 4.25 3.41 0.06 16.04
United Kingdom between 3.23 0.53 12.86
within 1.23 -0.66 10.72
overall 1.33 1.98 0.00 15.35
China between 1.36 0.05 4.33
within 1.44 -2.72 13.61
overall 0.90 0.97 0.00 6.38
Russia between 0.85 0.00 4.08
within 0.47 -0.73 3.57
overall 1.05 2.78 0.00 34.47
India between 1.86 0.03 9.66
within 2.08 -8.58 25.87
overall 0.85 1.20 0.00 8.92
Japan between 0.96 0.08 3.52
within 0.74 -1.86 6.53
These countries are accountable for nearly 90 percent of all overnight stays in Switzer-
land between 2006 and 2014. Their shares in aggregate tourism in Switzerland are pre-
sented in Figure 3.1.12 Domestic tourism accounts for around 50 percent of all overnight
stays. Tourists from the Euro Area are responsible for 30 to 40 percent of tourists visiting
Switzerland, whereas the other six countries’ shares range from 3 to 9 percent. Figure 3.2
illustrates the variation in the importance of different countries of origin across cantons
based on the comparison of the shares in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell Innerrho-
den. The latter is almost entirely dependent on domestic tourists whereas the canton of
Zürich is exposed to a wide variety of tourist groups. Between 30 and 40 percent of its
tourists come from the Euro Area, around 10 percent from the US, and around 8 percent
from the UK. Detailed descriptive statistics of the shares are reported in Table 3.1. The
12In the figure, shares of all eight countries sum to 100 percent. The reason is that I choose to display
the share data used in the derivation of the weights. As the weights serve as a basis for the calculation
of weighted averages, they have to sum to 100 percent.
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high standard deviations between cantons confirm that there is substantial variation in
the exposure to different countries of origin across cantons.
Figure 3.1: Shares in total overnight stays by country of origin
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Figure 3.2: Shares in total overnight stays by country of origin
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Exchange Rates
All bilateral exchange rates are defined as CURRENCYj/CHF . An exchange rate of
1.20EUR/CHF therefore means that one euro can buy 1.20 Swiss francs. Hence, an
increase in the exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation of the Swiss franc. An appre-
ciation of the Swiss franc, on the other hand, is reflected by a decrease in the exchange
rate.
I normalize bilateral nominal exchange rates to 100 in the first quarter of 1999 in order
to make them comparable across different countries. Specifically, I apply the following
formula:
NERCH,j,t =
NERCH,j,t
NERCH,j,0
· 100 (3.4)
where NERCH,j,0 is the nominal exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the currency
of country j in the base period, that is in the first quarter of 1999. Consistent with
the normalization of nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates are calculated following
Maciejewski (1983):
RERCH,j,t =
NERCH,j,t
NERCH,j,0
· CPIj,t/CPIj,0
CPICH,t/CPICH,0
· 100 (3.5)
where RERCH,j,t and NERCH,j,t denote real and nominal exchange rates between the
currency of country j and the Swiss franc at time t. CPIj,t is the consumer price index
of country j. Everything on the right hand side of the equation is measured relative to
the base period t = 0, which is again the first quarter of 1999.
For Switzerland (i.e. j = CH), the case is more complicated. In principle, Swiss
tourists do not face an exchange rate when traveling within Switzerland. However, to
the extent that they consider taking trips abroad, their decisions are still affected by
the strength of the Swiss franc with respect to other currencies. Therefore, I define the
exchange rate for Swiss tourists as a weighted average of the exchange rates between the
Swiss franc and the currencies of the main Swiss tourist destinations.13 In a robustness
check, I also consider a definition in which the exchange rate for Swiss residents is held
constant at a level of 100 for all points in time.
Measures of the real and nominal effective exchange rate for the cantons Basel-Stadt,
Jura, St. Gallen, and Genf are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. The compar-
ison of the four time series confirms that there is indeed variation in terms of the exposure
to exchange rate fluctuations across cantons. However, there is also a large common com-
13The Bundesamt für Statistik (2009) documents that in 2003, 51 percent of Swiss tourists traveled
within Switzerland, and 42 percent went to the Euro Area. The shares of other countries are negligible.
The exchange rate for the Swiss franc with itself is set to 100 for all points in time. The weights are fixed
at their level of 2003.
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Figure 3.3: Real effective exchange rates for different cantons
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ponent in the effective exchange rates of all cantons, which results in a strong comovement
of the time series.14
Real GDP
Data on real GDP are seasonally adjusted. Furthermore, GDP is expressed in terms of the
national currency of every country of origin.15 In order to make the measures comparable
across different countries, I therefore need to normalize them. For this purpose, I use data
for purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita from the year 1999 provided
by the World Bank (2015b). For this particular year, I normalize PPP-adjusted GDP
per capita of the US to 100 and compute real GDP for country j at every point in time
accordingly. This implies the following normalization:
RGDP normj,t =
RGDPj,t
RGDPj,0
· PPPRGDPpcj,0
PPPRGDPpcUS,0
· 100 (3.6)
where PPPRGDPpcj,0 denotes PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in t = 0, that is in the
year 1999. RGDPj,t is real GDP of country j at time t expressed in units of national
currency. The resulting time series of real effective GDP for the cantons Basel-Stadt,
Jura, St. Gallen, and Genf are presented in Figure 3.5.
In order to conduct robustness checks, I apply two alternative normalization methods
to the data. In the first case, I use PPP-adjusted aggregate GDP instead of GDP per
capita in the formula above. In the second case, I simply normalize the GDP of every
14I provide possible explanations for this point in Section 3.5.
15GDP for India is not available for the year 2014. This is the reason why my estimation period ends
in 2013.
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Figure 3.4: Nominal effective exchange rates for different cantons
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country to 100 in 1999, without taking into account differences in the levels across coun-
tries.
Data derived according to Equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) are used in the
formula for the effective exchange rate given in Equation (3.1) and for real effective GDP
in Equation (3.2). Having defined all dependent and explanatory variables, I now proceed
to the estimation of my model.
Figure 3.5: Real effective GDP for different cantons
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
Based on the fact that travel decisions are usually made a few quarters in advance, a
reasonable starting point for the estimation of the relationship between Swiss tourism
and exchange rates is an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) dynamic panel model:
ln(Yi,t) =
p∑
j=1
ηijln(Yi,t−j) +
p∑
j=0
κijln(EERi,t−j) +
p∑
j=0
δijln(REGDPi,t−j) + εi,t (3.7)
where Y denotes a tourism measure, such as arrivals, overnight stays, bed and room
occupancy rates, or revenues per available room. The current value of the tourism variable
is regressed on its own lags as well as on current and lagged values of the effective exchange
rate, denoted by EER, and real effective GDP in tourists’ countries of origin, denoted by
REGDP .
Depending on the order of integration of my variables, there are three alternative ways
of estimating Equation (3.7). First, if all variables are stationary, then the ARDL model
can be estimated in levels. If my variables are non-stationary, on the other hand, then the
estimation of the model in levels can produce spurious regression results. In that case,
stationarity can be achieved by estimating Equation (3.7) in differences. However, while
this solves the spurious regression problem, it also leads to a loss of valuable information
on the relationship between the levels of the variables and makes it impossible to estimate
long-run exchange rate elasticities. Fortunately, there is a third case. If there is a linear
combination of my variables that is stationary, then they are cointegrated. Based on
the Granger Representation Theorem by Engle and Granger (1987), the existence of a
cointegration relationship ensures that the model has an error correction representation.
In that case, Equation (3.7) can be reparametrized into a panel error correction model
(PECM). A convenient property of error correction models is that both long-run and
short-run coefficients can be estimated.
In order to choose the appropriate econometric model for my estimation, I first deter-
mine the order of integration of all my variables and then test them for cointegration.
3.3.1 Unit Root Tests
In order to test whether my variables contain unit roots, I use the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). It fits the following model:
∆yt = α + βyt−1 + δt+
k∑
j=1
ζj∆yt−j + εt (3.8)
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Table 3.2: Unit root tests for dependent variables
Canton Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Zt p Zt p Zt p Zt p Zt p
Zürich -2.41 (0.38) -2.61 (0.28) -2.85 (0.18) -2.78 (0.20) -4.07 (0.01)
Bern -2.36 (0.40) -2.79 (0.20) -3.02 (0.13) -2.81 (0.19) -2.49 (0.33)
Luzern -3.18 (0.09) -3.72 (0.02) -2.31 (0.43) -2.66 (0.25) -1.53 (0.82)
Uri -2.09 (0.55) -2.13 (0.53) -2.00 (0.60) -2.12 (0.53) -3.17 (0.09)
Schwyz -2.32 (0.43) -2.07 (0.56) -2.77 (0.21) -2.25 (0.46) -2.85 (0.18)
Obwalden -3.13 (0.10) -3.88 (0.01) -2.61 (0.28) -2.31 (0.43) -1.62 (0.78)
Nidwalden -1.41 (0.86) -1.69 (0.76) -0.81 (0.97) -1.08 (0.93) -1.08 (0.93)
Glarus -2.25 (0.46) -2.13 (0.53) -1.81 (0.70) -2.53 (0.32) -2.25 (0.46)
Zug -2.97 (0.14) -2.54 (0.31) -2.75 (0.21) -2.44 (0.36) -2.76 (0.21)
Freiburg -1.83 (0.69) -1.54 (0.82) -1.77 (0.72) -1.56 (0.81) -2.54 (0.31)
Solothurn -2.31 (0.43) -2.34 (0.41) -2.28 (0.45) -2.31 (0.43) -2.09 (0.55)
Basel-Stadt -1.97 (0.62) -3.80 (0.02) -3.72 (0.02) -3.80 (0.02) -3.35 (0.06)
Basel-Land -1.89 (0.66) -2.98 (0.14) -2.44 (0.36) -2.23 (0.47) -2.19 (0.50)
Schaffhausen -2.48 (0.34) -2.50 (0.33) -1.96 (0.62) -1.65 (0.77) -1.44 (0.85)
Appenzell-AR -1.16 (0.92) -1.48 (0.83) -2.58 (0.29) -2.25 (0.46) -2.20 (0.49)
Appenzell-IR -3.27 (0.07) -2.25 (0.46) -2.02 (0.59) -1.75 (0.73) -1.76 (0.72)
St. Gallen -1.75 (0.73) -3.13 (0.10) -3.53 (0.04) -3.45 (0.04) -2.78 (0.20)
Graubünden -2.25 (0.46) -2.62 (0.27) -2.98 (0.14) -3.30 (0.07) -2.98 (0.14)
Aargau -2.56 (0.30) -3.48 (0.04) -3.40 (0.05) -2.98 (0.14) -3.33 (0.06)
Thurgau -2.46 (0.35) -2.91 (0.16) -2.83 (0.19) -2.82 (0.19) -3.35 (0.06)
Tessin -2.67 (0.25) -2.29 (0.44) -2.37 (0.40) -2.30 (0.43) -3.41 (0.05)
Waadt -3.00 (0.13) -2.81 (0.19) -2.66 (0.25) -2.57 (0.30) -3.29 (0.07)
Wallis -3.18 (0.09) -2.57 (0.30) -2.71 (0.23) -3.13 (0.10) -3.75 (0.02)
Neuenburg -2.23 (0.48) -2.27 (0.45) -2.66 (0.25) -2.75 (0.22) -3.66 (0.02)
Jura -3.75 (0.02) -3.15 (0.09) -2.47 (0.34) -3.13 (0.10) -3.27 (0.07)
Genf -2.06 (0.57) -2.37 (0.40) -3.49 (0.04) -3.95 (0.01) -3.11 (0.10)
Notes: Test statistics from the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test including 3 lags and a linear
time trend. p-values in parentheses. The null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root is
rejected if the test statistic is lower than the critical values: -4.316 (1%), -3.572 (5%), and -3.223
(10%) for the first four variables and -4.325 (1%), -3.588 (5%), and -3.233 (10%) for revenues.
Under the null hypothesis, y follows a unit root process, and thus, H0 : β = 0. Under
the alternative, the process is stationary, and therefore, Ha : β < 0. The test statistic is
given by:
Zt =
βˆ
σˆβ
with σˆβ being the standard error of βˆ.
I conduct this test separately for every canton in my sample. In order to take care of
possible serial correlation, k = 3 lags of the dependent variable are included. Furthermore,
I allow for a linear time trend. Table 3.2 presents the resulting values of the test statistics
for my tourism variables, together with approximate p-values developed by MacKinnon
(1994). At a confidence level of one percent, I find that all variables exhibit a unit root in
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Table 3.3: Unit root tests for explanatory variables
Canton Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate Real GDP
Zt p Zt p Zt p
Zürich -2.30 (0.43) -2.29 (0.44) -2.04 (0.58)
Bern -2.33 (0.42) -2.36 (0.40) -1.82 (0.69)
Luzern -2.31 (0.43) -2.28 (0.44) -1.76 (0.72)
Uri -2.30 (0.44) -2.35 (0.41) -1.97 (0.62)
Schwyz -2.19 (0.49) -2.27 (0.45) -2.07 (0.56)
Obwalden -2.47 (0.34) -2.38 (0.39) -2.29 (0.44)
Nidwalden -2.19 (0.50) -2.30 (0.44) -1.50 (0.83)
Glarus -2.22 (0.48) -2.23 (0.47) -1.83 (0.69)
Zug -2.36 (0.40) -2.30 (0.43) -2.09 (0.55)
Freiburg -2.21 (0.49) -2.23 (0.47) -1.85 (0.68)
Solothurn -2.25 (0.46) -2.32 (0.42) -1.98 (0.61)
Basel-Stadt -2.22 (0.48) -2.31 (0.43) -2.08 (0.56)
Basel-Land -2.32 (0.42) -2.26 (0.46) -2.20 (0.49)
Schaffhausen -2.22 (0.48) -2.22 (0.48) -1.41 (0.86)
Appenzell-AR -2.22 (0.48) -2.28 (0.45) -1.90 (0.66)
Appenzell-IR -2.24 (0.47) -2.28 (0.45) -1.89 (0.66)
St. Gallen -2.23 (0.47) -2.29 (0.44) -1.99 (0.61)
Graubünden -2.25 (0.46) -2.26 (0.46) -1.71 (0.75)
Aargau -2.36 (0.40) -2.24 (0.47) -1.65 (0.77)
Thurgau -2.25 (0.46) 2.27 (0.45) -1.95 (0.63)
Tessin -2.22 (0.48) -2.26 (0.45) -1.93 (0.64)
Waadt -2.19 (0.50) -2.25 (0.46) -1.75 (0.73)
Wallis -2.25 (0.46) -2.27 (0.45) -1.45 (0.85)
Neuenburg -2.19 (0.50) -2.26 (0.46) -1.88 (0.66)
Jura -2.30 (0.44) -2.35 (0.41) -2.24 (0.47)
Genf -2.27 (0.45) -2.29 (0.44) -1.99 (0.61)
Notes: Test statistics from the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test including 3 lags and a linear
time trend. p-values in parentheses. The null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root is
rejected if the test statistic is lower than the critical values: -4.316 (1%), -3.572 (5%), and -3.223
(10%).
all cantons. Once I increase the confidence level to ten percent, arrivals, overnight stays,
and the room occupancy rate contain a unit root in 21 cantons and bed occupancy rates
in 22 cantons. For revenues per available room, I find evidence against the null in favor
of the alternative of stationarity in 10 cantons. Given that Switzerland has a total of
26 cantons, I still do not reject the null of unit roots in the majority of cantons for all
variables. I therefore proceed under the assumption that all my dependent variables are
integrated of order one. However, the results should be interpreted under the caveat that
the assumption of unit roots might not hold perfectly in case of revenues per available
rooms.
For my explanatory variables, I report the results of the ADF test in Table 3.3. The
size of the test statistics as well as the corresponding large p-values confirm that all
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variables are integrated of order one in all cantons, independently of the significance level
applied.
3.3.2 Cointegration Tests
Given that all my variables are integrated of order one, the next step is to test them for
cointegration. For this purpose, I use four panel data cointegration tests developed by
Westerlund (2007). All tests are based on the following regression model:
∆yi,t = δ
′
idt + αi(yi,t−1 − β′ixi,t−1) +
pi∑
j=1
αij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=0
γij∆xi,t−j + εi,t (3.9)
Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the adjustment coefficient αi is equal to
zero, i.e. H0 : αi = 0. If there is cointegration between the variables, the null is rejected
in favor of the alternative hypothesis, which is given by Ha : αi < 0. The four tests differ
in their assumptions about αi. Two tests assume that the adjustment coefficient is the
same for all panels, i.e. αi = α. In contrast to these so-called group-mean tests, another
set of tests allows αi to differ across panels. In the latter case, the alternative hypothesis
postulates that αi < 0 for at least one panel. For this reason, those tests are called panel
tests.16
The group-mean tests are calculated in a three-step procedure. First, Equation (3.9)
is estimated for all panels separately. The resulting residuals, εˆi,t, and the resulting
coefficients, γˆij, are used in a second step to obtain uˆi,t =
∑pi
j=0 γˆij∆xi,t−j + εˆi,t. The long-
run variances of uˆi,t and ∆yi,t are denoted by ωˆui and ωˆyi respectively and are estimated
following Newey and West (1994). In a third step, the test statistics are defined as:
Gτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
αˆi
SE(αˆi)
(3.10)
Gα =
1
N
N∑
i=1
T αˆi
αˆi(1)
(3.11)
where αˆi(1) = ωˆuiωˆyi is the ratio of the long-run variances computed in step 2.
The panel tests are constructed under the assumption that α is identical for all panels.
Accordingly, the test statistics are given by:
Pτ =
αˆ
SE(αˆ)
(3.12)
16See Persyn and Westerlund (2008) for a more detailed description of the method.
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and
Pα = T αˆ (3.13)
In my baseline specification, the test statistics are based on Equation (3.9) with yi,t
being one of my tourism variables, such as arrivals, overnight stays, bed and room occu-
pancy rates, and revenues per available room. xi,t contains either the real or the nominal
effective exchange rate, as well as real effective GDP. I choose the lag length based on the
Akaike information criterion, and I allow for a canton-specific constant in the cointegration
relationship.
Table 3.4: Cointegration tests for baseline specification
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -2.48 (0.01) -3.42 (0.00) -2.93 (0.00) -3.00 (0.00) -2.74 (0.00)
Gα -12.79 (0.00) -17.50 (0.00) -15.25 (0.00) -15.90 (0.00) -11.69 (0.02)
Pτ -11.28 (0.01) -14.06 (0.00) -14.46 (0.00) -14.02 (0.00) -11.00 (0.01)
Pα -11.79 (0.00) -16.29 (0.00) -17.10 (0.00) -17.22 (0.00) -13.54 (0.00)
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -2.52 (0.00) -3.57 (0.00) -3.03 (0.00) -2.95 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00)
Gα -12.21 (0.01) -17.66 (0.00) -15.47 (0.00) -16.07 (0.00) -12.93 (0.00)
Pτ -12.03 (0.00) -14.69 (0.00) -14.55 (0.00) -14.37 (0.00) -11.34 (0.01)
Pα -13.10 (0.00) -17.09 (0.00) -17.07 (0.00) -17.44 (0.00) -13.61 (0.00)
Notes: Test statistics from the panel data cointegration tests by Westerlund (2007) including a
canton-specific constant. Lag length determined by the Akaike information criterion. p-values in
parentheses. Under the null hypothesis, the variables are not cointegrated.
Table 3.4 reports the test statistics given in Equations (3.10)-(3.13) for my baseline
specification. The upper panel shows the results for the model with the real effective
exchange rate as an explanatory variable, and the lower panel presents the test statistics
for the model with the nominal effective exchange rate. In both regressions, I additionally
control for real effective GDP. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is clearly rejected
in all cases. This result is mostly robust to the inclusion of a panel-specific linear time
trend. Table 3.A.2 in the Appendix reports the corresponding test statistics. In that case,
one out of the four tests, the group-mean test Gα, fails to reject the null for revenues per
available room for both nominal and real effective exchange rates. Given that the unit
root tests in Section 3.3.1 are ambiguous for revenues per available room, this result is
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not surprising. For the model of arrivals and the real exchange rate, the Gα test is also
not able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. However, given that the p-value
of 0.28 is still rather low and that the other three tests provide strong evidence in favor of
the alternative hypothesis, I proceed under the assumption of cointegration for arrivals.
In a next step, I add time fixed effects to Equation (3.9). As shown in Table 3.5, the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is strongly rejected for all dependent variables. When
I include a canton-specific linear time trend in addition to the time dummies, I still find
cointegration for all variables except for revenues per available room, for which the tests
are again indecisive (see Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix).
All in all, I conclude that there is a cointegration relationship between my tourism
variables, effective exchange rates, and real effective GDP. However, for revenues per
available room, some caution is required because the results are ambiguous.
Table 3.5: Cointegration tests for specification with time fixed effects
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -2.78 (0.00) -3.03 (0.00) -3.03 (0.00) -2.78 (0.00) -2.95 (0.00)
Gα -14.59 (0.00) -15.82 (0.00) -16.91 (0.00) -14.91 (0.00) -13.29 (0.00)
Pτ -15.01 (0.00) -13.55 (0.00) -16.02 (0.00) -15.22 (0.00) -12.92 (0.00)
Pα -14.51 (0.00) -13.74 (0.00) -17.91 (0.00) -16.01 (0.00) -12.92 (0.00)
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -2.80 (0.00) -2.93 (0.00) -2.79 (0.00) -2.45 (0.01) -2.97 (0.00)
Gα -14.22 (0.00) -14.07 (0.00) -15.44 (0.00) -12.66 (0.00) -11.64 (0.02)
Pτ -15.24 (0.00) -13.82 (0.00) -15.51 (0.00) -14.06 (0.00) -13.68 (0.00)
Pα -14.60 (0.00) -13.97 (0.00) -17.36 (0.00) -14.84 (0.00) -13.41 (0.00)
Notes: Test statistics from the panel data cointegration tests by Westerlund (2007) including a
canton-specific constant and time fixed effects. Lag length determined by the Akaike information
criterion. p-values in parentheses. Under the null hypothesis, the variables are not cointegrated.
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3.3.3 Panel Error Correction Model
Given that my variables are cointegrated, I estimate the following baseline panel error
correction model (PECM):17
∆ln(Yi,t) = φi [ln(Yi,t−1)− β1ln(EERi,t−1)− β2ln(REGDPi,t−1)− µi − ρt] (3.14)
+
p−1∑
j=1
η˜ij∆ln(Yi,t−j) +
p−1∑
j=0
κ˜ij∆ln(EERi,t−j) +
p−1∑
j=0
δ˜ij∆ln(REGDPi,t−j) + γi + ε˜i,t
where ∆ denotes the difference with respect to the previous quarter. The term in the
square brackets is the error correction equation, which describes the long-run (cointegra-
tion) relationship between the variables. Under the assumption of weak exogeneity, φi
can be interpreted as the speed of adjustment after a deviation from equilibrium.18 Y is
a seasonally adjusted tourism measure, such as arrivals, overnight stays, bed and room
occupancy rates, or revenues per available room. REGDP represents the canton-specific
basket of seasonally adjusted real GDP in tourists’ countries of origin. It controls for
demand shocks due to a change in tourists’ income. EER is the nominal or real effective
exchange rate, depending on the specification. γi allows for a linear time trend in the level
of the variables. Analogously, ρ permits the cointegration relationship to be stationary
around a linear time trend.19 µi is a canton fixed effect. In addition to this baseline
specification, I also conduct a robustness check in which I estimate Equation (3.14) with
time fixed effects. In that case, the linear time trend in the cointegration relationship,
which is assumed to be common to all cantons, becomes redundant.
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. Due to the log-log specification, β1 can
be directly interpreted as long-run exchange rate elasticity and β2 as long-run income
elasticity of the tourism variable Y . Exchange rates are defined such that an increase
corresponds to an appreciation of foreign currencies with respect to the Swiss franc. In
that case, Swiss tourism services become cheaper for foreigners, and therefore I expect
β1 > 0. A higher real GDP in tourists’ countries of origin is also expected to increase
demand of Swiss tourism services, and I therefore hypothesize that β2 > 0. The speed of
17The tilde on top of the coefficients does not have a particular meaning. Its only purpose is to
emphasize that the parameters and the error term in the PECM model in Equation (3.14) are not
identical to their counterparts in the ARDL model in Equation (3.7).
18The assumption of weak exogeneity might be violated in my case due to the fact that the weights I
use in the construction of effective exchange rates and real effective GDP are time-varying. In a robustness
check, I therefore use ex-ante fixed weights from the year 2003. As is documented in Section 3.4.2, the
resulting coefficients for the adjustment speed are almost identical in both estimations. This is reassuring
and indicates that the weak exogeneity assumption is reasonable.
19Including a linear time trend in the long-run relationship is standard in the literature, see e.g.
Bonham, Gangnes, and Zhou (2009), Moore (2010), and Falk (2013a).
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adjustment parameter, on the other hand, should be significantly negative, i.e. φi < 0.
Otherwise, the system does not return to its long-run equilibrium after a deviation, which
implies that there exists no cointegration relationship.
I estimate Equation (3.14) using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator developed
by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). Identification is based on the assumption that long-
run coefficients are the same for all cantons, whereas short-run coefficients and standard
errors are allowed to be canton specific. In doing so, the PMG estimator combines the
advantages of a classical dynamic fixed effects model, which pools the data and restricts
all coefficients to be identical across panels, and a mean group approach that estimates
the regression separately for every canton.
All parameters are estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure.20 The lag length
is chosen based on the Schwarz Bayesian and Akaike information criterion. Given the
panel structure of my data, one might want to work with cluster-robust standard errors.
However, to the best of my knowledge, clustering has not been justified in the PMG
setting.21
3.4 Results
In this section, I present the results from my estimation of Equation (3.14). I furthermore
provide several robustness checks in which I use different measures for my explanatory
variables. Last but not least, I introduce time fixed effects into my baseline specification.
In each case, the estimation is conducted separately for real and nominal exchange rates.
3.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.6 shows the results from my baseline estimation for real exchange rates. The
upper panel of the table reports the long-run coefficients, and the lower panel contains
the short-run effects. Every column presents the results for a different dependent variable.
My main parameter of interest is the exchange rate elasticity, which is given by the long-
run coefficient on the effective exchange rate. It is positive and highly significant for
each of my five tourism variables. According to my estimates, a real depreciation of the
Swiss franc by one percent increases tourist arrivals by 1.03 percent, overnight stays by
0.49 percent, bed and room occupancy rates by 0.82 and 0.84 percent respectively, and
revenues per available room by 1.54 percent. The adjustment coefficients, on the other
hand, are all significantly negative and lie between -0.36 and -0.51. Under the assumption
20See Blackburne and Frank (2007) for a detailed description of the implementation in Stata.
21I thank Jeff Wooldridge for confirming this point.
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of weak exogeneity, they can be interpreted as the speed of adjustment back to the long-
run equilibrium after a shock. Thus, an adjustment parameter of -0.37 for arrivals means
that if the system is out of its long-run equilibrium, 37 percent of the (remaining) deviation
is corrected in each quarter. I find a higher adjustment speed for occupancy rates and
revenues per available room than for arrivals and overnight stays.
Although my primary focus lies on exchange rate effects, it is worth mentioning that
the long-run coefficients on real effective GDP all have the expected positive sign or are
insignificant. This is remarkable because the previous literature has found it difficult to
obtain reasonable parameter estimates for GDP. Abrahamsen and Simmons-Süer (2011)
find that for most countries of origin, the coefficient on the demand variable is either
insignificant or has an unexpected sign. Bonham, Gangnes, and Zhou (2009) also seem
to have trouble with their coefficient on real GDP as they have to restrict it in order to
get economically plausible results. It is reassuring that my estimation method does not
share the difficulties encountered by the previous literature.
Even in the short run, almost all of my coefficients on REGDP are significantly posi-
tive. In contrast, my short-run coefficients on REER are mostly insignificant, confirming
that it may take some time for exchange rate fluctuations to affect tourism. Furthermore,
I find a significantly negative autocorrelation for all my dependent variables.
Table 3.7 reports the baseline results for nominal exchange rates. I find highly sig-
nificant long-run exchange rate elasticities of 0.60 for arrivals, 0.47 for overnight stays,
0.92 and 0.85 for bed and room occupancy rates respectively, and 0.87 for revenues per
available room. Thus, my estimates for real and nominal exchange rates are similar in
magnitude for overnight stays and occupancy rates. In the case of arrivals and revenues
per available room, the coefficients are lower for nominal exchange rates. As to the
adjustment coefficient, I find slightly higher estimates in the case of nominal exchange
rates for all variables except arrivals. Moreover, the long-run coefficients on REGDP
are all positive, which again makes my approach stand out compared to previous studies.
The short-run estimates give rise to the same conclusions as in the specification with
real exchange rates. I find significantly positive coefficients on REGDP and consistently
negative autoregressive parameters. The short-run effect of NEER on tourism is again
inconclusive.
The exchange rate elasticities computed based on my approach are at the lower bound
of bilateral estimates documented in previous studies.22 In order to understand this
difference, it is important to note that my exchange rate elasticities are calculated with
respect to an entire basket of currencies, whereas previous estimates focus on bilateral
22The most recent estimates of bilateral exchange rate elasticities for overnight stays in Switzerland are
provided by Abrahamsen and Simmons-Süer (2011). They range from 0.45 to 1.83 for nominal exchange
rates and from 0.52 to 2.32 for real exchange rates.
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exchange rates. Therefore, my results have to be interpreted as aggregate elasticities for
all tourist groups. In that sense, my estimates reflect the actual situation of the tourism
sector by taking into account the possibility of substitution across tourists from different
countries of origin. In Switzerland, this has been a very important factor lately. In 2014
for example, the depreciation of the euro led to a decline in tourists coming from the
Euro Area. However, this reduction was compensated by an increase in overnight stays
by tourists from Asia and Switzerland (see Tagesanzeiger 2015), which resulted in an
overall positive growth rate of Swiss tourism in 2014. This implies that it is important to
consider all tourist groups at the same time when analyzing the general situation of the
tourism sector.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I perform several robustness checks. I refer to the results from my
baseline specification reported in the previous subsection as my benchmark to which
I compare the findings from the robustness exercises. Every robustness check reports two
tables: the results for real exchange rates and the results for nominal exchange rates. All
corresponding regression tables are collected in the Appendix.
Different Normalization of GDP
In my first robustness check, I explore the impact of different GDP normalization proce-
dures on my estimates. As indicated in Section 3.2.2, initial real GDP can be normalized
in different ways. In my benchmark specification, I set PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of
the US to 100 in the year 1999. In this robustness check, I use PPP-adjusted aggregate
instead of per capita GDP. Tables 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 demonstrate that the exchange rate
elasticity estimates and adjustment coefficients from my baseline specification are robust.
In a second robustness check, I normalize real GDP for every country of origin to 100 in
the year 1999. In doing so, I do not have to make any assumptions about how to compare
different levels of GDP across countries. Moreover, they are completely independent of
past exchange rates. I again find that my exchange rate elasticity estimates from the
baseline specification are robust (see Tables 3.A.6 and 3.A.7).
Weights with Eight Lags
Tables 3.A.8 and 3.A.9 report results for the baseline specification when I use eight instead
of four lags in my weighting procedure. All exchange rate elasticity coefficients remain
highly significant and are in the same range as in the benchmark case.
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Removing Business Cantons
One might suspect that my results are biased due to cantons that are visited by many
business travelers. This group of tourists is expected to be less sensitive to classical deter-
minants of tourism demand. Instead, the decision to take a business trip rather depends
on company-specific or general macroeconomic factors. Therefore, I perform a robustness
check in which I exclude the cantons with the three largest cities in Switzerland, i.e. the
canton of Basel-Stadt, the canton of Genf, and the canton of Zürich. The corresponding
results are presented in Tables 3.A.10 and 3.A.11. All in all, the results are robust. If
anything, the exchange rate elasticities and the adjustment speed slightly increase after
removing business cantons. This confirms the intuition that business travelers react less
to exchange rates than the average tourist. However, quantitatively, the impact on the
coefficients is very small, and I thus conclude that my benchmark results are robust to
the exclusion of the cantons with the three largest cities in Switzerland.
Excluding Tourists from Japan and Russia
In my benchmark estimation, I only include tourists from countries whose share in total
Swiss tourism exceeds three percent. In this robustness check, I increase this cutoff to five
percent, which leads to the exclusion of Japan and Russia. The results from my baseline
specification are largely unaffected by this new cutoff (see Tables 3.A.12 and 3.A.13).
Overall, this provides further evidence for the conclusion that my baseline estimates are
robust.
Constant Exchange Rate for Swiss Tourists
When computing the exchange rate basket for every canton, I have to make an assump-
tion about the exchange rate faced by Swiss tourists. In the benchmark case, I use a
weighted average of the exchange rates of the Swiss franc against the currencies of the
most important Swiss tourism destinations. Alternatively, one might assume that travel
decisions of Swiss tourists within Switzerland are not affected by exchange rates. In this
robustness check, I therefore hold the exchange rate for Swiss tourists constant at 100 for
all points in time. Tables 3.A.14 and 3.A.15 report the corresponding results, which yield
roughly identical exchange rate coefficients as in the benchmark case. The adjustment
coefficients are also highly robust in both cases.
Ex-Ante Fixed Shares
One might be worried that my weights are endogenous because they are allowed to change
over time. To some extent, this concern is mitigated by the fact that I use a minimum of
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four lags of the shares when I construct the weights. Nevertheless, I conduct a robustness
check in which I use constant average shares of the year 2003 as weights in my calculation
of REGDP , REER, and NEER. The results for the baseline specification with these
ex-ante fixed shares are presented in Tables 3.A.16 and 3.A.17. The estimated exchange
rate elasticities are largely unchanged.
Time Fixed Effects
In my last robustness check, I introduce time fixed effects into Equation (3.14). The corre-
sponding estimation results for real exchange rates are presented in Table 3.A.18. In that
case, the exchange rate elasticity estimates for all but one variable become insignificant.
For overnight stays, the sign of the coefficient reverses and is now equal to −2.70 and
highly significant. The estimated adjustment speed increases slightly for all variables, but
is in general still in the same range as in the baseline estimation. The pattern is similar
for nominal exchange rates. Results in Table 3.A.19 reveal significantly negative nominal
exchange rate elasticity estimates for arrivals, overnight stays, and room occupancy rates,
whereas the coefficients for bed occupancy rates and revenues per available room are not
significant. The adjustment coefficients are again in the same range as in the benchmark
specification.
The negative long-run exchange rate elasticities that I find for the specification with
time fixed effects are highly implausible. They suggest that an appreciation of the Swiss
franc attracts more tourists, which contradicts basic economic theories of demand. In the
following section, I therefore discuss possible explanations for this sign reversal.
3.5 Discussion
The previous subsection documents that my benchmark results are highly robust to al-
ternative measures of explanatory variables and to a number of different specifications.
However, once I add time fixed effects, most coefficients become insignificant or negative.
In the following, I show that this counterintuitive result is driven by the fact that there
is a large common component in effective exchange rates across cantons. After removing
this common factor by introducing time fixed effects, the variation is no longer sufficient
to identify the relationship between exchange rates and tourism.
Some illustrative evidence for this argument is presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. From
these plots, it becomes apparent that there is a large common component in real and
nominal effective exchange rates of different cantons. Panel summary statistics reported
in Table 3.8 confirm this finding. The standard deviation between cantons is very small
relative to the one within cantons. Thus, most of the variation in effective exchange rates
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comes from within cantons. Furthermore, the overall and the within variances are almost
identical.
Table 3.8: Summary statistics for effective exchange rates
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
overall 100.8511 5.432827 85.74796 112.306
REER between 0.628873 99.60287 102.5921
within 5.397679 86.99615 111.2945
overall 91.39194 7.462152 72.82052 101.7629
NEER between 1.749884 87.20607 94.16369
within 7.261973 77.00639 103.3001
Together with the fact that there is substantial variation in the shares of different
tourist groups across cantons (as shown in Table 3.1), the above findings suggest that
there must be an important common factor driving bilateral Swiss franc exchange rates.
Interestingly, this is exactly what previous research documents. Specifically, the literature
argues that the Swiss franc is a safe haven currency (see e.g. Grisse and Nitschka 2013,
Hoffmann and Suter 2010, and Ranaldo and Söderlind 2010). A typical characteristic of
such a currency is that its bilateral exchange rates respond to global shocks, which can
lead to a comovement between them.23 For this reason, most of the variation in effective
exchange rates is common to all cantons, making the specification with time fixed effects
too demanding for the data at hand.
In Section 3.A.2 in the Appendix, I further strengthen this argument by documenting
that the coefficients from the estimation with time fixed effects are highly unstable and
very sensitive to small changes in the data. For this purpose, I conduct all of the robustness
checks from the previous section for the case with time fixed effects. Depending on the
specification, the effects explode, disappear, or even reverse. In some cases, the estimates
for real and nominal exchange rates furthermore contradict each other. This confirms
that there is an identification problem inherent in the estimation with time fixed effects.
It is worth emphasizing that it is only the parameters of the cointegration equation
and not the adjustment coefficients that become unstable in the estimation with time
fixed effects. This leads to the conjecture that the non-stationarity in the data is mostly
driven by the common component in bilateral exchange rates.
23Hoffmann and Suter (2010) document that the Swiss franc was a safe haven currency with respect
to the US and Canadian dollar and with respect to the British pound in the time period between 1990
and 2009. Moreover, Grisse and Nitschka (2013) find that in the recent past, the Swiss franc appreciated
against the euro and traditional carry trade currencies in times of increased global uncertainty.
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The fact that I cannot control for time fixed effects might raise concerns about a possi-
ble omitted variable bias caused by unobserved aggregate variables that affect all cantons
in the same way. However, due to the super-consistency property of the parameters from
cointegration regressions, omitted variables should not be a problem in my setting. As
demonstrated by Stock (1987), the estimator of the cointegration coefficients converges
to its true value much faster than estimators from regressions with stationary time se-
ries.24 Thus, it is not necessary to include any stationary variables in the cointegration
relationship. Nevertheless, since this is an asymptotic result, there might still be a bias
in finite samples. Therefore, in Section 3.A.3 in the Appendix, I conduct an exercise that
disentangles the relative importance of the average exchange rate and possible omitted
variables. I document that all real exchange rate elasticities from the estimation with
time fixed effects can be replicated by simply including the average real exchange rate
over all cantons as an additional explanatory variable in the baseline estimation without
time fixed effects. The same is true in the case of nominal exchange rates for arrivals and
overnight stays. This suggests that for these variables, there is no major omitted variable
bias in my baseline estimation, even if I do not control for time fixed effects.
Based on these findings, I conclude that the exchange rate elasticity estimates from my
baseline specification are reliable even without controlling for time fixed effects.25 They
are largely unbiased and highly robust.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate exchange rate elasticities for tourism in Switzerland. For this
purpose, I use quarterly panel data across cantons, ranging from 2005 to 2013. Each
canton’s effective exchange rate is defined as a weighted average of bilateral exchange
rates, using past shares of tourists from different countries of origin as a measure of
exposure. The presence of a cointegration relationship between my variables allows me
to analyze the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on Swiss tourism using a panel error
correction model. Identification is based on the assumption that short-run dynamics are
canton-specific, whereas long-run coefficients are common to all cantons.
In my baseline estimation, I allow for canton fixed effects and a linear time trend. I find
real (nominal) long-run exchange rate elasticities of 1.03 (0.60) for tourist arrivals, 0.49
(0.47) for overnight stays, 0.82 (0.92) and 0.84 (0.85) for bed and room occupancy rates
respectively, and 1.54 (0.87) for revenues per available room. The estimated adjustment
24Specifically, cointegration estimators converge at a rate of T 1, whereas standard OLS estimators for
stationary time series converge at a rate of T 1/2.
25The fact that I do not include time fixed effects in my estimation does not mean that I simply pool
the data. In particular, I allow for canton-specific adjustment coefficients and short-run dynamics.
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speed ranges from 30 to 56 percent. My results are highly robust to alternative weighting
schemes and to various specifications.
I furthermore show that there is a strong common factor driving effective exchange
rates of all cantons. Therefore, it is not possible to control for time fixed effects. There is
simply not enough variation left after removing the common component by introducing
time dummies. However, based on the super-consistency property of cointegration pa-
rameters, my baseline estimates without time fixed effects should be free of any omitted
variable bias. In order to mitigate concerns about the fact that this asymptotic result
might not hold in my finite sample, I additionally conduct an exercise which shows that
my baseline results are indeed reliable and largely unbiased.
My findings have several policy implications. First of all, it is important to note
that my exchange rate elasticities for overnight stays are at the lower bound of existing
estimates. An important reason for this is that I use an entire exchange rate basket,
whereas the previous literature focuses on bilateral exchange rates only. In doing so,
my approach accounts for the possibility of substitution across different tourist groups.
This suggests that cantons are to some extent able to absorb the negative effects of an
appreciation of the Swiss franc by changing the composition of the tourists that they
attract. However, this practice quickly reaches its limit. The reason for this lies in the
second policy implication. Specifically, my findings show that even though tourist shares
vary substantially across cantons, there is a large common component in effective exchange
rates that affects all cantons at the same time. This implies that policies aimed at the
mitigation of the adverse effects of the strong Swiss franc on tourism should tackle the
problem on a more aggregate level.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Data
Table 3.A.1: Data sources for explanatory variables
Country Exchange Rate Consumer Price
Index
Real GDP
Switzerland Swiss National Bank
(2015)
OECD (2015a) OECD (2015b)
Euro Area Swiss National Bank
(2015)
Eurostat (2015b) Eurostat (2015a)
United Kingdom Swiss National Bank
(2015)
OECD (2015a) Eurostat (2015a)
United States Swiss National Bank
(2015)
OECD (2015a) Eurostat (2015a)
India Swiss National Bank
(2015)
OECD (2015a) World Bank (2015a)
China Bloomberg (2015) OECD (2015a) National Bureau of
Statistics of China (2015)
Japan Bloomberg (2015) OECD (2015a) OECD (2015b)
Russia Swiss National Bank
(2015)
OECD (2015a) OECD (2015b)
In the following, I address a few additional issues concerning my data.
• Exchange Rates:
Daily and monthly data are converted to a quarterly frequency by taking averages
over the entire time period.
• Real GDP:
For India, only yearly GDP is available. I linearly interpolate the missing values in
order to get quarterly data.
• Euro Area:
The Euro Area is continuously expanding. For my analysis, it is important that I
refer to the same group of countries for the entire time period. Therefore, I use the
definition of the Euro Area as of 2001. This includes the following twelve countries:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. My measure ignores Slovenia (joined in 2007),
Cyprus and Malta (joined in 2008), Slovakia (joined in 2009), Estonia (joined in
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2011), and Latvia (joined in 2014). However, the share of these countries in total
overnight stays of tourists from the Euro Area only amounts to 1.3 percent in 2014
and is therefore negligible.
3.A.2 Robustness Checks with Time Fixed Effects
The goal of this section is to shed more light on the origin of the counterintuitive results
found in the estimation with time fixed effects. For this purpose, I redo all my robustness
checks for the specification with time fixed effects. For the sake of clarity, I do not compare
the coefficients from the robustness checks with time fixed effects to the benchmark results
without time fixed effects. Therefore, in this section, the term ‘benchmark’ always refers
to the original specification with time fixed effects, as reported in Tables 3.A.18 and
3.A.19.
Different Normalization of GDP
If I rely on aggregate instead of per capita GDP in my normalization, most of the coeffi-
cients change their sign or significance level compared to the benchmark results with time
fixed effects (see Tables 3.A.20 and 3.A.21). In the benchmark specification with time
fixed effects for real exchange rates, the only coefficient that is significantly different from
zero is the elasticity for overnight stays. With this alternative normalization technique,
the opposite is the case. The exchange rate elasticity for overnight stays is estimated to
be -0.04 (compared to -2.70 in the benchmark case), whereas the coefficients for arrivals
and room occupancy rates become significant. Furthermore, their sign is reversed. The
real exchange rate elasticity for arrivals is equal to -1.09 (compared to 0.37 in the bench-
mark case), and for room occupancy rates it is equal to 1.34 (compared to -0.29 in the
benchmark case). For nominal exchange rates, the picture looks similar. A small change
in the normalization of real GDP leads to a large shift in the coefficients when I include
time fixed effects.
If I normalize GDP for every country of origin to 100 in the year 1999, then the change
in the coefficients in the estimation with time fixed effects is even more extreme than under
the previous alternative normalization. The corresponding results for real and nominal
exchange rates are presented in Tables 3.A.22 and 3.A.23. As opposed to the benchmark
estimates with time fixed effects, I now find positive exchange rate elasticities for all
variables. They are highly significant for arrivals and overnight stays in the specification
with real exchange rates and for occupancy rates in the case of nominal exchange rates.
Thus, with time fixed effects, the resulting exchange rate elasticities vary dramatically
depending on the normalization technique used, whereas the adjustment coefficients do
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not change.
Weights with Eight Lags
The use of eight instead of four lags in my weighting procedure does not have a large
impact on the results for real exchange rates, as is shown in Table 3.A.24. However, the
estimated nominal exchange rate elasticities displayed in Table 3.A.25 differ substantially
from the benchmark results with time fixed effects. Specifically, some of them are no longer
significantly different from zero, whereas others suddenly become significant. Adjustment
coefficients, on the other hand, are highly robust.
Removing Business Cantons
Removing business cantons from my sample does not change the coefficients compared to
the estimation with time fixed effects, as is shown in Tables 3.A.26 and 3.A.27.
Excluding Tourists from Japan and Russia
In this robustness check, I exclude Japan and Russia from tourists’ countries of origin by
raising the cutoff of the share in total Swiss tourism from three to five percent. As reported
in Tables 3.A.28 and 3.A.29, this has an effect on some coefficients in the estimation with
time fixed effects compared to the benchmark. Specifically, the exchange rate elasticity for
revenues per available room becomes highly significant and positive for both nominal and
real exchange rates, whereas the coefficient on nominal exchange rates for room occupancy
rates becomes insignificant. The adjustment coefficients are not affected. Overall, this
provides further evidence for the conclusion that my estimates with time fixed effects are
not robust.
Constant Exchange Rate for Swiss Tourists
Holding the Swiss franc exchange rate faced by Swiss tourists constant at 100 leads to
changes in the coefficients for real exchange rates, as is documented in Table 3.A.30. While
in the benchmark case with time fixed effects exchange rate elasticities for occupancy rates
are found to be close to zero and insignificant, they are now significantly negative. For
nominal exchange rates, on the other hand, the estimates are roughly identical to the ones
from the benchmark case with time fixed effects (see Table 3.A.31).
Ex-Ante Fixed Shares
In this last robustness check, I fix the weights used in the calculation of the explanatory
variables on their average level from the year 2003. Tables 3.A.32 and 3.A.33 show that
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with this specification, the coefficients on the real exchange rate for occupancy rates and
revenues per available room explode. The elasticities range between 7 and 14 percent.
For nominal exchange rates, the coefficients on the latter two variables increase as well,
but not as extremely as in the case with real exchange rates. The exchange rate elasticity
for arrivals turns highly negative. All in all, the results for real and nominal exchange
rates have contradicting implications for tourism. The adjustment speed, on the other
hand, is highly robust in both specifications.
Conclusion
The findings from this section confirm that there is an identification problem inherent in
the specification with time fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are highly unstable and
sensitive to small changes in the data. Given that the baseline results from the benchmark
estimation without time fixed effects are very robust (as demonstrated in Section 3.4.2),
this suggests that the identification problem in the specification with time fixed effects is
driven by the fact that most of the variation in effective exchange rates is common to all
cantons. This issue is further discussed in Section 3.5.
3.A.3 Test for Omitted Variables
In this subsection, I conduct an exercise to disentangle the effects of aggregate (average)
exchange rates and potential omitted variables. My approach is based on the following
argument. If there were no omitted variables on the aggregate level, then time fixed
effects would simply capture the common component in the effective exchange rates of
all cantons. In that case, an estimation with time fixed effects would be equivalent to
a specification that controls for the average effective exchange rate across all cantons at
every point in time. If both models – the one with time fixed effects and the one with
the average effective exchange rate as an additional control – yield the same coefficient
estimates, then this can be interpreted as evidence for the fact that there are no major
omitted variables present on the aggregate level.
In order to perform this exercise, I first compute the average of effective exchange
rates over all cantons at every point in time:
AV REERt =
1
26
26∑
i=1
REERi,t (3.A.1)
AV NEERt =
1
26
26∑
i=1
NEERi,t (3.A.2)
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In a next step, I include AV REER and AV NEER as an additional explanatory
variable in my baseline specification for real and nominal exchange rates respectively.
The results for the real exchange rate are given in Table 3.A.34. The coefficients on
the canton-specific effective exchange rates are remarkably similar to the ones from the
estimation with time fixed effects. Consider, for example, the real exchange rate elasticity
for overnight stays. In the specification with time fixed effects (see Table 3.A.18), it is
significantly negative and equal to −2.70. If I control for AV REER instead of time fixed
effects, the resulting coefficient is −2.91. The exchange rate elasticities for the other four
dependent variables are insignificant in both models. The fact that I can replicate the
pattern of coefficient estimates from the specification with time fixed effects by simply
including the average effective exchange rate as a control confirms that there are no major
omitted variables on the aggregate level. This is reassuring because it suggests that I am
able to identify the unbiased real exchange rate elasticities in my baseline specification
without including time fixed effects.
The results for nominal exchange rates are reported in Table 3.A.35. For arrivals and
overnight stays, I am again able to replicate the significantly negative coefficients from my
specification with time fixed effects (see Table 3.A.19) by simply including AV NEER as
a control variable. Thus, my nominal exchange rate elasticities for arrivals and overnight
stays from my estimation without time fixed effects do not seem to be subject to a
major omitted variable bias. For occupancy rates and revenues per available room, the
picture is less clear. Whereas time fixed effects lead to insignificant coefficients for the
bed occupancy rate and revenues per available room, the specification with AV NEER
yields significantly negative estimates for these variables. For the room occupancy rate,
the opposite is the case. Thus, some caution is required when interpreting the nominal
exchange rate elasticities for occupancy rates and revenues per available room.
The fact that I can replicate almost all coefficients from the specification with time
fixed effects simply by controlling for average effective exchange rates mitigates concerns
about potential omitted variables on the aggregate level.
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3.A.4 Tables
Table 3.A.2: Cointegration tests for baseline specification with trend
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -3.10 (0.00) -3.99 (0.00) -3.71 (0.00) -3.67 (0.00) -3.05 (0.00)
Gα -14.47 (0.28) -19.61 (0.00) -18.67 (0.00) -19.28 (0.00) -12.39 (0.81)
Pτ -14.65 (0.00) -16.65 (0.00) -15.92 (0.00) -16.38 (0.00) -13.09 (0.06)
Pα -17.13 (0.00) -20.67 (0.00) -20.48 (0.00) -22.27 (0.00) -16.81 (0.00)
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -3.35 (0.00) -4.10 (0.00) -3.79 (0.00) -3.46 (0.00) -2.91 (0.01)
Gα -15.53 (0.09) -20.35 (0.00) -19.17 (0.00) -19.28 (0.00) -12.59 (0.77)
Pτ -15.32 (0.00) -17.71 (0.00) -16.85 (0.00) -17.15 (0.00) -13.49 (0.02)
Pα -17.78 (0.00) -21.99 (0.00) -21.33 (0.00) -22.68 (0.00) -16.16 (0.00)
Notes: Test statistics from the panel data cointegration tests by Westerlund (2007) including a
canton-specific constant and a linear time trend. Lag length determined by the Akaike information
criterion. p-values in parentheses. Under the null hypothesis, the variables are not cointegrated.
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Table 3.A.3: Cointegration tests for specification with time fixed effects and trend
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -3.38 (0.00) -3.31 (0.00) -3.40 (0.00) -3.07 (0.00) -3.09 (0.00)
Gα -17.29 (0.01) -18.17 (0.00) -19.02 (0.00) -17.78 (0.00) -13.52 (0.53)
Pτ -18.09 (0.00) -18.05 (0.00) -17.98 (0.00) -17.47 (0.00) -14.63 (0.00)
Pα -19.66 (0.00) -20.60 (0.00) -20.90 (0.00) -19.31 (0.00) -14.93 (0.00)
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Arrivals Nights Bed OR Room OR Revenues
Value p Value p Value p Value p Value p
Gτ -3.28 (0.00) -3.23 (0.00) -3.23 (0.00) -3.40 (0.00) -2.94 (0.01)
Gα -17.12 (0.01) -17.87 (0.00) -18.77 (0.00) -19.58 (0.00) -11.33 (0.95)
Pτ -17.40 (0.00) -17.97 (0.00) -17.31 (0.00) -16.95 (0.00) -10.64 (0.87)
Pα -18.91 (0.00) -20.74 (0.00) -20.29 (0.00) -19.42 (0.00) -9.75 (0.71)
Notes: Test statistics from the panel data cointegration tests by Westerlund (2007) including a
canton-specific constant, a linear time trend, and time fixed effects. Lag length determined by the
Akaike information criterion. p-values in parentheses. Under the null hypothesis, the variables are
not cointegrated.
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Table
3.A
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esults
for
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d
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E
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1
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(0.24)
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(0.31)
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E
G
D
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(0.06)
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Linear
tim
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trend
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o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
O
bservations
858
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754
N
otes:
Standard
errors
in
parentheses.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1.
D
ependent
variables
are
seasonally
adjusted
for
every
canton
prior
to
the
estim
ation.
Standard
errors
are
corrected
accordingly.
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Table
3.A
.23:
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esults
for
nom
inalexchange
rates
w
ith
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fixed
effects
and
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D
ependent
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seasonally
adjusted
for
every
canton
prior
to
the
estim
ation.
Standard
errors
are
corrected
accordingly.
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Table
3.A
.25:
R
esults
for
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inalexchange
rates
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ith
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effects
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Table
3.A
.31:
R
esults
for
nom
inalexchange
rates
w
ith
tim
e
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and
a
constant
exchange
rate
for
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tourists
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d
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1
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Linear
tim
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trend
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o
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o
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754
N
otes:
Standard
errors
in
parentheses.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1.
D
ependent
variables
are
seasonally
adjusted
for
every
canton
prior
to
the
estim
ation.
Standard
errors
are
corrected
accordingly.
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Table
3.A
.33:
R
esults
for
nom
inalexchange
rates
w
ith
tim
e
fixed
effects
and
ex-ante
fixed
shares
D
ep
en
d
ent
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ariab
le
(Y
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rrivals
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R
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oeff.
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oeff.
SE
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on
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n
coeffi
cients
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E
E
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ln
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E
G
D
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1
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djustm
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coeffi
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(φ)
-0.33***
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(0.15)
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cients
∆
ln
(Y
)
t−
1
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.39***
(0.08)
-0.24***
(0.08)
-0.32***
(0.07)
-0.19
(0.12)
∆
ln
(Y
)
t−
2
-0.32***
(0.05)
-0.31***
(0.08)
-0.23***
(0.07)
-0.25***
(0.07)
-0.17*
(0.09)
∆
ln
(Y
)
t−
3
-0.19***
(0.05)
-0.24***
(0.05)
-0.12**
(0.05)
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(0.05)
-0.09
(0.06)
∆
ln
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E
E
R
)
t
2.79
(2.66)
3.47
(2.13)
1.42
(1.99)
0.74
(1.65)
3.95*
(2.39)
∆
ln
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E
E
R
)
t−
1
-0.23
(2.74)
2.75**
(1.14)
3.74*
(2.15)
3.16*
(1.87)
3.53
(2.69)
∆
ln
(N
E
E
R
)
t−
2
5.88
(4.14)
-0.33
(1.69)
-1.46
(1.73)
-2.26
(2.08)
0.00
(2.97)
∆
ln
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E
E
R
)
t−
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(1.27)
1.16
(1.46)
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(1.52)
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-0.12
(1.61)
∆
ln
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E
G
D
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(6.48)
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(8.75)
-1.01
(8.40)
∆
ln
(R
E
G
D
P
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1
9.98
(9.56)
5.02
(6.50)
12.73
(8.53)
12.17
(9.35)
3.21
(7.79)
∆
ln
(R
E
G
D
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(7.34)
11.01
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(11.53)
20.74
(13.94)
C
anton
fixed
effects
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im
e
fixed
effects
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Linear
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trend
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o
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728
N
otes:
Standard
errors
in
parentheses.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1.
D
ependent
variables
are
seasonally
adjusted
for
every
canton
prior
to
the
estim
ation.
Standard
errors
are
corrected
accordingly.
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0.44
(1.65)
-1.02
(1.54)
2.25
(2.03)
∆
ln
(A
V
N
E
E
R
)
t−
1
0.62
(1.50)
0.59
(1.33)
1.08
(1.44)
1.20
(1.32)
3.41*
(1.82)
∆
ln
(A
V
N
E
E
R
)
t−
2
0.11
(1.60)
1.81
(1.92)
0.76
(1.72)
1.11
(2.10)
1.46
(1.83)
C
anton
fixed
effects
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
im
e
fixed
effects
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Linear
tim
e
trend
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bservations
858
858
858
858
754
N
otes:
Standard
errors
in
parentheses.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1.
D
ependent
variables
are
seasonally
adjusted
for
every
canton
prior
to
the
estim
ation.
Standard
errors
are
corrected
accordingly.
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